William Blake, The Ancient of Days, 1794

2,903 words

Part 14 of 14

(Part 1 here, Part 2 here, Part 3 here, Part 4 here, Part 5 here, Part 6 here, Part 7 here, Part 8 here, Part 9 here, Part 10 here, Part 11 here, Part 12 here, Part 13 here)

Editor’s Note:

I will conclude my commentary on the Gorgias with a second series of articles early in 2025.

Who Is the Strongest?

Callicles argues that might makes right. The strongest should rule and have more of anything they want. Thus they are primarily talking about political inequality. Inequality of wealth derives from political inequality. Socrates agrees with Callicles that superior men have superior rights and deserve superior rewards. Socrates believes equals should be treated equally. But he does not believe in equal treatment for unequal people. Where Socrates disagrees with Callicles is about the question: What sort of superiority is relevant to politics? Is political superiority merely a matter of might, or is it something different?

Socrates asks Callicles to reprise his argument from the beginning. He asks if Callicles holds that:

What’s just in nature . . . [is] that he who is more powerful should carry off by force the things that belong to those who are less powerful, that he who is better should rule over those who are worse, and that the superior should have more than the inferior? (488b)

Callicles agrees that this is his position.

Then Socrates establishes that Callicles calls “more powerful, stronger, and better . . . the same thing” (488b), i.e., power = strength = goodness. Thus it is not possible to be “better but less powerful and weaker” or “more powerful but more wicked.”

Callicles states flatly, “They are the same thing” (488d).

Then Socrates points out that according to Callicles, “the many,” who are average and below average, pass laws to control superior individuals and make them their equals. This assumes that “in nature . . . the many [are] more powerful than the single individual.” Callicles agrees that “Of course they’re more powerful.” Socrates points out that this implies that “the rules prescribed by the many are the rules of the more powerful.” Callicles agrees, “Absolutely” (488d–e).

Then Socrates springs his trap. Callicles holds that the many use force to impose equality on their superiors. But Callicles also holds that “the more powerful are the better.” The obvious implication is that the many are the better because they are the more powerful. Socrates gives Callicles the chance to back out, but he affirms the premise that the more powerful are the better. Socrates then asks, “And in the nature of things are the rules of these people, since they are more powerful, fine [kalon]?” (488e). Fineness is a characteristic of superior men. Again, Callicles is given the option to change his position, but he agrees. Callicles seems oblivious of the conclusion Socrates is driving at, which at this point indicates that he’s a bit thick.

You can buy Greg Johnson’s The Trial of Socrates here.

Socrates presses forward and spells out his conclusion, asking if the many establish by convention the principle of equality and the principle that it is “more shameful to act unjustly than to be treated unjustly” (489a). (As far as we know, Socrates was the first to defend this thesis, so it is interesting that he is ascribing it to the many here.) Apparently, at this point Callicles sees where Socrates’ argument is driving, and he lapses into an embarrassed or annoyed silence. Thus Socrates prods him, “Please don’t refuse me this answer out of pique, Callicles. If you agree with me, then I’ll be getting full corroboration from you, since it will be a man of discernment who has agreed.” So Callicles agrees, “Yes, if it’s the many you’re talking about, they do regard that as a general rule” (489a).

Then Socrates states his final conclusion: “In which case, it’s not only by convention that acting unjustly is more disgraceful than being treated unjustly, or that having what is equal is just. It is so in nature as well” (489a). If by nature strength is the same thing as goodness, and if the many (the average and below average) together have the strength to impose equality on superior men, then equality is not merely right by convention, it is also right by nature. For behind convention is the power to establish and enforce convention. If power is right by nature, then power makes conventions right by nature, even if the convention is equality. The many also use power to establish the convention that it is more shameful to act unjustly than to be treated unjustly, and since power makes things right by nature, this convention is right by nature as well.

At this point, Callicles explodes: “Honestly! Will the man never stop babbling?” (489b). Here, Callicles is clearly addressing the audience. Then he turns to Socrates:

Tell me, Socrates, aren’t you ashamed at your age to be catching at words, and thinking it’s a real stroke of luck if someone slips up in a statement? I mean, do you think I’m saying that for people to be more powerful is anything other than for them to be better? Haven’t I been telling you for some time that I maintain the better and the more powerful are the same thing? Or do you think I’m saying that if a rabble of slaves gathers, or some ill-sorted collection of humanity good for nothing except perhaps the exercise of physical strength, and if these people make some claim, that is what is lawful? (489b–c)

Callicles isn’t taking this well. He claimed that might makes right. This means that whoever wields power is ipso facto right, because whatever norms they establish are right by nature, because they are backed by superior power. When confronted with the fact that this means that the mediocre many are more powerful than the excellent few, thus the norms they establish are right, Callicles in effect says, ‘I didn’t mean it that way.’

Power is not actually Callicles’ standard of the best. Instead, he thinks that the best are in some way noble or virtuous, whereas the worst are ignoble and base. Sometimes the noble lack power. But that does not deprive them of their excellence. Moreover, when base men have power, that does not make them noble. Thus Callicles doesn’t believe that might makes right. Instead, he believes that nobility and baseness are defined independent of power. As for power, he believes that those who are noble ought to rule, and those who are base ought not to rule. Stated at this level of generality, Socrates would completely agree with Callicles. They differ in their concrete ideas of what is excellent.

The Best Men are the Prudent

Callicles has made it clear that by the best men, he does not mean the physically strongest. But it is not yet clear what he does mean by the best. So Socrates continues to question him.

. . . I’ve been guessing for some time that by the stronger you meant something like that, my fortunate friend, and I repeated my question out of greedy desire to know plainly just what you do mean. You surely don’t mean you believe two men are better than one, or that your slaves are better than you because they’re physically stronger than you. But tell me again from the beginning: Just who do you mean are better, if not the physically stronger? And do please teach me my lessons more gently, dear friend, lest I stop attending your class. (489d)

To this, Callicles responds with the charge that Socrates is being “ironic” (489e). This is an instance in which the Greek eironeia is best translated as “condescending.” Socrates is pretending to be Callicles’ student, when he obviously believes himself to be Callicles’ teacher. Irony is a form of dissimulation practiced by Greek gentlemen around their inferiors. In order to spare the feelings of their inferiors, Greek gentlemen would pretend to be less than they really are. They would feign equality or even inferiority. If, however, your irony is seen through, then not only does it fail to hide your superiority, it is an expression of superiority. Hence you are guilty of being condescending. This is self-defeating, because it inflames rather than spares the feelings of your inferiors. Callicles is clearly becoming increasingly annoyed.

Socrates parries the charge of irony by swearing an oath not by Zeus, the god of friendship, but “by Zethus,” the son of Zeus in Euripides’ Antiope. Socrates then accuses Callicles of being condescending to him. This is obviously true, particularly when Callicles was speaking as Zethus. But Socrates is better at maintaining a cool head than Callicles, so he had not revealed his feelings until now. Having brushed aside this accusation, Socrates presses on: “Come and tell me: whom do you mean by the better?” (489e).

To this Callicles responds, “I mean the superior” (489e). But to say the better are the superior is not an answer. Superior in what, exactly? Thus Socrates suggests a more concrete answer: “Won’t you say whether by the better and stronger you mean the more prudent [Socrates refers here to phronesis, i.e., practical wisdom], or somebody else?” Callicles responds, “Well of course I mean them. Emphatically so” (489e).

Stated at this level of generality, Socrates is in full agreement with Callicles that it is right by nature that the prudent rule. So now Socrates hones in on where they differ, which has to do with the idea that it is right by nature for the prudent to “have more.” Socrates again sums up Callicles’ position:

So by your account, one wise man is often stronger than thousands of fools, and he should rule and they be ruled, and the ruler should have a greater share than the ruled. This is what you seem to wish to say, and surely I am not catching at phrases, if one man is to be stronger than thousands. (490a)

Callicles agrees entirely with this summary: “. . . that’s just what I mean. I think that the just by nature consists in the better and wiser ruling and having a greater share than their inferiors” (490a).

Again, at this level of generality, Socrates is in complete agreement with Callicles. The basic principle that the better should have more than the worse is not indefensible. Better athletes deserve to have more ribbons than worse athletes, and generally it’s in proportion to how good they are. Better golfers win more money than worse golfers, and it’s generally proportionate to the differences in quality. It would be a crazy and unjust system if great golfers got the exact same amount of prize money as mediocre golfers — indeed, if anybody who enters a golf tournament gets an equal portion of the prize.

You can buy Greg Johnson’s From Plato to Postmodernism here

Where Socrates differs from Callicles is his understanding of the nature of “equal” and “more.” Callicles understand these terms “numerically” whereas Socrates understands them “proportionally.” Let’s explore this difference. Numerical equality is simply sameness in number. If Jack and Jill have the exact same incomes, they are numerically equal. If Jack gets one more dollar than Jill, then they are numerically unequal.

If Jack and Jill are equal, then it is unjust for Jack to get one dollar more. But what if they are unequal? Then paying them the same amount would be unjust. For Callicles, the height of injustice is to impose numerical equality on unequal people. Socrates would agree with this.

From this, Callicles draws the conclusion that justice requires numerical inequality, i.e., the better deserve to have more stuff than their inferiors. How much more? As much as they can get. The number series goes on forever. There is no limit. But Socrates does not agree with this. If numerical equality leads to injustice, then the answer is not necessarily numerical inequality. The answer is to reject the numerical model altogether for another model: the proportional, which combines both equality and inequality.

If Jack is better than Jill, surely he deserves more. But how much more? Callicles believes “as much as he can get.” But if Jack is only twice as good as Jill, shouldn’t he get twice as much? The inequality of rewards should be proportionate to the inequality of merit. Thus if Jack gets a dollar more or a dollar less than twice Jill’s reward, that would be an injustice. If Jack gets a dollar less than twice, it is an injustice to Jack. If Jack gets a dollar more than twice, it is an injustice to Jill. The key to the idea of “proportional” justice is that unequal rewards should be proportionate to unequal merits. This gives equality its due, for justice also requires equal rewards for equal merits. Proportional justice can be expressed as an analogy: Jack’s merit is to Jack’s reward as Jill’s merit is to Jill’s reward, or:

Jack’s merit : Jack’s reward :: Jill’s merit : Jill’s reward

The idea of proportional justice is spelled out in Plato’s last book, Laws (book 6), and in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (book 5). In the Gorgias, however, Socrates is clearly driving at this model of justice. As we have seen in Socrates’ discussion with Polus, analogies are central to explaining the difference between true politics and sophistry. All of the analogies in the Gorgias depend on the key Socratic analogy:

Virtue : the soul :: health : the body

. . . which implies:

Philosophy : the soul :: medicine : the body

Later in the Gorgias, Socrates will claim that one can introduce harmony into one’s soul by imitating the kosmos as a proportional harmony of four terms: earth, heaven, gods, and mortals. (This may well be the source of Heidegger’s idea of the fourfold, which is also a harmony of earth and heaven, gods and mortals.[1]) At this point in the dialogue, however, Socrates is simply concerned to establish that all questions of more or less stuff must be proportionate to the objective natures of the people who possess things. The idea of acquisition without measure, which the Greeks called pleonexia, is thus contrary to nature. Nature is finite. Thus all natural excellences are finite. Therefore all natural rewards should be finite as well.

Socrates bids Callicles to imagine a group of men, like the ones gathered around them, forming a political community. As in every community, the members are unequal in countless ways. Imagine also that they take counsel from the wise. In matters of diet, they would take advice from a doctor. He would thus be the ruler in matters of diet. Callicles accepts this picture. Then Socrates asks: If the doctor rules in matters of food, does that mean that it is right by nature for the doctor to have more food than the rest, regardless of his physical needs? What if the doctor is the smallest and weakest of the lot? If medical wisdom ruled, wouldn’t the doctor get the least amount of food, not the most? Or, to use my own example: in the hospital where the doctor rules, would justice require that the doctor take more pills than the patients?

Callicles is indignant. This is not the sense in which he thinks that the better should have more. Socrates, however, continues to pester him with his typical techne analogies. A cloak-maker is the wisest man about cloaks. Does that imply that he should have the biggest cloaks, the most cloaks, or the prettiest cloaks? The shoemaker is wisest about shoes. Does that imply he should wear the biggest shoes or the most shoes? The farmer is wisest about seeds. Does that mean that he should have the most seeds? All these examples have the idea of arithmetic inequality at their root, and the number line goes on without limit.

Obviously, in each case, the size and amount of stuff each artisan should have should be proportional to something objective. If the cloak-maker is small, he should not have the biggest cloak. Obviously, the size of the shoemaker’s shoes should be proportional to his feet. Obviously, the amount of seed a farmer should plant should be proportional to his land. In all of these cases, the amount of stuff is finite because it is made proportional to something finite.

Like two millennia of Plato’s readers, Callicles finds Socrates’ techne analogies tedious and irritating. But they serve a purpose, for they force Callicles to think in more concrete terms. Thus Socrates sweeps aside Callicles’ annoyance and presses further: “. . . please say what things the stronger and wiser has more of, when he justly overreaches and gets more than his share? Or do you intend to reject my suggestions while offering none of your own?” (491a).

Callicles’ response is that the stronger and better are: “people who are prudent in the affairs of the city, and courageous [the Greek for courage is andreia, which means ‘manliness’]. Those are the persons who should rule their cities, and the just lies here, that they should have more than the others, the rulers more than the ruled” (491c–d). Thus Callicles adds another virtue to his list. The men best suited to rule are not just prudent in the affairs of the city, but courageous as well. Thus they are entitled to more stuff than their fellows.

Socrates is pleased that Callicles has added courage to prudence. But another Greek virtue is relevant to the question of having more stuff: the virtue of moderation (sophrosyne), which is the topic of the next installment in this series.

Note

1. Martin Heidegger, “The Thing,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).