Hitler the Peacemaker: David L. Hoggan’s The Forced War, Part 4

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Part 4 of 5 (Part 1 here ^[2], Part 3 here ^[3], Part 5 here ^[4])

Hitler’s cancellation of military operations for August 26 left him with only five days before September 1, after which, according to his generals, a military campaign in Poland would no longer be feasible. If war was to be prevented, it had to be done within this time.

On the morning of August 25, President Roosevelt had dispatched messages to Germany and Poland proposing a settlement by direct negotiation, arbitration, or mediation. This elicited a response from Polish President Ignacy Mościcki rejecting arbitration, but accepting in principle the prospect of negotiations. His statement remained airily general, however; he not only offered no concrete proposals, but suggested no time or place for talks. Hitler was justifiably suspicious of both Roosevelt and Mościcki’s intentions, putting more faith in the ability of Poland’s British allies to pressure her to come to the table. In fact, on the very day of President Mościcki’s remarks, Beck was telling America’s ambassador in Warsaw that Poland would take the initiative of declaring war on Germany if the Germans did not act soon.

As they waited for a response from London, the Germans worked out a new set of terms for negotiation with the Poles. These became known as the Marienwerder Proposals; they involved a plebiscite in the northern tip of the Corridor. Gdynia, a port 23 miles from Danzig that had been under construction by the Poles since 1920, was recognized by the Germans as indisputably Polish and was not included in the plebiscite area. In the event of a Polish plebiscite loss, she was to be granted a transit route to Gdynia similar to the route previously sought by the Germans. The total extent of the area involved in these new proposals amounted to only one-tenth of the territory Germany had surrendered to Poland and the League of Nations after the First World War:

The German government insisted again and again that these terms were formulated to offer a basis for unimpeded negotiations between equals rather than to constitute a series of demands which the Poles would be required to accept. There was nothing to prevent the Poles from presenting proposals of their own.

Hitler was also in correspondence with French Prime Minister Daladier during these days, who maintained that France “found it necessary to offer her support to Poland,” but insisted on his strong desire for peace. (As previously mentioned, Daladier’s Foreign Minister, Bonnet, opposed any French guarantee to Poland.)

France’s ambassador remarked to Hitler that

[a] war fought with modern arms would above all be a great tragedy for the women and children of Europe. [He] noted that these carefully calculated words produced a great effect on Hitler. There was a long pause, after which the German Chancellor observed pensively: “Yes, I have often thought of the women and children.”

The next day, Hitler extended a pledge to the French that in the event of hostilities, Germany would not take the initiative in the waging of war against enemy civilians. Hoggan remarks, “This pledge was later strictly observed. It was rendered inoperative by the indiscriminate British bombing campaign over Germany.”

A prominent role in these final days of peace was played by a Swedish engineer named Birger Dahlerus, a firm opponent of Anglo-German hostilities with numerous contacts in both Britain and Germany. Since early July he had been working, with Hitler’s knowledge and permission, as a private envoy between the British authorities and Germany’s second-in-command, Hermann Göring. Dahlerus conferred with Halifax in London on August 25 and 26. Halifax presented him with a personal letter to Göring recommending direct German negotiations with the Poles. (It might have been more pertinent to have addressed such a missive to the Poles.)

Dahlerus flew to Berlin on the afternoon of the 26th to deliver Halifax’s letter to Göring and have his first personal audience with Hitler. On the 27th he was back in London, where British leaders assured him that a formal reply to Hitler’s alliance offer would soon be made. The gist was to be that “an agreement for collaboration with Germany was acceptable in principle, but the British would continue to support the position taken by Poland in the Danzig issue.” Back in Berlin the same day, he conveyed this to Hitler, who was extremely pleased:

Hitler assured Dahlerus he would be willing to accept the British commitment to Poland once Germany had settled her own differences with the Poles. He believed the British would recognize that he had made an important concession when he ceased to regard their guarantee to Poland as an obstacle to an Anglo-German understanding. Hitler then raised the crucial point. He insisted it was necessary for the British to persuade the Poles to negotiate. Otherwise nothing would be accomplished, war would be inevitable, and a favorable opportunity for an Anglo-German understanding would be lost.

Hitler said he was prepared to accept an international guarantee of Poland as part of any settlement, and to deny support to any third power — including Italy — that came into conflict with Britain.

Göring instructed Dahlerus to inform the British authorities of three important points: first, of the German army’s military plans, specifically that they would be in their final positions for operations against Poland by the night of Aug 30-31; second, the substance of the Marienwerder Proposals, which had not yet been reduced to numbered articles; and third, a convenient neutral location for negotiations between Germany and Poland: a Swedish-owned yacht in the Baltic. Dahlerus conveyed this information in London on the afternoon of the 28th. Halifax’s reaction was revealing: He transmitted to Warsaw only the first point, about military plans.

Hitler assumed the British were exerting pressure on their Polish allies to negotiate during these critical days, but such was not the case. Halifax merely contacted the British ambassador in Warsaw — not the Poles themselves — on August 28 at 2:00 PM, three days after receiving Hitler’s offer. In Hoggan’s view, he might not have done even this without “constant prodding from Dahlerus.” Halifax referred to President Mościcki’s abstract claim to be open to negotiations in his reply to Roosevelt, adding that “Britain expected Poland to conduct herself accordingly.” The ambassador replied “nonchalantly” that “Beck was prepared to enter into direct negotiations at once.” It is doubtful whether he had even asked Beck, who maintained afterwards that the first direct appeal he received to renew negotiations with Germany only came “much later.” In short, the British brought no pressure whatever to bear on Poland.

Dahlerus returned to Berlin on the 28th to announce Halifax’s rejection of Hitler’s proposal for German defense of the British Empire, apparently regarding it as an insulting insinuation that the British were unable to defend it themselves. (Hoggan notes that the British had accepted the Japanese defense of her East Asian possessions as early as 1902.) Göring was disturbed by this development, but Hitler persisted in his confidence that Britain would bring the Poles to the negotiating table.

At 10:30 PM on the 28th, the British ambassador finally brought Hitler Halifax’s official response. Along with much verbiage about the approaching war being “a calamity without parallel in history,” the note made two points: first, that Britain would insist that any settlement of the controversy with Poland be subject to an international guarantee by a number of powers, including Poland and Germany; and second, that the Polish government had declared its willingness to negotiate directly with Germany. This latter claim was nothing more than an allusion to President Mościcki’s response to Roosevelt, which the Germans already knew about; Poland had made no new assurances to the British. Unaware of this, Hitler was elated at the British note.

On August 29 at 7:00 AM, Dahlerus telephoned the British Foreign Office to report Hitler’s new optimism. Britain’s ambassador in Berlin wired London several times that day to urge British insistence that the Poles negotiate, and to recommend associating France in this demand. He denied Polish allegations that Hitler’s efforts toward a negotiated settlement merely represented an attempt to split the Anglo-Polish front. Halifax ignored these appeals.

Poland ordered full mobilization that same day, something Polish military plans stipulated would only be taken in the event of a decision to go to war. As Hoggan notes, this step is unsurprising in view of Halifax’s relaying of Göring’s information regarding German military plans, combined with suppression of the accompanying peace proposals.

By this time, even in the absence of British pressure, rumors were reaching Beck that Poland might be urged to resume negotiations with Germany. He took the initiative to inform the British ambassador in Warsaw that he was unprepared to grant any concessions to the Germans, and therefore saw no point in negotiations. This was relayed to Halifax, who neither replied nor informed the Germans.

In ignorance of the true situation, Hitler was preparing his response to Britain. He requested that the British authorities advise the Poles to send an emissary to Berlin the following day, August 30, emphasizing the need for haste. The British received Hitler’s response that evening, the 29th. Shortly after midnight, Halifax forwarded it to Britain’s ambassador in Warsaw with the vague comment that it “appeared to be not unpromising.” In informing Beck of Hitler’s request for an emissary, the British ambassador took it upon himself to advise a refusal — not that Beck needed such advice. On the morning of the 30th, Halifax was told it would “be impossible to induce the Polish government to send Col. Beck or any other representative immediately to Berlin to discuss a settlement on the basis proposed by Herr Hitler.” (Bonnet urged Beck to accept Hitler’s offer as soon as he heard about it, but was unable to accomplish anything without British support.)

After dispatching his response to Britain, Hitler even followed up with a clarification that the proposed meeting need not take place in Berlin, and might be held after midnight: in other words, on the 31st rather than the 30th. This made no difference.

General mobilization notices were posted throughout Poland by the afternoon of the 30th. The Polish government released a communiqué to justify the measure. Written by Beck, it insisted to the world that Poland had supported all efforts for peace, but had gotten no response from Germany. These measures were understood by the German Foreign Office as a final Polish rejection, although Hitler, Göring, and Ribbentrop clung to their hopes until the 31st.

At 6:50 PM on August 30, Halifax sent Britain’s ambassador in Berlin the British reply to Hitler’s note of the 29th. He rejected as “wholly unreasonable” the proposal for a Polish emissary to come to Berlin to negotiate. Hitler was informed at midnight of a flat British refusal to advise the Poles to comply.

Dahlerus conveyed the Marienwerder Proposals to the Polish embassy in Berlin at 10:00 the next morning, August 31. The Polish ambassador forwarded them to Beck, who responded shortly before noon with an order not to accept any more German proposals. Göring’s office intercepted and decoded this telegram:

The German response was swift and decisive. Hitler could act with a clear conscience. He had offered to negotiate a moderate settlement with the Poles despite months of Polish provocations and savage persecution of the Germans in Poland. The Polish refusal to discuss a settlement with Germany on any terms was insulting. Hitler had waited as long as possible without jeopardizing the German operational plan. He issued the final attack order at forty minutes past noon, on August 31.