White Nationalism & the Geopolitics of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis, Part 3
Part 3 of 3
A Promising Rapprochement
In the last instance, the US-European rift of 2002–2003 followed from the Cold War’s end, which destroyed the rationale for the transatlantic alliance and hence the restraints on European autonomy. For without the Red Army on the Elbe, Europe was no longer obliged to take orders from the West Wing. Because NATO has outlived its usefulness and Bush’s unipolar security system made no accommodation to Europe’s post-Cold War status, the more self-confident Europeans have begun to distance themselves from Washington.
However headline-capturing, their modest assertion of autonomy has nevertheless been carried out in ways that are thoroughly inadequate to Europe’s independence, based as they are on principles of jurisprudence and ethics, rather than on more consequential forms of power. In Robert Kagan’s now famous characterization, Europeans are from Venus and Americans from Mars, with the former acting as if the world were governed by abstract Kantian principles, ignorant of or unwilling to acknowledge the violent Hobbesian reality which Americans, especially after 9/11, have been forced to confront. In other words, Europeans look to negotiations, diplomacy, and international law to resolve international disputes, while Americans emphasize the importance of military force. These differing “perspectives and psychologies of power,” the anti-white Kagan suggests, explain something of what divides the two shores of the Atlantic. But perhaps more debilitating than Europe’s “Kantianism” (which will not last) is the fact that its increasingly autonomous foreign policy is less an expression of its political identity (although it is that) than a symptom of its liberal evasion of what such an identity ought to entail.
In France, for instance, which is the sole continental country to have defended the European idea in the last half century, as well as maintained a nuclear arsenal and professional army worthy of a “power,” opposition to US unilateralism has been framed largely in liberal internationalist terms that draw attention away from the state’s failed domestic policies. Since De Gaulle’s death, France has been in decline. The population is aging, millions of inassimilable Muslim immigrants are colonizing its lands, and virtually all the major institutions are in need of reform. Having eyes only for the “poor immigrant,” the metastasizing state bureaucracy imposes unrealistic social laws that hamper production and serve as a force for national decline. At the same time, the historical sources of nationalism have been dissolved, the native French dispirited by the institutionalization of multiculturalism, and the country’s extraordinary military and diplomatic apparatus, the necessary basis of both French and European power, if not neglected, then underfunded. The hoopla that comes with France’s resistance to Bush simply focuses attention away from these failures and toward geopolitical developments that are potentially key to Europe’s future, but whose import is limited by the state’s misconceived domestic policies. As Julius Evola puts it: “The measure of freedom is power.” And because Europeans are now uncomfortable with the exercise of power, their freedom is necessarily limited.
It is worth recalling that Jacques Chirac was responsible for the totalitarian mobilization against the presidential candidacy of the nationalist Jean Marie Le Pen in 2002. Like much of the European governing class, he is a product of the same plutocratic system that subordinates national interests to international finance, indifferent to everything associated with his people’s blood and soil. Such a system, as our own experiences reveal, is incapable of producing anything other than mediocrities. In this spirit, Chirac’s opposition to Washington’s unipolar order orients to a multipolar model based on liberal market principles hostile to Europe’s unique bioculture. As Guillaume Faye points out, Chirac’s opposition to the Iraq war was motivated less by his Gaullist nationalism (which he routinely betrays) than by his pacifist and Third World politics. With the 2007 presidential elections in view, his foreign policy seems, in fact, aimed at the new Muslim electorate, which thrives on his anti-American, Third World, and multilateralist posturing.
Faye also claims that American power is ultimately a reflex of Europe’s refusal of power. Like many commentators, he stresses that US power in this period is greatly exaggerated and goes unchecked mainly for want of challengers. Revealingly, Chirac has, for all his opposition to Bush, done little to rearm Europe and what he does do he does for the worst of reasons, neglecting Grande Europe in the name of a legalistic idealism that contradicts the biocultural foundations of European life. Rather than fixating on the illegalities and incivilities of American unilateralism (which has proven to be a paper tiger in Iraq), he and other establishment leaders would make a greater contribution to Europe’s destiny if they devoted more attention to its military, restored the basis of its national identity, and addressed the real dangers coming from the South. Worse, they wholeheartedly subscribe to the American model of ethnopluralism, communitarianism, and multiculturalism. Just as US leaders think nothing of sending troops halfway around the world to fight a war whose immediate beneficiary is Israel, ignoring the more serious security threat posed by the Third World’s incessant assaults on the country’s southern border, European elites (and the demonstrators massed behind them) trumpet their solidarity with the Islamic Middle East, whose immigrants are presently rending the fabric of European life. There are good reasons for opposing Bush’s war, but the liberal ones motivating Chirac cannot but come back to haunt the continent.
Germany’s relationship with the US is significantly different than France’s, but no less infused with noxious anti-identitarian influences. Germany was virtually remade by the Americans after 1945 and throughout the Cold War remained subservient to them. Yet Germany is slowly beginning to throw off her tutelage. Schröder nevertheless adheres to values and policies that qualify as examples of Kagan’s Kantianism (i.e., pure liberalism). More than Chirac, he upholds Washington’s earlier liberal internationalism, criticizing Bush for violating its principles. (As one journalist for the Süddeutsche Zeitung writes: “We [Germans] owe a great debt to the US for contributing to our transformation into truly democratic citizens after World War II. . . . They [Americans] must forgive us if we have difficulty letting go some of the lessons we have learned.”) It was thus his pacifism—his Social Democratic opposition to power per se—rather than any geopolitical ambition for a powerful Europe that seems to have prompted his opposition to the Iraq war. And in this, alas, he resembles much of the German population, which prefers bourgeois comforts to those virtues that made earlier generations great. Finally, Schröder, like Chirac, supports Turkey’s admission to the EU and panders to the new “German Turk” electorate. He might therefore have been the first German chancellor since Hitler to frontally oppose Washington, but he has no intention of letting the old anti-liberal dream of white renaissance out of the bag.
Despite the mediocre stature of these politicians, which makes them ill-suited to the great tasks at hand, I would argue that the “force of things”—the realities of power and the dictates of survival—is greater than those charged with carrying them out. This seems especially evident in Europe’s rapprochement with Russia. For as France and Germany become increasingly alienated from the US, they lean eastward—even though French and German elites have much more in common with their American than their Russian counterparts.
A rapprochement between the three great European peoples promises great things. As Karl Haushofer once said: “The day when Germans, Frenchmen, and Russians unite will be the last day of Anglo-Saxon [i.e., liberal] hegemony.” Bush—and this is why his administration seems destined to achieve world-historical significance—has brought about what a century of US geostrategists have sought to prevent. Conversely, it is hardly coincidental that even at the Cold War’s height, a wing of the French military looked to Russia as a possible ally. In 1955, the prominent geostrategist, Admiral Raoul Castex, published an article titled “Moscou, rempart de l’Occident?” (Moscow, rampart of the West?), in which he wondered if Russia might not one day become “the vanguard of the white world’s defense.” Today, in a period when Grande Europe—from Dublin to Vladivostok—is at peace, white nationalists in Europe and America again pose Castex’s question and again affirm the possibility that Russia has a leading role to play in the white race’s defense. Indeed, the question now possesses a qualitatively greater weight than it did a half century ago, before the Third World hordes, abetted by the West’s liberal elites, began their colonization of our lands. Russia, moreover, is not just the last white nation on earth, but the only one to have shown the slightest interest in defending its ethnoracial identity. (Our russophobic nationalists might be reminded that the former Soviet Union was the sole white power to define nationality racially.) Its heritage of nationalism, socialism, and anti-liberalism also lends it something of that “Prussian socialism” which Spengler and Yockey saw as the one viable antidote to Western liberalism. In courting Russian support in their conflict with the US, French and German elites might think Putin will be converted to their misconceived Kantianism, but in the great racial-civilizational battles that lie ahead, it is far more likely that Russia’s ethnonationalism will prevail.
Since the rise to world power of the United States, white America has been in decline. For most of the twentieth century, but especially since the end of the Second World War, the country’s overlords have taken one step after another to de-Europeanize its white population. To this end, white culture and identity have been socially re-engineered. White communities, schools, and businesses have been forced to integrate with races previously considered inferior and inimical. And, for the last 40 years, whites have been expected to replace themselves with Third World immigrants. As the biocultural identity of white Americans gives way to a universal, transnational, and global one (the ideological analogue of the New World Order), they are further alienated from who they are. Against this de-Europeanization and the postnational, multiracial regime succeeding it, the small, isolated pockets of white resistance confront a seemingly impossible task—similar to the one King Canute faced when he tried to hold back the ocean tide. Because of this, I would argue that only a catastrophe will save white America. Only a catastrophic collapse of the political, institutional, and cultural systems associated with imperial America—call it the managerial state, liberal democracy, corporate capitalism, the NWO, or whatever label you prefer—holds out any possibility that a small, racially conscious vanguard of white Americans will succeed in defending their people’s existence. With the Iraq war, Bush—”this Buster Keaton of the apocalypse”—has opened a Pandora’s box of catastrophes. He, in fact, has done more to discredit, weaken, and vilify the existing systems of liberal subversion than any previous president, inadvertently creating conditions that should give white Americans another chance to regain control of their destiny. In this spirit, his administration acts as “a lightning rod for catastrophes.” As one foreign observer notes: “The paradox of the present situation is that the worse the crisis becomes, the more Washington reinforces the position that evokes so much resistance.” Indeed, his “war on terror creates more monsters than its destroys.” Lacking the cognitive and normative tools to deal with a complex area like the Mideast, the president ends up managing the Iraqi occupation “by the seat of his pants.” And as he does, the real dangers threatening the country are totally ignored: the dangers posed by the mestizo and Asiatic colonization of our lands, the growth of US Muslim communities, the denationalization of the economy and the looming fiscal crisis of the state, the Zionist domination of the political and information systems, the replacement of truth with propaganda and disinformation, the deculturation and miscegenation of our people, and the unrelenting assault on everything associated with the “freedoms” he allegedly defends in Mesopotamia. Instead of inaugurating a new era of unchallenged American power and enhancing national security, Bush seems set on preparing their demise. Since the murderous terror of 9/11, his administration has shattered the myth of American military omnipotence, tarnished the country’s moral authority, alienated its allies, squandered its once formidable diplomatic powers, created the basis of an anti-US realignment, and undermined America’s image not only as a force for democracy and order, but as a secure economic haven. This latter tendency is now causing overseas investors to think twice about sending their capital to the US, which, combined with the ballooning expenses of the Iraq war, is hastening the dollar’s decline and the country’s economic deterioration. But more than undermining American power and prestige, the Bush administration has discredited the liberal civilizational model associated with the United States, provoking, in the process, a worldwide revulsion against the “American way of life.”
The simple-minded, dishonorable, and raceless character of Bush’s government—riddled with Israeli spies and unsavory influence peddlers and premised on the belief that truth is irrelevant to its political calculus—seems to epitomize nothing so much as the debilitated state of our governing classes and their inability to serve as a nation-bearing stratum. That for the first time in American history Europe is not the focus of US strategic thinking, but rather Israel, should say it all. It would be misleading, though, to think the failures at the highest level of state are simply the result of an unusually incompetent administration or its alien controllers. For even the “opposition” party produces candidates who are but variants of the reigning mediocrity. This suggests that the system itself is bankrupt. Not coincidentally, the telltale signs of blockage, symptomatic of regimes heading toward the abyss (or “staying the course,” as George II says), appear now with increased frequency. The great bard of our decline, H. Millard, likens America to a runaway train. “The Israel firsters, neurotics, low IQ PTA types, political opportunists, easily susceptible dupes, genocidal blenders, party loyalists, war profiteers, and opportunists of various stripes” who are at the controls either have no idea of what they are doing or an unwillingness to profess it publicly.
Contrary to the pipedreams of both our conservatives and liberals, there will be no going back. Like the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the US has become bogged down in a protracted war at the very moment its economy is in steep decline. The slash-and-burn policies Bush has introduced will also be extremely difficult to retract, no matter who captures the White House in 2008. But even if there were a desire to retract them, the means are lacking. For example, in 1956, when Dwight Eisenhower warned France and England not to retake the Suez Canal, after Egypt nationalized it, he was able to threaten the stability of their national currencies. Today, the dollar is itself threatened. For all the fabled shock and awe of US power in this period, the country is qualitatively weaker than it was a generation ago, when it was able to rein in the largest European empires. This erosion of its economic, diplomatic, moral, and even military power, combined with the near universal opposition to its increasingly unilateral and militaristic foreign policy, cannot but provoke a geopolitical realignment. The prospect of the Iraq war spreading to Iran and elsewhere will simply compound these destabilizing forces. Increased conflict abroad, growing dissent at home, and deep division within the government itself are also likely to foster decisional paralysis, further exacerbating the crisis.
But however this crisis plays out, America and Europe seem set on a collision course. Already wary of Washington, France and Germany (along with Spain, Belgium, and Italy, once Berlusconi goes) will eventually have no choice but to reposition themselves in opposition to it, for their strategic imperatives are increasingly at odds. This is certain to trigger new conflicts and new alignments, compelling Europeans to reaffirm their sovereignty—and their distinct strategic identity. As they do, their cooperation is bound to deepen and their nationalist consciousness to grow. At the same time, certain mentalities will be forced to change and certain taboos to fall, including the postmodern ones that leave Europe powerless. The collapse of the Cold War alliance system also throws open the strategic-political parameters of the international arena. The future, as a consequence, now holds out several possible alternatives. The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis may still lack credibility, but this is probably less important than the effect it has had—and will continue to have—on the European spirit. It thus promises a possible renewal. The big question is whether or not Europeans have the will and acumen to realize it.
Fundamental to virtually all schools of geopolitical thought is the notion that the augmentation of power in one part of the world inevitably comes at the expense of another part. If the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis continues to affect the continent and shift power out of the Atlanticist camp, this cannot but destabilize the United States, for without its omnipotent dollar and its domination of global markets, it will no longer be able to consume more than it produces, to live on credit, to afford the social-welfare measures that buy off the Africans and tame the Mexicans, to sustain the social-engineering schemes discriminating against the talents and energies of its white majority, to afford the police, the drugs, the TVs, and the computer toys that narcotize its cretinized masses. The institutionalization of such an axis is also likely to dislodge America’s dominant place in the world system, setting off economic disruptions that will make it impossible for whites to live in the old way, to lose themselves in vacuous material comforts, to accept the lies that fly in the face of reality. Once this point is reached, European-Americans will be forced to act like people elsewhere who are suddenly thrown into a do-or-die situation.
Like the “American Century” Henry Luce announced in 1941, the “New American Century” of Washington’s current generation of schemers and chiselers promises an even greater holocaust of our people. The future they envisage might indeed be called the New Anti-White Century. For like the order issuing from their Second World War, the one planned for the period following Iraq will not serve white America, only the alien, plutocratic, and cosmopolitan interests aligned in the current Washington-London-Tel Aviv axis.
No one should be surprised, then, that when the inevitable collapse comes, white America’s front fighters will not mourn the eclipse of the so-called American Century, for they are nationalists not in the nineteenth century sense. They do not fight for the petty-statism of the so-called “nation-state”—which is now made up of peoples from many different nations. The American, German, and French states—none of these entities any longer represent the descendants of those who founded them. As Sam Francis puts it, “the state has become the enemy of the nation.” And as a thousand years of European history demonstrate, whenever the state and the nation come into conflict, the latter inevitably proves the stronger. I think it is no exaggeration to claim that only on the ruins of the existing political order will white America be reborn—and reborn not as another constitutional “nation-state” which elevates abstract rights above biocultural imperatives, but as a northern imperium of white peoples who, as Bismarck exhorted, “think with their blood.”
Those who would dismiss the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis as a temporary happenstance, a product of convenience, inflated with purely speculative significance, should be reminded that the 21st century will decide if white people have a future or not. From this perspective, collapse and realignment are necessities—and necessities have a way of engendering the imagination appropriate to them. For when the world’s population reaches ten billion, when China, India, and all Asia challenge the white man’s dominance, when the colored multitudes crossing our borders are magnified by ten or a hundred, when oil is depleted and raw materials are used up, when all the forests have been cut down and all the cultivable lands claimed, and—hopefully—when the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis has established an alternative realm of white existence, the ensuing chaos cannot but sunder whatever misbegotten allegiance white Americans have had to the present system. Then, in alliance with their kinsmen in Europe and Russia, they—if they are to survive as a people—will have no choice but to accept that they are made not in the multihued images of a deracinated humanity, but in that of the luminous Boreans, whose destiny opposes the darkening forces of Bush’s America.
Let us prepare for the coming collapse.
1. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003), p. 3. Actually, the unreferenced metaphor originates with Denis MacShane, “Europe and America Need Each Other More Than Ever,” http://www.post-gazette.com
2. Kagan, Of Paradise and Power, p. 28.
3. Guillaume Faye, La colonisation de l’Europe: Discours vrai sur l’immigration et l’Islam (Paris: L’Æncre, 2000); Nicolas Baverez, La France qui tombe (Paris: Perrin, 2004).
4. Julius Evola, Imperialismo pagano: Il fascismo dinanzi al pericolo euro-cristiano (Padua: Ar, 1996), p. 45.
5. Yves Daoudal, Le tour infernal: 21 avril–5 mai (Paris: Godefroy de Bouillon, 2003).
6. Yves-Marie Laulan, Jacques Chirac et le déclin français 1974–2002 (Paris: François-Xavier de Guilbert, 2001); Emmanuel Ratier, Le vrai visage de Jacques Chirac (Paris: Facta, 1995).
7. Faye, Le coup d’Etat mondial, p. 113.
8. Omer Taspinar, “Europe’s Muslim Streets,” Foreign Policy (March–April 2003).
9. As Schröder says: “Es gibt nicht zu viel Amerika, es gibt zu wenig Europa.” See “Die Krise, die Europa eint: Ein Gespräch mit Gerhard Schröder,” Die Zeit (14/2003). Cf. Philippe Grasset, “Le dilemme stratégique des U.S.A: Sa faiblesse militaire” (June 15, 2004), http://www.dedefensa.org
10. Günter Maschke, “Vereinigte Staaten sind die Macht der Unordnung,” Deutsche Stimme (June 2003).
11. Quoted in Richard Lambert, “Misunderstanding Each Other,” Foreign Affairs (March–April 2003).
12. Alexander Rar, “Europa ist Zerspaltet” (December 15, 2003), http://evrazia.org
13. Edouard Husson, “Crise allemande, crise européenne?” (March 2003), http://www.diploweb.com
14. As Joseph de Maistre said of the revolutionaries of 1789: “Ce ne sont point les hommes qui mènent la révolution, c’est la révolution qui emploie les hommes.” See Considérations sur la France (Lyon: Vitte, 1924), p. 7.
15. Maja Heidenreich, “Europa und Russland: Eine rückblickende und analysierende Darstellung” (n.d.), http://www.boschlektoren.de/
16. Quoted in Sacha Papovic, “De la dialectique géopolitique” (August 2003), http://www.voxnr.com.
17. Cited in “Russie-France-Allemagne” ( n.d.), http://www.paris-berlin-moscou.org
18. Oswald Spengler, Preussentum und Sozialismus (Munich: Beck, 1919); K. R. Bolton, ed., Varange: The Life and Thoughts of Francis Parker Yockey (Paraparaumu, NZ: Renaissance Press, 1998), pp. 36–38. Also N. N. Alexeiev, “Raisons spirituelles de la civilisation eurasiste” (1998), http://www.voxnr.com
19. W. Joseph Stoupe, “The Inevitability of a Eurasian Alliance” (August 17, 2004), http://atimes.com
20. James Kurth, “The War and the West,” Orbis (Spring 2002).
21. Guillaume Faye, Avant-Guerre: Chronique d’un cataclysme annoncé (Paris: L’Æncre, 2002).
22. Philippe Grasset, “Comment Rumsfeld devient le garante de l’aventure irakienne” (May 11, 2004), http://www.dedefense.org
23. François-Bernard Huyghe, Quatrième guerre mondiale: Faire mourir et faire croire (Paris: Rocher, 2004), p. 9.
24. D. Priest and T. E. Ricks, “Growing Pessimism on Iraq: Doubts Increase within U.S. Security Agencies,” The Washington Post, September 29, 2004.
25. Philippe Grasset, “La destruction méthodique de la puissance américaine” (September 27, 2004), http://www.dedefensa.org; Guatam Adhikari, “The End of the Unipolar Myth,” International Herald Tribune, September 27, 2004.
26. Philippe Grasset, “Comment l’américainisme est en train d’apparaître pour ce qu’il est: un problème de civilisation” (September 1, 2004), http://www.dedefensa.org
27. Brent Scowcroft, George I’s national security adviser, has publicly criticized George II for being “inordinately influenced by Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. ‘Sharon just has him wrapped around his little finger’, Scowcroft said. ‘I think the president is mesmerized.’“ See “Key GOP Figure Raps Bush on Mideast,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 17, 2004.
28. Ehsan Ahari, “How Bush, Kerry Are One and the Same” (September 2, 2004), http://www.latimes.com
29. H. Millard, “Ridin’ the Runaway Train Named America” (2004), http://www.newnation.org
30. Françoise Vergniolle de Chantal, “Les débats américains sur la relations transatlantiques” (2004), http://robert-schuman.org
31. Ian Williams, “Deterring the Empire” (May 13, 2003), http://www.alternet.org
32. David Wood, “U.S. to Sell Precision-Guided Bombs to Israel” (September 23, 2004), http://www.newhousesnews.com
33. Ian Black, “The Transatlantic Drift,” The Guardian, September 20, 2004; Philippe Grasset, “L’UE: Une stratégie de rupture avec l’Amérique” (September 20, 2004), http://www.dedefensa.org
34. Faye, Avant-Guerre.
35. Sam Francis, “When the State Is the Enemy of the Nation” (July 19, 2004), http://www.vdare.com This is not to say that the state is inherently the enemy of the nation—only that this is the case with the existing liberal state. On the difference between statism and nationalism, see Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
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