Polish Presidential Elections of 2025

2,384 words

In this short essay I will discuss the role of the president in the Polish political system, the background and context of the 2025 elections, the main actors, and finally, the outcome of the elections with some predictions for the future.

The Role of the President in the Polish Political System

The Polish political system is more similar to the German or British system (with the leading role of the head of government) than to the US system (with the leading role of the President). In Poland, the leading figure in the political system and head of the Polish government is the prime minister. While the real political power is held by the prime minister, the president’s most important role is to represent Poland on the international stage. However, the President of Poland is in some aspects different from the German president or the monarch of the United Kingdom. The Polish president can veto any legislation (though the veto can be later overturned by a vast majority in the Parliament), can propose new legislation to be accepted or rejected by the Parliament, and is the commander-in-chief of the Polish armed forces. Thus, the president in Poland is not the main figure of the political system, but is still a figure with some limited power—but needs to be willing to use it. Another main difference is that the President in Poland is elected via general elections.

This aspect of the Polish political system is a topic of many debates, with many arguing that Poland should move either in the German direction (thus limiting the power of the president even more) or in the American direction (thus increasing the power of the president and turning this position into the main one in the system). Opponents of the current political system argue that the president cannot do much, but can interrupt a lot when the government is trying to work. On the other hand, proponents claim that the president is an “emergency brake” of the system who can stop dangerous or irrational ideas of the government.

When it comes to the Polish presidential elections themself, it is noteworthy that they spark heated emotions among the public and usually have a higher turnout than the parliamentary elections, even though objectively speaking, the parliamentary elections are much more important as their aftermath is the forming of a new government which actually rules the country. However, it seems that people tend to be more interested in elections if they vote for a person than for a party.

The Stage and the Actors

The president finishing his second and last term is Andrzej Duda. Elected twice (in 2015 and 2020), a doctor of law connected with the previously ruling Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) party, he was a good embodiment of the views of the majority of Polish society: mildly conservative with a slight pro-social twist. We may also add that he comes from an old family of academics from Cracow which in Poland is considered the epitome of the traditional conservative bourgeoisie mixed with Catholic intelligentsia. Both terms of Andrzej Duda were just as one would expect: he was rather helpful towards the Law and Justice governments, and while he made some attempts to move out of the shadow of Jarosław Kaczyński (the party leader who was controlling the government from the back seat) he never managed to achieve this. Duda’s moment of glory (even acknowledged by many of his opponents) was the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022, when (as a commander-in-chief of Polish armed forces) he really took on the role of the leader, managed to control the situation, and kept cool in very risky circumstances. He also managed to represent Poland well on the international stage with his decisions actually shaping the reactions of other European countries. However, after a while, Germany and France dominated European politics  (as usual), and Polish-Ukrainian relations began to get worse.

The main background for the presidential elections of 2025 were the parliamentary elections of 2023. I wrote about these in detail (here and here), but to put it briefly: the previously ruling Law and Justice party won—but actually lost, while the main opposition party Platforma Obywatelska (Citizens Platform) lost, but actually won, as they managed to form a majority coalition and thus a majority government with other opposition parties with Donald Tusk as the Prime Minister. The presidential elections of 2025 quickly escalated into a plebiscite: for or against the ruling government.

During the campaign it became apparent that there are two most important candidates in the race: Rafał Trzaskowski from Citizens Platform and Karol Nawrocki—officially an “independent candidate” but backed by Law and Justice. Rafał Trzaskowski is the president of Polish capital Warsaw, and he already unsuccessfully ran for president in 2020, losing slightly to Andrzej Duda. Karol Nawrocki is a historian, head of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (a state institution in charge of historical archives and shaping official politics of memory). Donald Tusk decided to go for a candidate with much political experience and a strong party identity who can be considered as a government insider, while Jarosław Kaczyński decided to go for a candidate with no party affiliation who has not been part of parliamentary politics and thus could be considered a total outsider.

The Results and Predictions for the Future

To cut a long story short, the first round was a victory for Trzaskowski, with Nawrocki coming second, and two “rightist” candidates coming next: Sławomir Mentzen (a conservative libertarian) and Grzegorz Braun (who since my short piece about him went into full “political comedian living off naïve fans” mode). The turnout of 66.9% was very high by Polish standards. What was especially interesting is that the youngest voters did not vote for the two main candidates choosing either one of the two “rightist” candidates or the leftist Adrian Zandberg (a Polish Jew born in Denmark who is a local version of the Western limousine left). This shows that the youngest generation feels betrayed by both sides of the Polish political mainstream, and with the generational change it is possible that the two main Polish parties might fade into oblivion.

After many heated debates when the two remaining candidates accused each other of countless vices including addictions to snus or drugs we encountered quite a funny situation: exit polls on the Sunday night of the elections predicted a slight victory of Rafał Trzaskowki who quickly began celebrating his apparent victory. However, once the actual votes were counted, it turned out that the actual winner is Karol Nawrocki: 50.89% to 49.11%. Rafał Trzaskowski was mocked as “a president for one night”. The voter turnout was very high: 71.31% (though slightly lower than during the parliamentary elections of 2023).

As I wrote earlier, these elections were a general vote of confidence for the government of Donald Tusk. And as it turns out, the majority of Poles (but not vast majority) are against this government. Some are against the liberal policies and values proclaimed not that much by Tusk himself but by his leftist and more liberal coalition partners. Others are against the foreign policy represented by Tusk: very pro-EU and very pro-German. Most Poles (including many of Tusk’s proponents) are disappointed by the lack of results. When running for the Parliament, Tusk and his allies have promised a lot, and they have literally delivered nothing of importance. Even opponents of the previous government admit that Kaczyński has a political vision, and he takes actions to achieve it. Tusk might have a vision but he does not do much. Many insiders complain that Tusk loves to be in the spotlight, but he does not like to do the actual work—and it seems that they were right all along.

Most people did not vote for Nawrocki or Trzaskowski: they voted for or against Tusk. And as one of the commenters has stated: Tusk could have cut the candidate out of cardboard and Kaczyński could have made his cat run for office, nobody would have cared. The turnout and the results of the elections would have been the same.

Now some in the media (both Polish and foreign) have described the newly elected Karol Nawrocki as a street thug, a football hooligan, a Catholic bigot, and a pro-Russian Nazi antisemite with ties to the crime underworld who used to work as a pimp. This is all lies. While the media likes to portray Nawrocki as some kind of shady and violent figure, the reality is that he is an academic, a doctor of history who does research and who was a head of a museum and later of a state research institution. He does box and go to the gym, but that is about it. He is a football fan with some ties to the hooligan scene but pretty much the same ties that many football fans in Poland have. (Though we should underline that he is a fan of Lechia Gdańsk which is a traditionally anti-communist and pro-rightist club with ties to the RAC and nationalist scene in Poland.) He did eventually admit to taking part in an illegal hooligans fight, which is a criminal offence in Poland. When it comes to his ties with the criminal underworld, in his early youth he used to work as security guard in legal clubs and hotels where he might have rubbed shoulders with some criminal figures. Again, speaking from personal experience, in these times it was difficult to attend a gym, box, work in security, or go to the football games and not have contact with people of criminal background. He did write a book (under a pseudonym) about the Polish organized crime in Gdańsk in the 1990s, but it is far from apologetic.

Nawrocki was also accused of being a nationalist on the “environmental” and on the ideological levels. When it comes to the environmental aspect, in Gdańsk there is a small area of overlap of the nationalist skinhead, hooligan, and criminal environments. Due to his earlier mentioned activities Nawrocki has surely rubbed shoulders with people of all three kinds. However, there is no evidence that he has close ties with any of these. Furthermore, there is no evidence (on any side) that he actually has any real connections to the widely understood nationalist scene. When it comes to ideology, Nawrocki is surely a patriot with a mildly conservative outlook. While being first the head of the Museum of Second World War and then the head of the Institute of National Remembrance he was promoting the typically patriotic vision of Polish history, including emphasis on Poles who were helping Jews during German occupation. In Poland (just as in the US and the European countries) the patriotic vision and the national vision of history are not the same, and just as in Western countries Polish patriots like to underline that being Polish is a question of culture not of ethnicity which is an antithesis of the nationalist vision.

When it comes to foreign affairs, Nawrocki is (just like the Law and Justice Party) economically pro-EU, ideologically anti-EU, and very pro-NATO and pro-US. Presenting him as pro-Russian is simply stupid and evil. One of the main goals of both the Institute of National Remembrance and the Polish Museum of the Second World War is counteracting the (neo)Soviet vision of history, especially of the twentieth century. One of the tasks of the Institute is the removal of Soviet monuments and other remains of Soviet occupation in Poland. Due to these actions, in 2022 Nawrocki was listed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation as one of the figures facing criminal prosecution in Russia for insulting the memory of the USSR. It is probably one of the highest credentials of being anti-Russian a politician can have. During the campaign Nawrocki has made statements which can be considered not pro-Ukrainian (though in the conflict with Russia he supports Ukraine without reservations). However, what many people do not understand is that Poles have never been very pro-Ukrainian, but they have always been anti-Russian. Support for Ukraine in their war with Russia does not equal being pro-Ukrainian in all aspects.

Nawrocki has also been portrayed by the media as some kind of epitome of toxic masculinity, an alpha male and Catholic ayatollah with a traditional family. This is also not true. His marriage is a typical Polish contemporary urban family model (married parents, both working full time jobs, with children). However, when it comes to children, his family is not that traditionalist. His wife gave birth to her first son (from a different relationship) while she was a teenager, and Nawrocki is raising him as his own. So just as in the case of Donald Trump, Viktor Orban, or any other political figure, the media image of Karol Nawrocki is far from truth.

My predictions for the first term of Nawrocki as president are that he will stay in the shadow of Jarosław Kaczyński and be a part of the Law and Justice strategy to counter the government of Donald Tusk with hopes of regaining power by winning the next parliamentary elections. I also think that Donald Tusk will use the new president as an excuse for his failures and inactions, naming the possible presidential veto as the reason for not proposing any new legislation. What will happen later? I think it all depends on who wins the next parliamentary elections and whether Nawrocki will be able to become an independent political figure. And if he does, he has the chance of becoming the next leader of the Polish right (the non-nationalist, mainstream, mildly conservative right).

To end it all on a sour note: in Poland we already have an important political figure who comes from a working class Catholic family and hardcore anti-communist circles, who is a fan of Lechia Gdańsk and who participated in hooligan activities in his youth, and who even is also a historian by education. This man is Donald Tusk, whose biography and early political platform are very similar to these of Nawrocki. However, all of these have not made Tusk a nationalist or even a rightist later in his career. Thus, I predict that the political career of the next Polish president is a huge unknown which can develop even in the most unexpected ways.