An Idea Whose Time Has Come
Keith Woods’ Nationalism: The Politics of Identity

1,989 words

Keith Woods
Nationalism: The Politics of Identity
Colverhill House Publishing, 2024

Late last year, Irish nationalist Keith Woods came out with an excellent new book of essays. In Nationalism: The Politics of Identity he covers some of the most important issues for the West today in an accessible and logical manner.

In one essay Mr. Woods argues that the only effective way to counter woke politics in the US is through overt white identity. He begins with recent events which have been hailed as victories against wokeness. Black Harvard president Claudine Gay resigned in January over plagiarism, after being targeted for her alleged tolerance of antisemitism. However, this was a narrow victory. She was replaced by Alan Garber, who was Jewish, but also supported “diversity, equity and inclusion” (DEI).

Mr. Woods argues against the idea that whites must only defend their own interests through proxies, such as opposing antisemitism. Woke policies are wrong because they discriminate against whites, and saying so is neither immoral nor impractical.

The argument from those promoting colorblind nationalism is that most people will never accept explicit talk of racial differences and white interests, but that in a meritocracy, whites will nevertheless have a dominant position. Therefore, the focus should be on equal treatment under the law.

The problem is that with equal treatment the disparities between whites and less capable minorities would be even more glaring than they are today. If we refuse to be explicit about racial differences in psychology, there will be no good explanation for this. It would lead to even greater complaints of “racism” and demands for special treatment, which colorblind whites would be in no position to resist.

Further, Mr. Woods argues that many people already recognize racial differences. One study found that in 2017 41% of Americans were aware that whites have higher average IQs than blacks, and this number increased to 59% for white conservatives. These numbers have presumably increased since then, as the issue can now be more openly discussed on the social media platform X and has been covered by prominent conservatives. This is also true of racial disparities in crime rates, which have been mentioned by Matt Walsh and Elon Musk. There is no reason to assume that race differences will remain taboo.

A related position is that racial differences could be discussed openly, but without explicit white identity politics. However, Mr. Woods argues that this still leaves whites at a disadvantage. Even if the facts were more widely known, minorities would never give up lobbying for their own people’s interests. Many whites, by contrast, still consider it wrong to side explicitly with their own race, even if they know the facts. If they do not abandon this mindset, they will never match their opponents’ fervor and are bound to lose.

In another essay Mr. Woods addresses an argument which has become popular among Irish journalists and politicians. Irish identity, many now claim, was never about the interests of the ethnic Irish people. The leader of Fianna Fáil, one of the two most prominent Irish political parties, recently uploaded a speech to X expressing this view. Micheál Martin claims that “The people who fought for and founded our state saw it as a place with multiple identities, open to the world and embodying the most important republican principle of all, to reflect the diversity of its people.”

On the contrary, they were “racist” by today’s standards. One of the most important Irish nationalists of the 19^th century was writer John Mitchel. Two of Mitchel’s sons fought in the Confederate army, and he vocally supported their cause. He even advocated bringing back the slave trade, writing that he would be happy to see slave plantations in Ireland.

The founder of Sinn Féin, a political party involved in the Irish War of Independence, complained that others had “deprecatingly excused” Mr. Mitchel’s views. Arthur Griffith wrote in 1913 that no excuse was necessary for “an Irish Nationalist declining to hold the negro his peer.” In the same year he noted that 2.5% of the population of Ireland was foreign-born (mostly English); in his view this was “too great a percentage for a country like ours.”

The first president of Ireland, Douglas Hyde, also spoke in racial terms. As he put it,

[W]e must strive to cultivate everything that is most racial, most smacking of the soil, most Gaelic, most Irish, because in spite of the little admixture of Anglo-Saxon blood in the north-east corner, this island is and will ever remain Celtic at its core … On racial lines, then, we shall best develop, following the bent of our own natures.

Indeed, the idea that nationalism was connected to ethnicity was taken for granted until relatively recently. A distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism was not articulated until 1944, when American historian Hans Kohn published The Idea of Nationalism. Historical Irish patriots objected even to the influence of their fellow Europeans from England, and would have been appalled by the race-blind multiculturalism today’s elite ascribe to them.

Another interesting essays analyzes the possibility of a violent right-wing revolution or civil war. The author explains that this is not nearly as likely as some have recently claimed. Historically, such events required both discontent among the population and a disgruntled would-be ruling class which could organize the masses against the regime.

There is certainly discontent among the people. A 2021 poll found that 2/3 of Republicans in the South would support seceding from the Union again, while polling from 2023 shows 70% of Republicans believe that Biden’s election was illegitimate. There are even growing numbers of people who believe political violence is justifiable. However, Mr. Woods argues that this is nowhere near the desperate circumstances of historical revolutions. Before the French Revolution, there was widespread starvation. Most people today have more to lose.

Another key factor is “overproduction” of elites – more people have aspirations to high status than can possibly achieve power through traditional means, so they have an incentive to attack the system. The number of lawyers in the United States tripled from the mid-1970s to 2011, while the population grew by only 45%. Every year, there are an estimated 25,000 more new qualified lawyers than there are job openings in the field.

Although our young elites are critical of the existing system, they mainly want it to move even further to the left. Mr. Woods cites a survey from the elite Trinity College Dublin showing that 63% of students had participated in a left-wing student organization and 82% identified as “socialist.” He argues that the situation is similar in the United States. Polling of Black Lives Matter protesters in 2020 showed that the largest age group was those under 35, while the largest income group was “those earning more than $150,000.”

There are some among the current elite in Silicon Valley who oppose wokeness and support Donald Trump, such as Elon Musk and Peter Thiel. However, they are calling for meritocratic reform, not revolution. It is unlikely that they would support a violent overthrow of the current system; being wealthy and well-connected, they have a great deal to lose.

Mr. Woods adds that the US government has an overwhelming advantage over any potential threat through its militarized law enforcement agencies, enormous surveillance capacity, and ability to cut its opponents off from the financial system. Even if a revolution succeeded in one nation, it would be isolated and sabotaged by the remainder of the West until it was again ruled by a “pro-democracy” elite.

The author concludes that opponents of the current system “should not put their faith in some future uprising or collapse to reverse it.” This is an imaginary shortcut around what is needed. Change is possible, but it will require a great deal of hard work and patience to shift public opinion and gain power within the system.

One interesting essay near the end of the book covers the much-discussed subject of birth rates. Mr. Woods cites economist Philip Pilkington, who argues that as per capita GDP increases, fertility falls. For approximately 50 years now each new generation in most Western countries has been smaller than the last; the fertility rate is said to be “below replacement level.” This means more old and retired people, fewer young working people, and slower economic growth. The problem has become a popular subject among the powerful in the West, but in most cases the birth rate still remains low.

Mr. Woods argues that the problem stems from an “alienated, secular, modern worldview” which is unable to “vitalize” a population. He points to distressing trends in our people’s health and fitness as an example of the same phenomenon. Most Europeans and Americans are overweight, one in five American adults is mentally ill, and the average American IQ is declining.

Some nations have attempted to raise the birth rates with financial incentives. Sweden for example maintained a birth rate above or just below the replacement level in the late 1980s and early 1990s with policies including paid parental leave. Italy took no such action, and its birthrate in the mid-90s was down to 1.2 children per woman.

However, money is no guarantee of fertility. South Korea currently has a fertility rate of 0.81, one of the lowest in the world, despite 15 years of generous expenditures to encourage reproduction. Mr. Woods cites a review of such programs throughout the OECD showing that although such policies may briefly increase the birth rate, the effect on long-term fertility is questionable. Many who take advantage of new government programs to have children would have had children at some point regardless.

The nation of Georgia provides a good example of non-financial incentives to have children. In 2007 Patriarch Ilya II, the leader of the Georgian Orthodox Church, declared that he would baptize and serve as godfather to any child beyond the second born to any married couple. Georgia is highly religious, with a recent poll showing the patriarch is by far the most favorably viewed person in the country. The number of children born to married women jumped dramatically in the next two years, and fertility has remained relatively high since.

Israel has also managed to maintain a high birth rate. Religion is one factor here, as religious Israeli Jews have 4.0 children per woman and the ultra-Orthodox closer to 7. However, even secular Jews have a fertility rate of 2.2, which is still above replacement level. One study attributes this not only to Israel’s social welfare program which supports families with children, but also to group identity. The author cites Jewish nationalism, reinforced by frequent conflict with outsiders, as well as “a discourse which defines women as the biological reproducers of the nation.”

Other nations will not have exactly the same situation as Georgia or Israel, but there is still something to learn from their example. Mr. Woods argues that cultural incentives are more important than financial ones, and there must be some in the West who can muster the social capital needed to avoid withering away.

Several of the essays in this collection deal with historical topics such as the Roman Empire, which may seem distant from the typical reader’s concerns. However, the book ends with an interesting set of questions which readers have likely seen posed on social media or in person. Mr. Woods engages directly with common objections to nationalist or “racist” thinking in a conversational format. After covering genes, criminality and IQ, he explains that realism is no reason to be rude to people of other races, and in fact it is easier to treat others with respect when you can be honest about their differences. This is the section I would most recommend to anyone not already on board with our worldview.

Mr. Woods does an admirable job of articulating the meaning of race and national identity in a manner that might actually change the reader’s mind. If even half of our up-and-coming elite could study and understand the arguments in this book, we would be well on our way to a far better society.