Ideological Foundations of the Nouvelle Droite
Part 10

5,421 words

The European Question

The European philosophy [1] defended by the ND is one of a people’s self-assertion, the pursuit of its power in the world, the worldwide radiation of its influence, and the reconquest of its cultural specificity. It therefore opposes the pseudo-Europeanist ideology that makes Europe the first stone in the edifice of a world civilization and that urges European peoples to forget their cultural roots and wills to power in favor of the immaterial idea of “Western civilization.”

Geopolitically, Europe sits at the geographic center of the world’s landmasses. Its semi-continental and semi-maritime position makes it a key piece in any bid for global dominance. Whoever neutralizes it, or possesses it, gains decisive hegemony over his adversary. Our continent is thus the geostrategic theater where the two superpowers face off. The USSR, a giant continental power with open frontiers and thereby the possibility of being directly threatened, aware that it is surrounded and hemmed in by hostile peoples who drive it northward—whose seas are permanently frozen and lack access to the great oceans—must reach the seas to prevent suffocation by the United States (a maritime power). This is why the USSR, in order to break the encirclement and dominate the Great Continent, extends westward, northwestward, and southward to gain access to ice-free seas and to the straits. As for the United States, a maritime and thalassocratic power, an island open onto two great oceans, fated either to suffer a blockade or to dominate the continents fringing those oceans (the Far East and Europe), it acts as England once did: implanting itself along the edges of the great Afro-Eurasian continent (the world’s central island), that is, on its maritime façades (the rimlands), and checking the expansion of any continental power (USSR, China, India) or continental-maritime power (Europe, the Arab countries).

The United States, a new Carthage, holds that achieving world hegemony passes through control of economic markets, whereas Soviets and Chinese, heirs of Genghis Khan, focus rather on the military domination of the great-continental space. Neither the USSR nor the United States can tolerate the existence of a great Western power that is simultaneously a great maritime power. For this reason Europe is a serious threat to them. A great reunified Europe, pushing into Eurasian territory, open on three seas, holding important possessions on all the oceans of the globe, endowed with almost 500 million inhabitants and immense industrial capacity, is geopolitically inadmissible for the United States and the USSR. European power rests on five advantages that no other nation possesses together: a large population, an extremely high technological and cultural level within that population, combined variety and density in terms of settlement and geographic factors, considerable economic power grounded in a complete array of all types of productions, and a geographic position that is at once central and continental-maritime on the globe: it has access to all seas and opens toward the Asian and African continents.

Since Yalta, the USSR and the United States have been associated powers collaborating to prevent their common rival (Europe) from uniting and being reborn. The two powers exist in a state of conflict-cooperation. Their common rivals, first and foremost Europe, seem more worrisome to them than their own rivalry. The latter serves, on the contrary, to contain their competitors and mobilize their clientele, their subjects and protégés. The very definition of a “condominium” is mutual understanding under an apparent antagonism. Behind this logic of factual bipolarization, which pits a Euro-American West against the Soviet bloc, hides the true antagonism, the real conflict, which pits Europe and other peoples against the two great powers. The United States could tolerate, under certain conditions, a Finlandized or Sovietized Europe, but never a Europe reunited up to the borders with the USSR. Such a European empire, freed from the Iron Curtain and Marxist-Leninist paralysis, would be more dangerous for the United States than a Euro-Soviet bloc. For such an empire would be not only a military competitor to the United States, but an economic and technological competitor as well. The principal enemy of the United States is a Europe liberated from communism, since the enormous power that would arise would draw Africa, India, and the Near East into its orbit. At the same time, the Pacific region would be destabilized, and neither China nor Japan would be able to maintain their current relations with the United States. The latter would find themselves prisoners on their island, reduced to the difficult administration of their Ibero-American colonies, trapped in isolationism and relegated to the rank of a secondary power.

The USSR’s nightmare is exactly the same. The Soviets fear a Europe freed in the West from American tutelage and in the East and Central Europe from their own colonization. Such a Europe—by virtue of its superior weight—would threaten the USSR and, once liberated from communism and from American economic and monetary subjection, would dominate it as well through its industry and technology, likely forcing it to abandon the communist system.

Were a Soviet-American armed clash to occur in Europe, it would not constitute a total and global war between the two hegemonic powers. It would be a localized war. An East–West war would be nothing but the continuation of US–USSR collaboration by open conflict. Fighting on our soil, the associated powers would not destroy each other, but would destroy us Europeans—or, at a minimum, weaken us for a century. Such is the meaning of the joint deployment of SS-20s in Central Europe and American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe: to guarantee to the two superpowers that any engagement in Europe would destroy only Europe and that no strike would be directed at the territory of the two greats. In short, the annihilation of Europe through a tactical war between the United States and the USSR. The interest of the United States—like that of the USSR, which likewise understood that it needed an adversary-partner to carve up the world—is to contain communism when it goes too far, but to respect its “natural” acquisitions, that is, those situated on the USSR’s frontier (Poland, Afghanistan). American policy generally uses barter: the United States tolerates, for example, Cuba because the Soviets accept the vassalage of Turkey and Pakistan within the American military system. The Soviet military presence in Central and Eastern Europe and its colonization of the countries of Central Europe is not aimed at aggression against Western Europe, but at preventing European reunification.

This American-Soviet “entente” tends to block any independent European strategy. For example, from the USSR’s point of view, Euro-Arab ties would compromise its presence in the Mediterranean and its policy of communist influence in the Near East. From the American point of view, intensifying exchanges between Arabs and Europeans would help form a competing economic, commercial, and technological pole. Both powers seek to appropriate the Mediterranean and install bases there to watch over Europeans and Arabs. By implanting themselves in the Mediterranean space under the pretext of Israeli turbulence, the two great powers erect Israel as a sanitary cordon to separate Europe from the Arab world—who, allied, would become a pole with excessive magnetism. The constant concern of the two greats is to prevent the establishment of political, economic, and military bonds between Europe and the Third World, for these could sketch an axis of non-alignment with the two blocs and a third way beyond the two great powers. The new cold war that arose in the 1980s corresponds to a joint process by the two dominant powers intended to polarize their respective satellites around Atlanticism and communism. Each European country within the two respective zones must feel that the threat comes from the Europeans opposite them, and that the friend is the occupant-protector. The American-Soviet condominium is likewise exercised in the economic sphere. Just as Central and Eastern Europe are subjected to colonial plunder by the USSR, Western Europe finances the US balance-of-payments deficit and supplies the United States with the hard currency it uses to buy our industries.

Furthermore, the United States has realized that its economic interest lies in limiting the number of major capitalist powers, to keep potential competitors at bay. It therefore has an interest in maintaining in the USSR and Central Europe a regime that anesthetizes all economic dynamism. It is easier to negotiate with a communist country to which one sells grain or raw materials without fearing its competition or exports in the leading sectors of the economy.

To the convergence of geostrategic interests we must add the similarity of the two civilizational projects. Both seek to build a universal, uniform, egalitarian society grounded in the dictatorship of the economy. Both are possessed by the same technomorphic frenzy, the same desire for uniformization, the same obsession with revealed truth, the same mystique of progress and unilateral, universal development. The existence of the United States serves Soviet expansionist interests, by a logical parallelism that makes the existence of the USSR justify American hegemony and allow it to remain in Europe. The USSR and the United States, metaphysical and geopolitical doubles of the same thing, see in each other’s symbols (similar yet contrary—capitalism and communism) the figure of the devil, which both need in order to exercise their messianic imperialism and their perpetual holy war.

Today’s Atlanticist discourse is a mode of neutralizing the European idea. This strategy is explained by the terror felt in Atlanticist circles that Europe might become conscious of its identity and constitute itself as a third way between the blocs. The aim of the Atlanticist Party is to make Europeans lose the sense of their historical community of destiny (Europe as nation), exploiting Europeans’ fear of the USSR. The aim is not to defend us from the USSR—a united and independent Europe would defend itself far better than by trusting in Atlantic protection—but to subject us to the American-Western order. For Atlanticists, the European project is nothing but reinforcing Europe’s role as protective shield and cannon fodder for the Western order. Europe is not justified as the homeland of Europeans, in the name of the concrete values of its civilization and history, but insofar as Europe is a geographic zone of the planetary Western system. In this sense Europe is not an autonomous ensemble, but a Western sector. And within this perspective, defending Europe is not defending a project of historical peoples, but defending the Western way of life, Atlanticism, growth, freedom, and other immaterial notions that have nothing to do with European interests, but much to do with American interests and the international groups tied to them. Likewise, Atlanticists take great care to exclude a priori Eastern Europe from Europe. The idea of reunifying all of Europe, because of the imperial project it implies, is unbearable to them, for it ruins the power of the Great Ally and weakens its universalist vision of the world.

The clearest proof of Atlanticist duplicity was the signing of the Helsinki accords, which legitimized Soviet hegemony over half of the European nation and reinforced Europe’s rupture into two halves.

The Atlanticist Party and the Sovietist Party use the theme of the struggle against fascisms to grant themselves humanitarian and democratic legitimacy. The more time passes and fascism and National Socialism cease to constitute real threats, the more intensely the political mythologies of East and West use antifascist ideology as a demonological exorcism against the fascist specter, with the classic aim of legitimizing current social and political systems. The totalitarian state of the East and the mercantile and technocratic society of the West are obliged, to justify their rule, not to present themselves decked out in all the virtues of the world, but with the negative advantage of being a remedy against fascism. Since the latter has already disappeared from the European stage, it may be said that legitimation through antifascism is ultimately phantasmagoric and proves the indigence and loss of credibility of these ideologies.

A deep study of American policy would show Atlanticists that the United States pursues a globally non-European strategy and that, for the present, they play the Atlanticist card because it suits them. One must be quite naïve to think that a great power’s foreign policy could rest on humanitarian affections, friendships, or a spiritual community of civilization. The United States has never missed an opportunity to block European unity. It is well known that the Marshall Plan was designed to prevent an autonomous economic union of Europeans. From the formation of the EEC onward, the Americans pressed for the Community to be conceived only within the Atlantic system and not to obstruct American economic penetration.

One thing is certain: the American thalassocracy cannot prevent the unity of the Eurasian continent, which is sealed by historical and geopolitical logic and will be carried out, sooner or later, against America. Some Americans already foresee with glee the industrial and technological decline of Western Europe. They are betting on the “Third-world-ization” of Europe and the USSR, which they would try to accelerate by adroitly managing the current crisis. Moreover, increasingly marked by a Californian vision of the world, America has reinforced its contempt for the Old World and its interest in the Pacific regions.

Contrary to Atlanticist theses, the threat of war in Western Europe is less a Soviet aggression than a regional US–USSR war on our soil. Through the Atlantic Alliance the United States seeks to make us pay the costs of a frontal clash that would eliminate both the European economic competitor and the Soviet military adversary. Moreover, the intrinsic strength of communism is no longer intellectual; it remains dangerous because it draws its force from the instincts of cowardice, of assistance, and of the maternal protection of the social-democratic “nanny-state,” and from the need for mediocrity, egalitarianism, and micro-privilege so deeply rooted in our society. This mercantilist society thus predisposes us to succumb to the communist model, since only countries won over to the egalitarian spirit can see in communism the sole means of realizing it.

The community of interests between Europe and the Third World is partly strategic (against the American-Soviet condominium), cultural (against the American-morph mass civilization), and economic (against the dispossession of indigenous productive forces and the loss of national independence). This solidarity with the Third World [2] has nothing to do with biblical “Third-World-ism,” rooted in the “humility” of a former colonizer seeking an extra dose of good conscience. Nor is it governed by an apology for weakness, which only plays into the hands of modern imperialisms; rather, it is based on awareness that force is the essence of politics. Any country that refuses alignment with the superpowers must be helped to become strong.

The Left has betrayed the Third World because the latter offered powerful resistance to Soviet socialism and American capitalism, as well as to democratism, developmental mythology, and human rights. Progressive opinion has understood that the Third World, a fertile reserve of traditional mental structures, is inhospitable to individualism and egalitarianism, while noticing that the most clear-sighted Third-World intellectuals would nourish their nationalism not in Western socialism but in their own traditions; moreover, the imperial idea of autocentered development was taking shape and could result in international relations tending to restore the world’s polycentric organization.

In short, the Third World finds its allies among the proponents of a new European greatness, and its adversaries among its former friends, who have realized that a new Third-World-ism could ruin the two pillars of the post-1945 dogma of international relations: cosmopolitanism and the abolition of European power.

Europe should renounce the current form of aid to the Third World, which is nothing but the maintenance of a neocolonial development system, and should stimulate the creation of semi-autarkic areas of autocentered development regrouping nations compatible in geographic and cultural terms. This could yield large autonomous units achieving independence in the economic and political realms. In this way the American-Soviet bipolar logic and the globalist civilization would be broken. Effects of domination, being more widely dispersed in a polycentric world, would lose their current alienating force. Conflicts would certainly not cease, but they would lose their monovalent character and peoples would confront one another on their own behalf, not on behalf of one of the two superpowers.

The point would be to generalize the philosophy and practice of non-alignment. Now, it must be noted that if the Non-Aligned Movement failed in its aim of constituting a third way between the blocs, this was because some member states were vassals of one of the great powers (Cuba, for example), and because no great power formed part of it. A European policy of non-alignment should define its ideology according to the doctrine of armed neutralism. This conception does not aim to grant the movement an illusory absence of participation in the world’s conflicts, but must be understood as a refusal to take part in the quarrels between the two blocs or to join their defense systems, while in no case opposing the struggle against either bloc that threatens a possible alliance of the non-aligned.

The European defense policy advocated by the ND rests on building an autonomous European conventional and nuclear defense outside NATO [3], seeking at first to establish with the Soviets a balanced moratorium on strategic forces and theater nuclear weapons. Since we have entered a period in which pinpoint, “surgical” action is militarily possible thanks to the ever greater precision of existing weapons, a nuclear war could occur without exhibiting the apocalyptic character still attributed to it today. For all these reasons, military and budgetary strategy should center on the nuclear deterrent and on possessing armaments (for example, nuclear submarines) capable of being withdrawn from an adversary’s initial strike and, at the same time, capable of inflicting on him damage sufficient that the advantages of conquest would be inferior to the price paid.

The intellectual key to history and the cause of peoples’ power and prosperity is the capacity to think in continental terms—in terms of planetary relations of power and expansion. It is the territorial war of peoples, the implacable struggle for living space, that alters the order of civilizations. A space too small confers no power. Only countries that command a great space and a numerous population can act upon the world’s destiny.

The central problem facing those who would assume the role of heads of state of a future Europe will be the attitude to adopt toward the Eastern countries and the communist world, as well as the problem of the eastern frontiers of a possible European bloc. By way of a first response: spare Western Europe from communism, seek to free Central and Eastern Europe from communism, and at the first stage conclude a pact with the USSR without trying to change its regime. This position entails fighting by all means the collaborator’s complex in certain circles that play at being pro-Soviet. Pleasures they will not know, for their Soviet friends will brusquely let them know their “help” is undesirable. Facing the USSR, there is only one language: that of force. Within the perspective of a parity pact with the USSR based on deterrence by strength, the German problem arises. The German question lies at the very heart of the European question. German reunification is the sine qua non condition of European reunification. The solution of neutralizing Germany prior to reunification is unacceptable. The USSR would not tolerate a reunified Germany—even neutralized—for it would still appear Western to it.

Moreover, a neutralized Germany would compromise Europe’s possibilities for power and sovereignty. If the people occupying the most central position in Europe is neutralized, Europe will fall definitively—its western part under American protectorate and its eastern part under an even harsher Soviet domination. There is a third way consisting of proceeding in two stages: first, constitute a powerful Western European alliance including the FRG, based on the Franco-German axis, while simultaneously developing mutual relations between the FRG and the GDR. Then the USSR would have at its doorstep not the American NATO but a powerful Western Europe, and a global negotiation of power to power would be possible. This negotiation would refer not only to German reunification but also to revising the Helsinki accords, the frontiers emerging from 1945, and the Soviet annexations in Finland and the Baltic countries. In exchange for the progressive reconquest of the countries of Central Europe, for German reunification within an independent European framework free of both blocs, and for the USSR’s return to its 1938 borders—that is, in exchange for liberating half our continent—we would have to grant the USSR the guarantee of our disengagement from the United States and the liquidation of NATO, the withdrawal from Europe of all American forces stationed on our soil, and the guarantee of our economic and technological cooperation to develop its territory.

Let it be clear: we do not have to choose between Atlantic solidarity with the United States, within the framework of Western civilization, and our absorption by the Soviet bloc, but between a parity pact with Russia that would preserve our independence and vassalage to the Soviet bloc. We must choose between an alliance of power and an alliance of submission, for whether we like it or not, we must cohabit with the Soviets. If we are little rodents, we shall be devoured; if we are wolves, we shall be free and respected.

Eastern communism would then cease to be a threat, confronted with a Western Europe free of the United States, powerfully armed, having broken with Western solidarity, and building a society different from capitalist liberalism and socialism. Geopolitics and history force us to come to terms with the USSR, since we occupy neighboring spaces; they also show that interests of a continental, Euro-Siberian nature exist.

We must not forget either that American strategy seeks to distract the USSR from the China-Pacific zone coveted by the United States by drawing the Soviet threat westward through its military presence. In the long run, Europeans must make Russians and Slavic nations understand that communism is in fact a factor of isolation, backwardness, and decadence. Communism has isolated Russia from the world and separated it from the European nation. Russians must be persuaded that the alternative to communism is not necessarily Anglo-Saxon mercantilism and that Europe can offer them a third way. Only an atmosphere of détente with the USSR would allow Europeans to realize a triple objective: to constitute a European defense force more effective and dissuasive than the current Atlantic system; to polarize the USSR’s energy toward its eastern borders, where the true threat lies; and, finally, to initiate large-scale economic cooperation between Western Europe and the ensemble of Central and Eastern European countries—still underdeveloped—which would be one factor in our economic rebirth.

As for Europe’s construction, we must not fall into the institutional and legalist illusion that has paralyzed every project of European unity. History itself will oblige us, along the way, to improvise Europe’s form. The essential task is ideological work: educating Europeans’ will for Europe’s construction.

Every Empire begins with the organic alliance of a few elements. The contagion then spreads to the whole. The disappearance of current nations as a prior step to such a union is a utopia that would block any imperial European construction. Europe is not an abstract idea; it is a piece on the board of world geopolitics. [4] Europe will mean something only if it becomes a power. The solution does not lie in denying the existence of European nations in favor of regions alone—for an ideal assembly of small Rousseauian enclaves would be easy prey for the superpowers—nor in denying regions in favor of the nation alone. Between Jacobinism and separatism a third way is possible.

European nations, endowed with a common currency, an authentic economic space, and a common defense, would provide themselves with an executive power limited to the essential questions of the Empire’s grand politics. There is no need to transplant to Europe the nation-state model of the French type. No people would accept it. By contrast, modernizing the model of the old Roman-Germanic Empire, where a royal sphere and an imperial sphere coexisted, could constitute the solution to European unity. The imperial model would allow each State to define its own political institutions—that is, its own regime—while reserving a higher tier for the properly imperial function.

The age of nationalisms is past for European countries, because each of them will illustrate its prestige only insofar as it is assimilated to the European whole. European nations will regain a certain greatness by speaking in Europe’s name, and in the long run European interest will serve their own national interest. In short, Europe will not be built save over the tomb of petty nationalisms. The task is not to overcome nationalism through a supranationality tinged with universalism (Europe as the first step toward a globalist civilization), but to shift nationalisms toward a European nationalism. To the region should belong rootedness and affection; to the nation, patriotism; and to Europe, nationalism. The point is to extend the spiritual and affective principle of national solidarity and belonging to the other European countries, but limiting it to them alone. In this perspective it is inconceivable that just any people should be part of Europe. Only the peoples of the European cultural, historical, and geographic ensemble will belong to Europe. This conception opposes the purely contractual and mercantilist doctrine of the EEC that assimilates Europe to a commercial company (as in the inclusion of Turkey and Israel).

To correct this globalist tendency, which would be mortal for Europe, only spreading among youth the imperial myth—deeply inscribed in our history—seems the appropriate antidote. This imperial myth [5] is as much a founding myth to be regenerated and applied in Europe as it is a political and geopolitical philosophy. This organizing conception of politics and sovereignty, according to organic principles, reconciles at once the unifying power of the sovereign function and the natural diversity of society, culture, economy, and space. The Empire, in this conception, unifies around the sovereign function—which pertains to the essence of politics and of historical consciousness and therefore of destiny—while preserving the diversity of the remaining functions and institutions that do not touch these domains. The Empire, thus understood, includes and takes charge only of the destiny of those nations that belong to the same people from an ethnic, cultural, and historical point of view. Reviving this European imperial myth constitutes one of the most important spiritual mobilizations our generation can find, insofar as the idea of Empire is the central figure that has haunted Europe’s restless conscience for over a thousand years, and the contemporary extinction of Christianity—eternal adversary of this idea—may perhaps allow it to reemerge. Both Western cosmopolitanism and Christianity’s current evolution enable Europe to free itself from the Christian West and recognize itself in a common Indo-European culture, its deepest founding memory. Europe comes from afar and will go far. Its roots sink deep into the soil of history and ensure the possibility of a rebirth. The ND seeks to reclaim the totality of Europe’s heritage: Greek, Latin, Celtic, Germanic, and Slavic. This European heritage [6] is a base upon which to build a powerful future in unity: conscious of being united in what is essential—that is, in a common worldview—Europeans will find the will for a common destiny.

Europe’s essence is tragic. Its destiny always leads it to metamorphosis and to the self-overcoming of its own tradition. Its essence is energy, a change of forms with each new period, as if in an alchemical transmutation. This tragic and grandiose surge forward is the very sign of its genius. Europe is thus condemned by its own nature to perpetual ascent, but also to risk, to constantly brush against death. Its essence is will and movement. In other words, Europe is revolutionary by nature.

Through a Faustian self-transformation [7], Europe must shed the Western civilization it itself created; it must go to the very end of decadence so that the regeneration of its own history can occur. Europe is passing through one of those dark periods it has so often known in its tumultuous history, from which it has emerged at the price of an extraordinary mutation of itself. Through such mutations it has always responded to history’s challenges and assaults. Since the dawn of its destiny, European civilization has known three great metamorphoses: the first saw Indo-European tribes burst forth into the high cultures of pagan antiquity. The second—under the assault of Christianity—compelled European peoples to religious syncretism but also to establish the states, kingdoms, and empires of medieval and classical Europe. The fourth metamorphosis was that of Europe’s transformation into the West. We are now called to another great historical metamorphosis; but these metamorphoses, before translating into facts, begin first as mental metamorphoses. This one advances in four distinct fields: social, cultural, ideological, economic, and political. Perhaps the most important is the birth of a neo-European generation that must start from zero, which does not seek the reconstruction of our grand past, but the beginning of a new history opening before us and completely unknown to us. The new neo-European psyche—imbued with active nihilism and inhabited by the spirit of the pre-war—is a spirit more formative than the pseudo-romanticism of the ’70s. This new “neo-European” generation—the first barbarian generation of modern times, in which one can find in raw state instincts freed from Judeo-Christian inhibitions—is a generation in which the European collective unconscious can surface and blood can speak through aesthetics and technique, as a preliminary step toward a European regeneration in the more or less distant future.

Europe is the encounter between the engineer (technical modernity) and History. Europe was born of Greece and Rome, that is, of the mysterious alliance of political order—generator of historical consciousness—of philosophical and aesthetic culture—generator of a global and universal conception of the world—and of the techno-scientific mentality—producer of an appropriative domination of the Earth. If Europe renounces all this, it will betray itself, for Europe is rooted only in power and in the ascending metamorphosis of forms. Europe is condemned to anguish and to greatness. Europe must mobilize the forces enclosed in its immemorial tradition—archaic and hypermodern—and inaugurate Faustian culture: a mobilizing alloy of the nuclear plant and the Greek temple, of the computer and poetry, of the cathedral and the reactor, of the will to power embodied in technique and of fidelity to tradition embodied in historicity.

A unified Europe, from the Atlantic to the European parts of the USSR, would be the world’s foremost power. The two superpowers know this formidable potential strength of Europe. Hence the permanent axis of their foreign policy is to contain the sleeping European giant and prevent it from awakening to avert its threat. Europe is threatened because it threatens the superpowers, and the logic of Atlanticist and Soviet ideologies is to persuade Europeans that they are not strong enough to face alone the threats around them. The first task to be accomplished for Europe’s liberation is not political but ideological: to make Europeans know that Europe is strong, that it is the world’s foremost virtual power, and that it overestimates the threats surrounding it as well as the reactions of its protectors—the United States and the USSR—should it rebel. Either Europe continues to glide gently down the imperceptible slope of decadence, remains Western, and disperses into small nations without a project; or else, at the edge of the grave slowly opening before us, we are reborn into history at the price of the greatest European metamorphosis: to become new Europeans and to accede to Empire.

Translated into English by Francisco Albanese.

Notes

[1] Faye, Guillaume: Nouveau Discours à la Nation Européenne, Editions Albatros, Paris, 1985, pp. 11-164.

[2] Benoist, Alain de: Orientations pour des anées décisives, op. cit. p. 32.

[3] Cartry, Jean-Louis: “Pour une défense non alignée” & “La grande faute des Etats-Unis,” interview conducted by Alain de Benoist with General Gallois, in: Eléments no. 41, pp. 8-18.

[4] Benoist, Alain de: “Entre jacobinisme et séparatisme,” en Eléments no. 12 (September-November 1975), p. 2.

[5] Vouloir no. 8 (August-September 1984), p. 3.

[6] Vial, Pierre: “Le recours aux émpires,” La Trisième Voie, op. cit., pp. 37-45. “Le combat culturel du GRECE,” in: Eléments no. 32 (November-December 1979). pp. 22. “L’Europe,” in: Pour une renaissance culturelle, op. cit., pp. 231-268.

[7] Faye, Guillaume: “Dans les replis du déclin: la metamorphose,” in: La Fin d’un monde-cris ou déclin, op. cit., pp. 72-75.