Birth Rates & Eugenics

834 words

The Trump administration has shown an unusual enthusiasm for raising America’s birth rate, promoting pro-natalist policies such as baby bonuses and expanded family tax credits. Officials argue that reversing population decline is essential for national strength and economic vitality. Yet this well-meaning agenda could produce unintended consequences. If pro-natalist measures disproportionately increase births among lower-income or less-educated groups, the long-term effect could be a decline in the population’s overall human capital

Across the developed world, intelligence and fertility are inversely related. In most industrialized societies, people with higher IQs, greater education, and higher incomes tend to have fewer children. This pattern, observed for more than a century, has led some researchers to argue that the modern world is experiencing dysgenic trends, meaning that the traits associated with intelligence and competence are slowly declining. Studies using both genetic and demographic data have shown persistent selection against intelligence-related characteristics. In Western countries, the most intelligent individuals often postpone or avoid childbearing, while those with lower intelligence have tended to reproduce earlier and more frequently

Recent evidence, however, suggests that these trends are slowing, and in some places beginning to reverse. In Europe, fertility is increasingly concentrated among people with higher incomes and better education. A large study of sixteen Western European countries found that higher income now predicts a higher likelihood of becoming a parent for both men and women . The research shows that the “income prerequisites of parenthood” have grown stronger. People with stable and substantial incomes are the ones who still choose to have children, while fertility among low-income groups has fallen sharply. In countries such as Austria, Belgium, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, the gap between rich and poor in the likelihood of becoming parents has widened.

This pattern is important because it links reproduction to education, intelligence, and stability. As more children are born to high-income, well-educated parents, the population’s average level of human capital may be better preserved. In other words, the dysgenic trend that once seemed inevitable has weakened. Women with professional careers are now more likely to balance work and family life, and their financial security allows them to raise children without severe tradeoffs.

A similar change is visible in some religious populations in the United States. Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints show a rare positive relationship between intelligence and fertility. Data from the General Social Survey demonstrate that, unlike the general population, more intelligent Latter-day Saints have more children. Politically conservative Americans, who tend to be more religious, also show weaker selection against intelligence than liberals. In such groups, strong pronatalist values and supportive communities encourage educated and intelligent individuals to have large families. These patterns show that cultural norms can counteract the general link between intelligence and low fertility.

Another factor slowing dysgenic change is the collapse of teenage motherhood. More than half of the recent decline in the American fertility rate is due to the fact that women under nineteen now have virtually no children. About one third of the missing births would have been unplanned, and most of those would have been to low-income women. Since these women tend to have lower education and lower cognitive ability, the reduction in teenage and unplanned pregnancies has improved the overall quality of reproduction

For example, only eight percent of the children of American-born parents without college degrees are expected to obtain a bachelor’s degree themselves. Over a lifetime, the average high-school graduate contributes less than one-tenth as much to public finances as the average college graduate. The children of working-class parents are therefore less impressive in educational and economic outcomes, and they contribute far less to the prosperity of society. When policies stimulate fertility mainly among these groups, the long-term result is a population with lower skills and productivity.

Additionally, evidence from Europe shows that direct cash payments to parents mainly influence fertility among the poor. In Norway and Finland, the modest rise in births after pro-natalist subsidies came almost entirely from women in the lowest income groups, while the middle class did not alter its behavior. The same was true in France, where halving middle-class child tax credits in 2014 produced no measurable change in birth rates. These findings suggest that the affluent are motivated by stability and opportunity, not short-term incentives, while the poor are more responsive to direct payments.

These lessons matter for policymakers. Proposals such as the Trump administration’s five-thousand-dollar baby bonus would likely raise birth rates among working-class families whose children tend to be less educated and less economically productive. A wiser approach would focus on supporting educated households that already make large contributions to the nation’s prosperity.

As unplanned births decline and educated families continue to reproduce, the world’s demographic trajectory is beginning to shift in a more positive direction. The future is not condemned to mediocrity or decline. With thoughtful incentives that favor capable and productive citizens, societies can ensure that the next generation inherits both stability and intelligence rather than a slow erosion of competence.