Notes on Plato’s Alcibiades I, Part 2
The Question of Justice

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Part 2 of 7 (Part 1 here, Part 3 here)

In the first part of this series, Socrates accuses Alcibiades of wanting to be a tyrant and argues that if he wishes to fulfill this ambition, he must study philosophy. Alcibiades won’t admit that he aspires to be a tyrant, but “if” he did, he wants to know what Socrates would teach him.

The Question of Justice

Before Socrates answers, he asks Alcibiades if he expects a “long speech . . . of the sort you are accustomed to hear” (106b). Long speeches were heard in legislative assemblies and law courts. Crafting such speeches was a focus of the Sophistical education sought out by ambitious young men such as Alcibiades. (Interestingly enough, we never hear of Alcibiades seeking out the Sophists, though he had the requisite money and ambitions.) Socrates, however, specializes in dialogue. He will instruct Alcibiades by asking questions. (Socrates also insists on dialogue rather than speech-making in his discussions with the sophists Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles in the Gorgias.)

As soon as he comes of age, which will be quite soon, Alcibiades wants to go before the Athenian assembly to advise them. But of what? Surely Alcibiades would only advise them about things that he knew, specifically things that he knew better than the men in the assembly. One can give advice only about the things one knows. One will be listened to only if one knows better than one’s audience.

Socrates suggests that there are two kinds of knowledge: things one discovers oneself and things ones one learns from others. Alcibiades agrees. But maybe he was too hasty. Socrates seems to have an empirical model of knowledge in mind here, namely that all knowledge can be traced to experience, either one’s own or that of another. By assuming that premise, he can then show that Alcibiades has not learned anything that would qualify him to advise the city. But are there other forms of knowledge that are not derived from experience? For instance, isn’t it possible that we are simply born with some kinds of knowledge? Socratic argument actually presupposes that we already know what we are trying to define. Maybe we always already know some things.[1]

Socrates also proposes that Alcibiades would not have pursued knowledge unless he was aware that he lacked it. Alcibiades agrees. Self-knowledge, specifically knowledge of one’s own ignorance, seems to be a necessary condition for pursuing knowledge of other things.

Socrates then lists the things that Alcibiades has studied: reading and writing, cithara playing, and wrestling — but not the flute. Note that there’s no mention of Sophistry. How does Socrates know this? Apparently because he was a stalker following Alcibiades’ every move for years. He knew he studied wrestling, because he followed him to and from the wrestling school. We moderns are not comfortable with this. But I think it was supposed to seem creepy to the ancients as well.

So does Alcibiades plan to advise the assembly about spelling cithara playing, or wrestling, since these are things he knows? Obviously not. What about house-building, divination, or medicine? Obviously not. Athenians would only listen to experts in those fields.

Socrates also points out that looks, breeding, and wealth really don’t matter when it comes to technical expertise. This is Socrates slyly voicing what Alcibiades is really depending upon: not what he knows but who he is, not what he has learned but what he was born with.

There might be something to this. There may be more to leading the city than possessing the requisite knowledge and technical expertise. Looks, breeding, and wealth really do matter to politics. But Socrates keeps the discussion firmly focused on knowledge, specifically different forms of technical expertise.

The Athenians might well give Alcibiades a hearing based simply on his looks, breeding, and wealth. But when he opens his mouth, he’d better have something of substance to say. He needs to know something. But what does he know? What is his area of expertise?

Alcibiades answers that he will advise the citizens about “their own affairs.” But again, Socrates finds this vague. He wants something more concrete. Will Alcibiades advise the Athenians about building ships, for instance? Obviously not, since he has no expertise in shipbuilding. That would be for shipbuilders to discuss.

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So Alcibiades gets more specific. He will advise the Athenians “when they are deliberating on war or on peace or some other of the city’s affairs” (107d).

Socrates thinks this is promising. He asks if this means that they are deliberating about whom it is better to fight, when it is better to fight, and how long it is better to fight. Alcibiades agrees. Here Socrates is introducing the concept of the good. He is turning the discussion toward moral philosophy. For Socrates, philosophy is about wisdom, and wisdom is the ability to make right use of all things, which means it is intrinsically connected to the good.

But then Socrates does something surprising. He argues that questions of the good are subordinate to technical expertise. Wrestling coaches know the better and worse in wrestling. Musicians know the better and worse in music. Thus, as a general rule, “what is correct is surely what comes about according to art (techne)” (108b).

Is the good merely a technical question, a matter of know-how? On the one hand, an expert is the best judge of how skillfully an art is performed. But there’s more to the good than being good at wrestling or playing music or any other skill.

A skilled wrestler would also be a skilled assassin. A skilled musician would also be adept at torturing people with unbearable noise. A pharmacist has the ability to cure or to kill. The difference is merely a matter of dose. A surgeon likewise has the power to cure or to kill. The most skilled torturers are probably surgeons, but being the best at torturing people is not the same as being good in the moral sense.

The mere possession of a technical ability does not guarantee that it will be used rightly. That requires something over and above knowledge or skill. It requires wisdom, which directs the skill toward good ends and away from bad ones. But as far as Socrates is concerned here, there seems to be nothing above knowledge, specifically technical knowledge.

Socrates argues that we would call the better in wrestling the “athletic” and the better in music the “artistic.” Alcibiades agrees. But what would we call the better with regard to war and peace and other important affairs of the city? Alcibiades draws a blank: “Nothing occurs to me” (109e).

Socrates mocks this as shameful. Alcibiades doesn’t need to be a doctor to know that the better in medicine is health. Yet, he would advise the Athenians on war and peace without knowing the word for the better regarding war and peace.

Socrates prods Alcibiades by asking what people fight wars about. He responds: “we say we have been deceived, or done violence to, or deprived of something” (109b). Socrates then asks how we are affronted in such cases. This question finally gets Alcibiades to the right answer: “do you mean justly or unjustly?” And Socrates says, “This very thing!” When matters of war and peace are handled well, we call that justice. It isn’t a complete account of justice, but it is a start.

Alcibiades Knows What Justice Is After All

Socrates continues to shame and bully Alcibiades for not knowing what justice is, even though he plans to advise the city on matters of justice and injustice.

Even more shamefully, Alcibiades made no provisions to learn about justice:

Or did it escape me that you were learning and going to a teacher who taught you to recognize the more just and the more unjust? And who is this, who is your teacher in this matter? Tell me as well, so you can introduce me, and I too can become his pupil. (109d)

It is slightly absurd that the ward of Pericles himself has studied wrestling and music but nothing of politics and its highest value, justice.

Alcibiades is a spirited young man, and at this point he accuses Socrates of mocking him, which Socrates denies with an oath to Zeus. (He is clearly lying, so his oath is an act of impiety.)

Alcibiades asks if he could not have learned about justice and injustice in a different way, i.e., not from a teacher. This is a pertinent question. Socrates immediately responds: “Yes . . . if you discovered it” (109e). But this, as we have noted, is not the only option.

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Socrates says that Alcibiades could discover the just if he investigates it. But “I do think you could investigate this if, that is, you supposed you did not know.” This is classic Socrates:  You will only search for knowledge if you know that you don’t know something. If you’re unaware of your own ignorance, you’ll never search for knowledge.

Socrates continues to hammer away at Alcibiades for being ignorant of justice, and ignorant of his ignorance. Socrates asks Alcibiades if there was ever a time when he didn’t think he knew what justice is: “When did you learn the just and the unjust things? Three or four years ago when you were still a child?” (110a–b). Alcibiades can’t remember a time when he thought he was ignorant of justice. Socrates is insinuating, of course, that Alcibiades is deluded that he always knew about justice. But Alcibiades is not eager to accept this claim.

Socrates points out that when Alcibiades was a child playing dice or other games with his fellow children, he did not act as if he was ignorant of justice. In fact, he would declare loudly and confidently that other children were behaving unjustly toward him. “No fair!” How many times have you heard little kids saying that? Even as children, we think we know what justice is.

Alcibiades replies, “But what was I going to do, Socrates, when someone was behaving unjustly towards me?” (110b). Except protest “No fair!”

And Socrates replies, “What should you do, you mean, if you happened at that time to be ignorant of whether you were being unjustly treated or not?” If Alcibiades didn’t know what justice is, Socrates insinuates, perhaps he should have remained silent.

Alcibiades’ response is interesting. He says, “By Zeus! I was not ignorant but knew clearly that I was being treated unjustly.” His oath indicates indignation. He is pushing back angrily at Socrates.

Socrates says, “You suppose, therefore, you had knowledge of the just and the unjust things even as a child, as it appears.”

Alcibiades stands his ground: “I did, and I did have the knowledge” (110c).

When & How Did Alcibiades Learn about Justice?

When Alcibiades claims he knows what justice is, Socrates asks when he discovered it. Alcibiades can’t remember when he discovered it. Socrates then reminds Alcibiades that he said that he didn’t learn it, either. Socrates is inviting Alcibiades to consider there might be other possibilities besides discovering what justice is himself or learning it from others, for instance innate knowledge. But Alcibiades immediately flips back to the other side of the false dichotomy, affirming that if he didn’t discover it, he must have learned it from someone. Socrates asks from whom, to which Alcibiades gives a surprising answer: “from the many” (110e), i.e., from the people of Athens.

Socrates is initially dismissive. He responds that the many are not very serious teachers. They couldn’t competently teach him to play a child’s board game, much less about something important such as justice. But Alcibiades stands his ground, arguing that the many are capable of teaching important things: “for instance it was from them I learned to speak Greek” (110e). If you’ve ever studied Greek, you know that’s no mean thing. But Alcibiades learned Greek as a child, and he learned it from the people of Athens.

Socrates admits that the many can teach Greek. But that’s only because they know it. You can only teach what you know.

Socrates then introduces the idea that agreement is a sign of knowledge. If two people know something, they would say the same things about it. This is true of language, for speakers use the same words to mean the same things. But when it comes to justice, the many disagree. They even fight wars about it. Isn’t this evidence that they don’t know what justice is?

Alcibiades agrees, but again, he might be too hasty. If, for instance, we all had innate knowledge of justice we might still disagree about it. We might articulate this innate knowledge in different ways. We might also disagree about the application of this knowledge in particular situations.

Because Alcibiades accepts that disagreement indicates the absence of knowledge, however, Socrates easily convinces him that the many cannot know what justice is, because the many are constantly disagreeing about justice. And if the many don’t know what justice is, they could not have taught it to Alcibiades.

When Alcibiades draws the conclusion that the many did not teach him justice, he attributes this conclusion to Socrates. But Socrates reproaches him for speaking badly. Socrates did not draw the conclusion that Alcibiades does not know what justice is. Socrates only asked questions. Alcibiades is the one who drew the conclusion. Thus he learned it from himself, not from Socrates.

But if Alcibiades learned this truth from himself, doesn’t that imply that the truth was already in him, in an implicit fashion, and all he needed to access it was the right questions? Indeed, that is true. But the deeper Socratic teaching is that actually Alcibiades does know what justice is, but it is innate knowledge, which he neither learned from others nor discovered himself. All he needs is the right questions to access it.

Then Socrates states the practical implication he’s been driving at with this line of questioning: It would be mad for Alcibiades to go before the people of Athens to teach them things he does not know. Alcibiades is not yet ready for politics. First he must study philosophy.

Notes

[1] See my “Notes on Philosophical Dialectic” in From Plato to Postmodernism (San Francisco: Counter-Currents, 2019).