Gorgias (Image source: Wikimedia Commons, from an Italian book published in 1818)

1,878 words

Part 4 of 14 (Part 1 here, Part 2 here, Part 3 here, Part 5 here)

Ethics as an Afterthought (456d–457c)

Is Socrates right that sophistry is essentially amoral and technocratic? After all, the sophists were widely seen as not just teachers of rhetoric but also as teachers of morals. However, as we shall see, both Polus and Callicles strongly embrace the amoral and technocratic idea of sophistry. Moreover, in the Meno—which is set in 402 BCE, after the Peloponnesian War and the latest possible date of the Gorgias—Meno tells Socrates: “I admire this most in Gorgias, Socrates, that you would never hear him promising this [to teach virtue]. Indeed, he ridicules the others [other sophists] when he hears them making this claim. He thinks one [the sophists] should [only] make people better speakers” (95c).^[1]

The evidence, however, is contradictory. Recall that Gorgias’ dedication in Olympia claimed that he trained men for the “contests of virtue.” And, as we shall see, in this very conversation with Socrates, Gorgias shows that he is aware of the question of right use.

But the question is not: Did the sophists take note of morals? The real question is: Did the sophists believe that rhetoric or moral philosophy had the right to rule? Gorgias presents rhetoric as the ruling art: the art that encompasses, subordinates, and makes all other arts effective. But if rhetoric cannot assure that it will be used rightly, then it cannot be the highest authority. It must look to moral philosophy for guidance.

After lauding the daimonic power of rhetoric, Gorgias hastens to add that this power should be used rightly like any other power (456d). Specifically, he says that rhetoricians should use their powers against their enemies, not their friends. (This is the idea that justice is helping one’s friends and harming one’s enemies, which Socrates criticizes in Republic, book 1.[2])

Gorgias gives the example of a man trained in boxing who “strikes his father or mother or one of his familiars or friends” (456d). This is an allusion to Aristophanes’ Clouds, in which the young man Pheidippides ends up beating his father after being corrupted by Socrates’ (and Chaerephon’s) sophistical teachings. In Plato’s Apology, Socrates says that the Clouds is the origin of the accusation that Socrates corrupts the youth. But was the Clouds based on real events? Where there’s smoke, there’s fire. (Socrates’s defense in the Apology is essentially: the Clouds was the fire, not the smoke; it was the source of Socrates’ bad reputation, not merely a sign of it.)

Gorgias argues that, as an art, rhetoric is morally neutral. Whether an art is used well or badly is up to the practitioner. The teacher is entirely innocent. Thus it is unjust to punish teachers for the misdeeds of their students. This would be Gorgias’ Apology if he were indicted for corrupting the youth.

It is noteworthy that it is not Socrates’ apology. Indeed, in Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates agrees in principle that society should not tolerate the corrupters of the youth.[3] But Socrates thinks that he is not one of the corrupters. Unfortunately, the public can’t tell the difference between Socrates and the sophists.

Love of Truth vs. Love of Victory (457c–458d)

At this point, Socrates thinks that Gorgias has contradicted himself. But before he points out the contradiction, Socrates introduces a distinction between two kinds of men. One kind of man primarily wants to win an argument. The other kind of man primarily wants to get to the truth. Of course we all want both: to win and to know the truth. But if we are forced to choose, one type prefers truth to winning; the other prefers winning to truth.

The kind of man who is primarily concerned with winning will never allow himself to be refuted, even if he’s wrong. He’ll be stubborn. He’ll filibuster. He’ll commit every sophistry in the book. He’ll grandstand to the audience, of course, because if he’s wrong, the only way to “win” is to make other people think he’s won. Because he is so concerned with maintaining the image of being correct, he will never discover his errors and actually be correct.

By contrast, the man who is primarily interested in the truth is happy to be refuted if he’s wrong, because by getting rid of his false beliefs he gets closer to having true beliefs.

Then Socrates puts Gorgias on the spot by asking what kind of man he is: Is he primarily concerned with truth or victory?

Of course Gorgias says he is primarily concerned with truth. But when put on the spot like that in front of an audience, wouldn’t everyone say that?

But since Socrates has brought the audience into it, Gorgias says that although he is willing to continue the conversation, perhaps they should think of their audience. After all, they have already heard Gorgias’ speech and Q&A session. Perhaps they are tired. Perhaps they wish to leave and are lingering merely to be polite. Chaerephon, Callicles, and the crowd enthusiastically press Gorgias to continue. To this, Gorgias replies that it would be “shameful” for him to back out now, especially after declaring that he would answer any question.

This little episode is very rich. First, it shows that Socrates is a rather cagey operator, boxing Gorgias into answering lest he make the embarrassing admission that he is not the kind of man who prefers truth to victory. Second, it shows that Gorgias is equally cagey, by putting the decision in the hands of the audience out of politeness. Was Gorgias hoping that the crowd would get him out of a tight spot? If so, the demos had other ideas. Gorgias abides by the decision of the majority and keeps his promise to answer any question. Plato includes these dramatic details to show that Gorgias has a sense of shame, which means that he has a sense of honor, which means he’s a gentleman. As we shall see, Gorgias’ sense of shame makes it possible for Socrates to catch him in a contradiction.

Gorgias’ Contradiction (458d–461b)

To show Gorgias that he is contradicting himself, Socrates first secures his assent to the following statements. Gorgias claims he can teach men to be orators. An orator can speak to the many on any subject and gain their assent by evoking belief, not by imparting knowledge. An orator can be more persuasive than a doctor, even on matters of health. But this works only among the many who are ignorant of medicine, not among the few who are knowledgeable of it. An orator who is not a physician is ignorant of medicine. Socrates then concludes that when an orator is more persuasive than a doctor, this is a case of an ignorant man being more persuasive to the ignorant than a knowledgeable man. Gorgias agrees.

Then Socrates generalizes to the other arts: a successful orator need not know the truth about any of the arts, as long as he can persuade the ignorant that he knows more than the experts. Gorgias agrees. He thinks that it is wonderful to be able to beat experts in any art in the eyes of the many by becoming proficient solely in one art, namely rhetoric.

Socrates then asks: Are orators as ignorant of “the just and unjust, noble and shameful, good and evil” as they are of medicine and the other arts? If students are ignorant of good and evil, will Gorgias simply teach them to fake such knowledge before the ignorant? Or must students know about good and evil before they study rhetoric?

Gorgias replies that if students come to him ignorant of good and evil, they will learn these from him alongside rhetoric. Socrates then concludes that whoever learns rhetoric “must either know the nature of the just and unjust already, or he must be taught by you [Gorgias].” Gorgias agrees.

Socrates then argues that, just as a man who learns carpentry is a carpenter, and a man who learns medicine is a doctor, a man who learns justice would be a just man. Here Socrates is assuming a thesis that he argues for in the Meno and the Protagoras, namely, that virtue is a kind of knowledge, thus if one knows what is virtuous, one will be virtuous.[4] Thus if a man knows justice, he will be a just man. A just man always desires to do justice. He always performs just deeds. And he never does injustice. Gorgias agrees on all points.

At this point, Socrates reveals Gorgias’ contradiction. On the one hand, Gorgias maintains that rhetoric is a morally neutral techne. Thus when students of rhetoric misuse this techne, it is their fault, not the fault of rhetoric or their teachers. On the other hand, Gorgias holds that every student either knows about justice before studying rhetoric or he picks up knowledge along the way. But, if to know justice is to be just, then no orator would misuse rhetoric.

Gorgias can resolve the contradiction by dropping his claim that orators necessarily learn what is just. Or he can challenge the premise that those who know the just will act justly.

But the deeper problem is his insistence that rhetoric is the master art. The polemos of the Gorgias is a struggle between rhetoric and philosophy for supremacy. If rhetoric must look outside itself to moral philosophy to ensure right use, then it is not the highest form of knowledge. Philosophy is. If moral knowledge is intrinsic to rhetoric—which seems to be what Gorgias is driving at with the idea that all orators will know the good—then rhetoric is no longer a techne. In effect, it becomes philosophy, so philosophy still rules.

Socrates says that it will take a great deal more discussion for them to untangle this contradiction. He swears an oath “by the dog” (461b) to indicate his seriousness about pursuing the truth. Later in the Gorgias, we learn that the dog is an Egyptian god, probably Anubis (482b).

Polus Interrupts (461b)

But before Socrates can continue to question Gorgias, Polus interrupts again, and this time he maintains control of the conversation.

The substance of Polus’ objection is that Gorgias was defeated by his own sense of shame. When Socrates asked whether students of rhetoric need to know the just, Gorgias was too ashamed to say “no” and maintain that rhetoric is a value-neutral techne.

Prudence might also have played a role. According to Meno, Gorgias mocked the idea that sophists should teach morals in addition to rhetoric. Here, he defends that idea.

One explanation for the contradiction is that the former view was Gorgias’ private conviction, which he related to his students and peers. The latter view, however, is for public consumption, to ward off the charge of being a corrupter of the youth. However, whether from shame or prudence or a mixture of the two, Gorgias’ claim that every student of rhetoric knows the just is definitely playing to the crowd.

[1] Plato, Meno, trans. G. M. A. Grube, in Plato, Complete Works, ed. John A. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), p. 893.

[2] Plato, Republic, 331e–336a.

[3] See my lecture on the Euthyphro in The Trial of Socrates.

[4] Plato, Meno, 87b–89a; Protagoras, 358d–361b.