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In the United States, discussions surrounding gifted education seem to have progressed beyond mere reform and into a phase of reduction. For instance, during his time in office, Bill de Blasio instructed New York City’s public elementary schools to stop using standardized testing for gifted programs. This action dismantled a long-established system for recognizing highly capable students at an early age. More recently, Zohran Mamdani has proposed completely getting rid of gifted and talented programs for kindergarten students. These occurrences are not simply isolated administrative decisions; they represent a seismic intellectual shift observed across Western countries, where selective education is increasingly viewed as unfair rather than essential because the beneficiaries tend to be intellectual elites from the upper classes.
Yet this shift rests on a questionable premise—that minimizing distinctions in ability produces a fairer or more prosperous society. Historically, the opposite case is stronger. Economic and scientific development has depended disproportionately on a relatively small number of highly capable individuals whose talents, when cultivated, generate outsized returns for society as a whole. From technological innovation to institutional design, progress is rarely egalitarian in its origins; it is driven by concentrated excellence. To neglect the identification and training of such individuals is not to level the playing field, but to lower the ceiling of collective achievement.
If the Western turn against selectivity reflects a growing discomfort with hierarchy, other parts of the world have moved in the opposite direction. In Singapore, high-ability students are systematically identified in primary school and placed into specialized tracks with accelerated and differentiated curricula. Similarly, South Korea has announced plans to establish a dedicated high school by 2027 for students demonstrating exceptional aptitude in artificial intelligence. In these systems, educational differentiation is not framed as exclusion or unfairness, but as a strategic investment in national development and a means of sustaining long-term economic and technological leadership.
Indeed, a thoughtful reading of the literature shows that elites have been essential to development. The case of Denmark offers an insightful starting point. The industrialization of Denmark’s dairy sector was not simply an organic process driven solely by small farmers. Instead, it was deeply rooted in earlier interventions by landowning elites with upper end human capital who introduced proto-modern dairying techniques and organizational innovations. Their influence was both substantial and measurable. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in elite presence led to a 56% greater exposure to industrialized dairying. These elites functioned as carriers of advanced knowledge, helping to spread new production methods across various regions.
What makes the Danish experience particularly noteworthy is how this initial elite-driven innovation eventually led to broader societal benefits. The expansion of dairying created a demand for education, which was met by institutions like the folk high schools. These schools provided practical agricultural training alongside deeper intellectual development, enabling the wider population to absorb and build upon the innovations that had been introduced by the elites. Regions with a stronger elite influence not only adopted new technologies earlier, but also developed higher levels of human capital and long-term prosperity. This suggests that elites do not just innovate; they also shape the conditions under which knowledge spreads.
A similar pattern emerges in Sweden, although with even greater clarity when looking at invention. During the country’s industrialization, innovation was highly concentrated among a very small segment of society. Roughly 40% of inventors belonged to an elite group that made up only about 2% of the population. These individuals were not only more likely to invent, but they were also consistently more productive and created higher-quality innovations.
The difference in quality is particularly telling. Elite inventors, on average, maintained their patents for longer periods, with an average renewal duration of approximately five years, compared to about three and a half years for inventors from lower social classes. Since renewing a patent required paying fees and reflected the expected value of an invention, longer renewal durations indicate innovations that were more commercially viable and technologically significant. This pattern is further supported by the distribution of long-lived patents. A significantly larger proportion of patents originating from elite inventors were maintained for the full statutory term of fifteen years, providing additional evidence that their inventions possessed a higher enduring value.
Additional indicators point in the same direction. Elite inventors were more likely to secure patents not only within their own country but also through the United States Patent and Trademark Office, suggesting that their innovations were sufficiently novel and valuable to compete in international markets. Furthermore, patents associated with firms, which tended to be of higher quality as reflected in higher patent fees, were disproportionately linked to elite inventors. These patterns collectively demonstrate that elites did not merely produce more inventions; they produced inventions that were more valuable, more durable, and more internationally competitive.
Crucially, these disparities persisted even in the face of institutional reforms designed to broaden participation. The Swedish patent reform of 1884, for example, reduced fees and introduced technical examination, creating a more accessible and standardized system. Despite these changes, the social composition of inventors remained largely consistent. Children from elite families were approximately fifteen times more likely to become inventors than those from unskilled backgrounds. This persistence indicates that innovation is not determined solely by formal access to institutions; instead, it is deeply rooted in differences in education, cognitive ability, and exposure to knowledge networks.
The importance of elite human capital becomes even more apparent when it is suddenly absent. The First World War serves as a real-world experiment in this context. The war disproportionately claimed the lives of young and relatively educated men, creating a significant disruption to the upper end of the skill distribution. The consequences for innovation were both immediate and long-lasting. A 10% increase in local war deaths reduced the probability that a parish produced any patent from approximately 0.09% 0.12%, with the reduction in high-quality “breakthrough” patents being roughly three times greater.

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These effects were not limited to overall patent counts. They manifested through multiple channels. Higher mortality led to fewer new inventors entering the field, while also reducing the productivity of those already active. The impact was particularly severe in technologically complex sectors such as engineering and physics, where innovation relies heavily on highly specialized knowledge and collaboration. Moreover, the loss of individuals with elite education or technical expertise had an additional negative effect, emphasizing that the most skilled individuals contribute disproportionately to the generation of new ideas. Although factors like proximity to universities and participation in professional networks could partially lessen these effects, they could not fully compensate for the loss of high-level human capital.
Looking at contemporary evidence, the relationship among background, ability, and innovation remains highly structured. While individuals from higher-income families are more likely to become inventors, much of this connection weakens once differences in parental education, socioeconomic status, and an individual’s cognitive ability are taken into account. This suggests that the apparent effect of income largely operates through its influence on the development of human capital, rather than acting as an independent factor. At the same time, cognitive ability itself directly and strongly influences inventive activity, both on its own and through its impact on educational attainment.
What emerges is a nuanced understanding where ability and environment interact. Higher-income families can provide conditions that foster the development of talent, but it is the underlying cognitive and educational advantages that ultimately drive innovation. Individuals with higher ability are more likely to benefit from these environments, increasing their chances of producing inventions. Conversely, when highly capable individuals are not identified or supported, their potential contributions are less likely to come to fruition.
Together these findings point to a consistent conclusion. Innovation and economic progress depend disproportionately on a relatively small group of individuals possessing high levels of cognitive ability, education, and access to other elite networks. These individuals generate a significant portion of new ideas, produce higher-quality innovations, and play a central role in spreading knowledge throughout the economy.
In light of this, the current trend of reducing gifted education in the United States and other Western countries appears increasingly difficult to justify. Policies that eliminate mechanisms for identifying and nurturing high-ability students do not erase differences in ability; rather, they decrease the likelihood that such abilities will translate into productive outcomes. In contrast, systems that actively cultivate talent are more likely to sustain innovation and long-term growth.
The historical record is clear on this matter. Societies that recognize and invest in their most capable members tend to achieve higher levels of technological progress and economic prosperity. Those that neglect this task might achieve a form of formal equality, but they do so at the cost of diminished dynamism and a reduced capacity for innovation.

7 comments
Free market economies with bad intellectual capital investment will find it difficult to avoid the middle income trap.
Even from what I remember in the late 1970s, programs for the gifted were nearly nonexistent. It all fits a pattern. For any policy that is wise and constructive, imagine doing the very opposite, and that’s how things are run here.
The next thing could happen is that the ivy leagues might lower their admissions standards for non-whites. Some states might even drop the bar exam as a requirement for a law license.
The Ivy League already has been a spoils system for a long time, with Jews at the head of the line. I haven’t heard about bar exams going away, but it wouldn’t surprise me. (Maybe public pretenders will get even worse!) I did write about some medical schools foregoing MCAT exams in the name of diversity. I wonder how many deaths that will cause.
Beau Albrecht: April 25, 2026 The Ivy League already has been a spoils system for a long time, with Jews at the head of the line….
Attorney Glen Allen mentioned in a recent video that 13% of law students at Harvard are White, probably more like 6% if you deduct the percentage of Jews who claim to be White. But why would they claim to be goyim if being a non-Jew would exclude them from here: Jewish Law Students Association at Harvard Law
Welcome to the Harvard Jewish Law Students Association!
The Harvard Jewish Law Students Association (JLSA) is a cultural, social, educational, and religious organization that reflects the varied interests of the Jewish student community of Harvard Law School. The organization consists of more than 400 HLS students, Boston-area graduate school students, and others who are interested in Jewish legal affairs or the affairs of the Jewish community at Harvard Law School.
We’ve seen photos of the “alleged” handcuffed, nappy-headed shooter at the White House Correspondents Dinner, yet I haven’t seen even one of the hundreds of media reports mention that he’s Black — just that he’s very smart, educated at exclusive Cal Tech; photos of him in his cap and gown for when he earned his Master’s in computer science, or something — oh, and that he was “Teacher of the Month” when tutoring kids, probably “disadvantaged, at risk” Blacks, being groomed to be elites like him in our <cough!> “society as a whole.”
Sorry, Lip Man, we do not need your elite non-Whites in our midst — none!
Not levelling the playing field, but lowering the bar (to refine the analogy).
Lip Man: … Economic and scientific development has depended disproportionately on a relatively small number of highly capable individuals whose talents, when cultivated, generate outsized returns for society as a whole.
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In the ideal exclusively White society of the future, you’re right.
For you and your kinsmen, however, your mixed-race society as a whole will be excluded. No Black or other non-White elites — none — only our own.
We can handle our own economic and scientific development, thanks.
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