Foreign Policy, Non-Interventionism, and the Draft
Posted By David M. Zsutty On In North American New Right | Comments Disabled
[1]5,525 words
- Only 23.1% of all respondents and 30.2% of Republican respondents can think of a concrete example of Israel aiding American interests off the top of their heads.
- 68.4% of respondents oppose direct intervention in the Gaza conflict with airstrikes or boots on the ground.
- 25.7% of respondents aged 18-29 would oppose a draft through peaceful protest, and 16.9% through non-violent civil disobedience.
- 4.4% of respondents aged 18-29 said they would oppose a draft through violence against government property, and 4.4% through violence against government officials.
In light of the Gaza conflict, the Homeland Institute polled 1,008 respondents who are politically and demographically representative of white, non-Hispanic American voters about anti-interventionism and related topics such as the legacy of the Global War on Terror and the feasibility of and possible resistance to a draft.
This poll was conducted from December 26, 2023 through January 9, 2024, and our margin of error was plus or minus 3%.
Information warfare has played a pronounced role in the Gaza conflict. For example, there was a deluge of atrocity propaganda at the start of the war.[1] Many people on both sides portray it in morally absolute terms and as a struggle for existence. Incendiary rhetoric has become the norm.
The Gaza crisis has the potential to escalate into a wider regional or global conflict involving Iran and/or the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. Because Iran has close ties with Russia and China, it is likely that they would also become involved if the conflict escalates, even if only indirectly or through material support. The consequences could be catastrophic.
[2]You can buy Greg Johnson’s The Year America Died here. [3]
Only a few years after the close of the Global War on Terror, the United States is now poised to return to direct intervention in the Middle East. This would risk a return to Americans spilling precious blood and treasure on a foreign war at a time when the US homeland is economically and socially devastated, and its southern border is wide open.
It would also risk resuming the phenomenon of “bomb the Third World, import the Third World.” The global elites have come to demand mass migration to white countries based on increasingly flimsy pretexts, when they still bother with pretexts at all.[2] But one of the most commonly cited pretexts was that white countries had a moral duty to accept refugees from countries they had bombed, occupied, or otherwise destabilized — even though it was the global elites who conceived, launched, and profited from these foreign adventures, and not the common citizenry whom they then burdened with mass migration.
The past may provide insight to the future, so let’s being with attitudes about the Global War on Terror.
I. The Global War on Terror: A Legacy of Failure
For the first section, we asked respondents six separate questions about the Global War on Terror, which we defined using neutral language from Wikipedia as “a series of anti-terrorism campaigns and interventions following the September 11, 2001 attacks. Its main phase lasted until August, 2021. It took place predominately in the Middle-East.” Respondents could answer: strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree not disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree, and I don’t know. For each question, more respondents were in some form of disagreement than in some form of agreement.
- For “The United States homeland is safer from terrorist attacks due to the Global War on Terror,” 43.6% at least somewhat disagreed and 39.4% at least somewhat agreed.
- For “The Middle East is safer from terrorist attacks and political instability due to the Global War on Terror,” 71.3% at least somewhat disagreed and 10.9% at least somewhat agreed.
- For “The United States is more economically prosperous due to the Global War on Terror,” 53.7% at least somewhat disagreed and 17.3% at least somewhat agreed.
- For “The Middle East is more economically prosperous due to the Global War on Terror,” 56.2% at least somewhat disagreed and 11.4% at least somewhat agreed.
- For “The United States is freer and more democratic due to the Global War on Terror,” 66.6% at least somewhat disagreed and 11.7% at least somewhat agreed.
- For “The Middle East is freer and more democratic due to the Global War on Terror”, 64.7% at least somewhat disagreed and 12.8% at least somewhat agreed.
Hardly any respondents agreed that the Global War on Terror left the US better off in regards to prosperity or freedom and democracy, or that it left the Middle East better off by any metric at all. Even for the question about whether the US homeland is safer from terrorist attacks had more disagreement than agreement, despite the fact that this was officially the main objective of the Global War on Terror.
Interestingly, Independents lead the way in skepticism about whether the Global War on Terror left the US homeland safer from terrorism. For the first question, 50.3% of Independents at least somewhat disagreed, and 31.6% at least somewhat agreed, compared to 38.2% of Democrats who at least somewhat disagreed and 42.4% who at least somewhat agreed, and 40.8% of Republicans who at least somewhat disagreed and 45.8% who at least somewhat agreed.
| Q. 1 How much do you agree with the following statement: “The United States homeland is safer from terrorist attacks due to the Global War on Terror.” | ||||||
| Results by Party | Another | |||||
| # | % | Democrats | Independents | Republicans | Party | |
| Strongly agree | 61 | 6.1% | 5.8% | 3.5% | 9.5% | 0.0% |
| Somewhat agree | 336 | 33.3% | 36.6% | 28.1% | 36.3% | 27.6% |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 146 | 14.5% | 17.2% | 14.0% | 12.2% | 17.2% |
| Somewhat disagree | 237 | 23.5% | 24.6% | 26.9% | 19.5% | 17.2% |
| Strongly disagree | 203 | 20.1% | 13.6% | 23.4% | 21.3% | 37.9% |
| I don’t know | 25 | 2.5% | 2.3% | 4.1% | 1.2% | 0.0% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
Non-interventionism may therefore be a way for politicians to court Independent voters who can sway the tide in close elections.
Interestingly, respondents aged 18-29 had a less negative view of the Global War on Terror’s impact on economic prosperity and freedom and democracy at home.[3]
| Q. 3 How much do you agree with the following statement: “The United States is more economically prosperous due to the Global War on Terror.” | ||||||
| Results by Age | % | % | % | % | ||
| # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | 65 and over | |
| Strongly agree | 11 | 1.1% | 8.7% | 2.9% | 3.1% | 0.0% |
| Somewhat agree | 99 | 9.8% | 22.4% | 12.0% | 11.7% | 12.4% |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 153 | 15.2% | 23.0% | 21.5% | 23.7% | 31.1% |
| Somewhat disagree | 297 | 29.5% | 21.9% | 26.4% | 26.0% | 27.1% |
| Strongly disagree | 421 | 41.8% | 18.0% | 33.5% | 30.7% | 26.2% |
| I don’t know | 27 | 2.7% | 6.0% | 3.7% | 4.7% | 3.1% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| Q.5 How much do you agree with the following statement: “The United States is freer and more democratic due to the Global War on Terror.” | ||||||
| Results by Age | % | % | % | % | ||
| # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | 65 and over | |
| Strongly agree | 20 | 2.0% | 4.9% | 2.1% | 1.4% | 0.4% |
| Somewhat agree | 98 | 9.7% | 15.3% | 7.9% | 7.5% | 10.7% |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 196 | 19.4% | 20.8% | 14.5% | 19.3% | 24.0% |
| Somewhat disagree | 283 | 28.1% | 26.2% | 20.7% | 33.8% | 28.4% |
| Strongly disagree | 388 | 38.5% | 29.0% | 53.7% | 35.8% | 34.2% |
| I don’t know | 23 | 2.3% | 3.8% | 1.2% | 2.2% | 2.2% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
Part of this could be that the Zoomers did not live through most, if any, of the Global War on Terror. We may need to educate the youth about just how futile years of foreign intervention turned out to be so as to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. Those who remember a time before the Patriot Act should remind the youth that the “new normal” of government eavesdropping and excessive airport security would have once been unthinkably abnormal. September 11 and its fallout were arguably the first of “current things” which were used as a pretext to demand a “new normal.”
II. America’s Greatest Friend and Ally?
We asked respondents how they see the US’ relationship with Israel. Respondents could answer a major net positive, a minor net positive, about equally positive and negative, a minor net negative, a major net negative, or I don’t know.
More respondents see the US’ relationship as a major or minor net positive at 40.7% compared to those who see it as a major or minor net negative at 23.3%. Republicans were the most likely to see it as a net positive, with 55.2% of Republicans seeing it as being a major or minor net positive.
| Q. 9 For the United States, the United States’ relationship with Israel is: | ||||||
| Results by Party | Another | |||||
| # | % | Democrats | Independents | Republicans | Party | |
| A major net positive | 211 | 20.9% | 12.6% | 15.5% | 35.1% | 13.8% |
| A minor net positive | 200 | 19.8% | 21.4% | 19.3% | 20.1% | 6.9% |
| About equally positive and negative | 279 | 27.7% | 31.1% | 28.7% | 23.5% | 27.6% |
| A minor net negative | 124 | 12.3% | 14.9% | 14.0% | 8.5% | 6.9% |
| A major net negative | 111 | 11.0% | 10.0% | 14.0% | 6.7% | 34.5% |
| I don’t know | 83 | 8.2% | 10.0% | 8.5% | 6.1% | 10.3% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
There was a major decrease in seeing the US’ relationship as a net positive in the 30-44 age cohort, followed by a slight rebound in the 30-44 age cohort. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that those aged 30-44 experienced firsthand the failures of the Global War on Terror. This emphasizes the need to educate the youth about the Global War on Terror and its legacy, since it has passed from being a current event into history.
| Q. 9 For the United States, the United States’ relationship with Israel is: | ||||||
| Results by Age | ||||||
| # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 | |
| A major net positive | 211 | 20.9% | 15.3% | 12.0% | 25.4% | 28.0% |
| A minor net positive | 200 | 19.8% | 19.1% | 19.8% | 19.6% | 21.0% |
| About equally positive and negative | 279 | 27.7% | 25.1% | 28.1% | 29.3% | 26.7% |
| A minor net negative | 124 | 12.3% | 19.1% | 12.4% | 10.1% | 10.2% |
| A major net negative | 111 | 11.0% | 9.3% | 18.2% | 8.1% | 9.3% |
| I don’t know | 83 | 8.2% | 12.0% | 9.5% | 7.5% | 4.9% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
Among Republicans aged 18-29, 47.8% thought that the US’ relationship with Israel was a major or minor net positive, compared to 40.7% of all respondents.
However, the 47.8% of Republicans aged 18-29 who see the US’ relationship as a net positive was also lower than the 55.2% of total Republican respondents who see the US’ relationship as a net positive. Additionally, 21.7% of Republicans aged 18-29 see it as a major or minor net negative, compared to 15.2% of all Republican respondents.
| Q. 9 For the United States, the United States’ relationship with Israel is: | ||||||
| Republicans by age | # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 |
| A major net positive | 115 | 35.1% | 21.7% | 23.6% | 36.2% | 53.6% |
| A minor net positive | 66 | 20.1% | 26.1% | 19.4% | 19.9% | 17.4% |
| About equally positive and negative | 77 | 23.5% | 21.7% | 26.4% | 24.8% | 18.8% |
| A minor net negative | 28 | 8.5% | 15.2% | 12.5% | 6.4% | 4.4% |
| A major net negative | 22 | 6.7% | 6.5% | 13.9% | 5.0% | 2.9% |
| I don’t know | 20 | 6.1% | 8.7% | 4.2% | 7.8% | 2.9% |
| Total | 328 | |||||
The Republican aged 18-29 subgroup is significantly smaller than just those who are just aged 18-29 or just Republican, and thus comes with a higher margin of error. However, our numbers are apparently replicating the findings of polls conducted by the Anti-Defamation League and others which Jonathan Greenblatt referenced in a leaked audio recording, in which he remarked that the issue of declining support for Israel was not an issue of Left versus Right, but old versus young.[4]
Many Americans who support Israel claim that it is “our greatest friend and ally,” yet will oftentimes have trouble articulating in concrete terms why that is. We therefore asked respondents if they could think of a concrete example of Israel aiding American interests off the top of their heads.
| Q. 10 Off the top of your head, can you think of a concrete example of Israel aiding American interests? | ||||||
| Results by Party | % | % | % | % | ||
| # | % | Democrats | Independents | Republicans | Another | |
| Yes | 233 | 23.1% | 19.1% | 19.3% | 30.2% | 31.0% |
| No | 775 | 76.9% | 80.9% | 80.7% | 69.8% | 69.0% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| Results by Age | ||||||
| % | % | % | % | |||
| # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 | |
| Yes | 233 | 23.1% | 27.3% | 16.9% | 22.3% | 27.6% |
| No | 775 | 76.9% | 72.7% | 83.1% | 77.7% | 72.4% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| REPUBS BY AGE | # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 |
| Yes | 99 | 30.2% | 37.0% | 18.1% | 30.5% | 37.7% |
| No | 229 | 69.8% | 63.0% | 81.9% | 69.5% | 62.3% |
| Total | 328 | |||||
Only 23.1% of all respondents claimed they could think of a concrete example of Israel aiding American interests. This number was 30.2% for all Republican respondents, 27.3% among respondents aged 18-29, and 37.0% among Republican respondents aged 18-29.
Interestingly, the 30-44 age cohort led the way again in skepticism toward Israel, with only 16.9% of all respondents aged 30-44 saying yes, and 18.1% among Republicans aged 30-44.
This suggests that while support for Israel is declining among the youth, that decline could be even further hastened by educating them about the reality of the Global War on Terror, and particularly about how Israel was conspicuously absent from participating in that conflict. This is important because the claim that Israel is an important ally of the US is often used as a justification for costly and misguided foreign interventions in the Middle East.
We next asked a similar question about whether respondents could think of a concrete example of Israel hurting American interests.
| Q. 11 Off the top of your head, can you think of a concrete example of Israel hurting American interests? | ||||||
| Results by Party | % | % | % | % | ||
| # | % | Democrats | Independents | Republicans | Another | |
| Yes | 295 | 29.3% | 31.1% | 34.2% | 20.4% | 51.7% |
| No | 713 | 70.7% | 68.9% | 65.8% | 79.6% | 48.3% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| Results by Age | ||||||
| % | % | % | % | |||
| # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 | |
| Yes | 295 | 29.3% | 32.8% | 33.1% | 25.1% | 28.9% |
| No | 713 | 70.7% | 67.2% | 66.9% | 74.9% | 71.1% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| REPUBS BY AGE | # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 |
| Yes | 67 | 20.4% | 21.7% | 25.0% | 21.3% | 13.0% |
| No | 261 | 79.6% | 78.3% | 75.0% | 78.7% | 87.0% |
| Total | 328 | |||||
The results were similar to the previous question. 29.3% of all respondents replied yes, compared to 20.4% of Republicans, 33.1% of respondents aged 30-44, and 25% of Republicans aged 30-44.
While skeptics and critics of Israel may be familiar with the bombing of the USS Liberty, the Lavon Affair, prior Israeli knowledge of the September 11 attacks [4], that Jeffrey Epstein was a Mossad agent, and that the Israeli lobby is particularly robust, the general public is not. This suggests that declining support for Israel among the youth could be further hastened by educating the public about how Israel has concretely hurt US interests over the years. This would reduce the danger of continued foreign interventions in the Middle East.
III. Intervention in the Gaza War
We polled respondents about the ongoing Gaza conflict, which we defined using neutral language from Wikipedia as follows: “An armed conflict between Israel and Hamas-led Palestinian militant groups has been taking place chiefly in and around the Gaza Strip since October 7, 2023. On that day, militant groups launched a surprise attack on southern Israel from the Gaza Strip, marking the start of the most significant military escalation in the region since the Yom Kippur War in 1973.”
We asked respondents: “Which of the following best describes your stance on the United States providing economic, material and diplomatic aid to Israel in the Israel-Hamas War?” Respondents could answer strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose, and I don’t know.
| Q. 12 Which of the following best describes your stance on the United States providing economic, material and diplomatic aid to Israel in the Israel-Hamas War? | ||||||
| Results by Party | % | % | % | % | ||
| # | % | Democrats | Independents | Republicans | Another | |
| Strongly support | 216 | 21.4% | 11.3% | 15.8% | 37.8% | 10.3% |
| Somewhat support | 305 | 30.3% | 34.0% | 30.1% | 27.4% | 24.1% |
| Somewhat oppose | 197 | 19.5% | 25.6% | 19.3% | 14.3% | 17.2% |
| Strongly oppose | 210 | 20.8% | 19.7% | 24.0% | 16.5% | 44.8% |
| I don’t know | 80 | 7.9% | 9.4% | 10.8% | 4.0% | 3.4% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| Results by Age | ||||||
| % | % | % | % | |||
| # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 | |
| Strongly support | 216 | 21.4% | 13.1% | 12.4% | 27.9% | 27.6% |
| Somewhat support | 305 | 30.3% | 24.6% | 27.3% | 28.2% | 41.3% |
| Somewhat oppose | 197 | 19.5% | 19.7% | 21.1% | 21.5% | 14.7% |
| Strongly oppose | 210 | 20.8% | 30.1% | 29.8% | 15.6% | 12.0% |
| I don’t know | 80 | 7.9% | 12.6% | 9.5% | 6.7% | 4.4% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| REPUBS BY AGE | # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 |
| Strongly support | 124 | 37.8% | 30.4% | 26.4% | 40.4% | 49.3% |
| Somewhat support | 90 | 27.4% | 21.7% | 29.2% | 25.5% | 33.3% |
| Somewhat oppose | 47 | 14.3% | 19.6% | 13.9% | 15.6% | 8.7% |
| Strongly oppose | 54 | 16.5% | 15.2% | 27.8% | 15.6% | 7.2% |
| I don’t know | 13 | 4.0% | 13.0% | 2.8% | 2.8% | 1.4% |
| Total | 328 | |||||
A slim margin of all respondents at 51.7% strongly or somewhat support providing economic, material, and diplomatic aid to Israel in the current conflict. That number is 65.2% of all Republican respondents, 37.7% among all respondents aged 18-29, 39.7% among all respondents aged 30-44, 52.1% among Republicans aged 18-29, and 55.6% of Republicans aged 30-44.
49.8% of all respondents aged 18-29 somewhat or strongly oppose providing such aid to Israel in the current conflict, as do 50.9% of all respondents aged 30-44.
We also asked respondents: “Which of the following best describes your stance on United States directly intervening on behalf of Israel in the Israel-Hamas War, up to and including troops on the ground and airstrikes?”
| Q. 17 Which of the following best describes your stance on United States directly intervening on behalf of Israel in the Israel-Hamas War, up to and including troops on the ground and airstrikes? | ||||||
| Results by Party | % | % | % | % | ||
| # | % | Democrats | Independents | Republicans | Another | |
| Strongly support | 79 | 7.8% | 2.9% | 5.8% | 14.6% | 6.9% |
| Somewhat support | 155 | 15.4% | 13.3% | 13.2% | 20.4% | 6.9% |
| Somewhat oppose | 275 | 27.3% | 29.4% | 25.4% | 28.4% | 13.8% |
| Strongly oppose | 414 | 41.1% | 47.2% | 46.2% | 28.0% | 62.1% |
| I don’t know | 85 | 8.4% | 7.1% | 9.4% | 8.5% | 10.3% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| Results by Age | ||||||
| % | % | % | % | |||
| # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 | |
| Strongly support | 79 | 7.8% | 5.5% | 5.0% | 12.0% | 6.2% |
| Somewhat support | 155 | 15.4% | 15.3% | 12.4% | 15.9% | 17.8% |
| Somewhat oppose | 275 | 27.3% | 26.2% | 25.6% | 29.9% | 25.8% |
| Strongly oppose | 414 | 41.1% | 38.3% | 46.3% | 35.8% | 46.2% |
| I don’t know | 85 | 8.4% | 14.8% | 10.7% | 6.4% | 4.0% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| REPUBS BY AGE | # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 |
| Strongly support | 48 | 14.6% | 13.0% | 12.5% | 17.7% | 11.6% |
| Somewhat support | 67 | 20.4% | 19.6% | 18.1% | 19.1% | 26.1% |
| Somewhat oppose | 93 | 28.4% | 39.1% | 22.2% | 29.1% | 26.1% |
| Strongly oppose | 92 | 28.0% | 15.2% | 36.1% | 24.8% | 34.8% |
| I don’t know | 28 | 8.5% | 13.0% | 11.1% | 9.2% | 1.4% |
| Total | 328 | |||||
The 23.2% of all respondents who at least somewhat support direct intervention with airstrikes or boots on the ground are decisively outnumbered by the 68.4% who at least somewhat oppose such intervention.
Even among Republican respondents, the 35% who support direct intervention are outnumbered by the 56.4% who oppose it. 20.8% of respondents aged 18-29 support direct intervention, while 64.5% oppose it. 17.4% of respondents aged 30-44 support direct intervention, while 71.9% oppose it, which continues the theme of those who experienced the Global War on Terror first-hand being the most reluctant to resume foreign adventurism. 32.6% of Republicans aged 18-29 support direct intervention, while 54.3% oppose it.
IV. Bomb the Third World, Import the Third World?
[5]You can buy Greg Johnson’s Against Imperialism here [6].
A common neoconservative talking point is that if we don’t fight the terrorists over there, we will have to fight them here. But if we didn’t let them in, we wouldn’t have to fight them anywhere at all.
We asked respondents if they thought that the risk of terrorist attacks on the US homeland would increase due to US support for Israel in the current conflict. 14.4% of respondents think that US support for Israel in the current conflict will greatly increase the risk of terrorist attacks on the US homeland, while 47.7% replied that it would somewhat increase, and 31.9% said that it would stay about the same. Almost nobody thought that it would decrease the likelihood of terrorist attacks.
Republicans were most likely to think that US support for Israel would at least somewhat increase the risk of terrorist attacks, followed by Independents, with Democrats being the least likely to see a heightened risk of terrorist attacks, albeit still with a majority.
| Q. 8 Due the United States’ support of Israel, do you think that the risk of terrorist attacks in the United States homeland will: | ||||||
| Results by Party | Another | |||||
| # | % | Democrats | Independents | Republicans | Party | |
| Greatly increase | 145 | 14.4% | 10.7% | 16.1% | 14.6% | 31.0% |
| Somewhat increase | 481 | 47.7% | 44.3% | 45.9% | 53.7% | 37.9% |
| Stay about the same | 322 | 31.9% | 37.5% | 31.6% | 27.1% | 31.0% |
| Somewhat decrease | 14 | 1.4% | 1.6% | 1.2% | 1.5% | 0.0% |
| Greatly decrease | 4 | 0.4% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 0.9% | 0.0% |
| I don’t know | 42 | 4.2% | 5.8% | 5.0% | 2.1% | 0.0% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
When asked whether accepting Palestinian refugees from Gaza would increase the risk of terrorist attacks and violent crime in the US homeland, the gap between Republican and Democrat respondents drastically widened. 75.9% of Republicans think that accepting Palestinian refugees would at least somewhat increase the risk of terrorism and violent crime, compared to only 34.3% of Democrats.
| Q. 13 Do you think that accepting Palestinian refugees from Gaza would cause the risk of terrorist attacks and violent crime in the United States homeland to: | ||||||
| Results by Party | Another | |||||
| # | % | Democrats | Independents | Republicans | Party | |
| Greatly increase | 224 | 22.2% | 4.2% | 21.1% | 39.9% | 27.6% |
| Somewhat increase | 325 | 32.2% | 30.1% | 31.6% | 36.0% | 20.7% |
| Stay about the same | 357 | 35.4% | 53.1% | 36.0% | 17.4% | 44.8% |
| Somewhat decrease | 27 | 2.7% | 3.9% | 2.6% | 1.5% | 3.4% |
| Greatly decrease | 7 | 0.7% | 0.6% | 0.9% | 0.6% | 0.0% |
| I don’t know | 68 | 6.7% | 8.1% | 7.9% | 4.6% | 3.4% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
Furthermore, when asked if they would support accepting Palestinian refugees from Gaza, the partisan gap became a gulf, with 56.7% of Republicans strongly opposing it and 24.7% somewhat opposing it, compared to 24.3% of Democrats who strongly support it and 42.1% who somewhat support it.
| Q. 14 Which of the following best describes your position on accepting Palestinian refugees from Gaza: | ||||||
| Results by Party | Another | |||||
| # | % | Democrats | Independents | Republicans | Party | |
| Strongly support | 139 | 13.8% | 24.3% | 14.3% | 1.8% | 31.0% |
| Somewhat support | 246 | 24.4% | 42.1% | 24.0% | 9.1% | 13.8% |
| Somewhat oppose | 195 | 19.3% | 15.2% | 19.3% | 24.7% | 3.4% |
| Strongly oppose | 327 | 32.4% | 7.1% | 31.3% | 56.7% | 41.4% |
| I don’t know | 101 | 10.0% | 11.3% | 11.1% | 7.6% | 10.3% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
V. Escalation
We asked respondents if they think the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict risks escalating into a broader regional conflict, what they think the outcome of a broader regional conflict would be, and the sacrifices they are willing to make in the event of a regional or global conflict.
As to whether the Israel-Hamas War will escalate into a broader regional conflict, 22.3% of respondents answered very likely, 53.5% somewhat likely, 13.5% somewhat unlikely, 3.4% very unlikely, and 7.3% I don’t know. There were no significant differences due to party affiliation.
We next asked respondents what they think the outcome of such an escalation would be, to include direct military action by and against Iran.
| Q. 16 If the Israel-Hamas War escalates into a broader regional conflict to include direct military action by and against Iran, which of the following best describes what you think the ultimate end result for the United States and its allies would be? | ||||||
| Results by Party | % | % | % | % | ||
| # | % | Democrat | Independent | Republican | Another | |
| A decisive victory with minimal costs | 43 | 4.3% | 2.9% | 4.1% | 6.1% | 0.0% |
| A victory with moderate costs | 228 | 22.6% | 18.4% | 21.6% | 27.7% | 20.7% |
| A victory with heavy costs | 286 | 28.4% | 30.7% | 25.7% | 29.6% | 20.7% |
| A strategic stalemate, neither victory nor defeat | 267 | 26.5% | 31.4% | 27.5% | 19.2% | 44.8% |
| A defeat with moderate costs | 22 | 2.2% | 2.3% | 2.6% | 1.8% | 0.0% |
| A decisive defeat with heavy costs | 31 | 3.1% | 2.3% | 2.9% | 3.4% | 10.3% |
| I don’t know | 131 | 13.0% | 12.0% | 15.5% | 12.2% | 3.4% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| Results by Age | ||||||
| % | % | % | % | |||
| # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 | |
| A decisive victory with minimal costs | 43 | 4.3% | 5.5% | 3.3% | 4.7% | 3.6% |
| A victory with moderate costs | 228 | 22.6% | 22.4% | 20.7% | 27.1% | 17.8% |
| A victory with heavy costs | 286 | 28.4% | 30.6% | 29.3% | 23.2% | 33.8% |
| A strategic stalemate, neither victory nor defeat | 267 | 26.5% | 18.6% | 28.9% | 26.5% | 30.2% |
| A defeat with moderate costs | 22 | 2.2% | 1.1% | 2.1% | 2.5% | 2.7% |
| A decisive defeat with heavy costs | 31 | 3.1% | 3.8% | 3.7% | 2.2% | 3.1% |
| I don’t know | 131 | 13.0% | 18.0% | 12.0% | 13.7% | 8.9% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| REPUBS BY AGE | # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 |
| A decisive victory with minimal costs | 20 | 6.1% | 6.5% | 6.9% | 5.7% | 5.8% |
| A victory with moderate costs | 91 | 27.7% | 19.6% | 27.8% | 32.6% | 23.2% |
| A victory with heavy costs | 97 | 29.6% | 37.0% | 29.2% | 22.7% | 39.1% |
| A strategic stalemate, neither victory nor defeat | 63 | 19.2% | 19.6% | 19.4% | 20.6% | 15.9% |
| A defeat with moderate costs | 6 | 1.8% | 2.2% | 2.8% | 1.4% | 1.4% |
| A decisive defeat with heavy costs | 11 | 3.4% | 0.0% | 5.6% | 2.8% | 4.3% |
| I don’t know | 40 | 12.2% | 15.2% | 8.3% | 14.2% | 10.1% |
| Total | 328 | |||||
4.3% of all respondents think that the end result of a broader regional conflict would be a decisive victory with minimal costs, 22.6% think there would be a victory with moderate costs, 28.4% think there would be a victory with heavy costs, 26.5% think there would be a strategic stalemate which is neither victory nor defeat, 2.2% think there would be a defeat with moderate costs, 3.1% think there would be a decisive defeat with heavy costs, and 13% replied I don’t know.
We next asked respondents: “In the event of a third world war or a large-scale global conflict, which of the following best represents the sacrifices you are willing to accept to achieve victory for the United States and maintain the United States’ position on the world stage.”
| Q. 18 In the event of a third world war or a large-scale global conflict, which of the following best represents the sacrifices you are willing to accept to achieve victory for the United States and maintain the United States’ position on the world stage: | ||||||
| Results by Party | % | % | % | % | ||
| # | % | Democrats | Independents | Republicans | Another | |
| Much higher taxes and/or inflation and heavy casualties | 66 | 6.5% | 6.1% | 5.0% | 8.5% | 6.9% |
| Somewhat higher taxes and/or inflation and moderate casualties | 155 | 15.4% | 16.8% | 11.7% | 18.0% | 13.8% |
| Slightly higher taxes and/or inflation and minimal casualties | 426 | 42.3% | 41.4% | 41.8% | 45.4% | 20.7% |
| I would be indifferent towards the United States winning | 111 | 11.0% | 12.9% | 11.7% | 8.5% | 10.3% |
| I would be opposed to the United States winning | 45 | 4.5% | 3.2% | 6.4% | 2.4% | 17.2% |
| I don’t know | 205 | 20.3% | 19.4% | 23.4% | 17.1% | 31.0% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| Results by Age | ||||||
| % | % | % | % | |||
| # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 | |
| Much higher taxes and/or inflation and heavy casualties | 66 | 6.5% | 7.1% | 7.9% | 5.9% | 5.8% |
| Somewhat higher taxes and/or inflation and moderate casualties | 155 | 15.4% | 15.3% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 22.2% |
| Slightly higher taxes and/or inflation and minimal casualties | 426 | 42.3% | 43.2% | 35.5% | 43.9% | 46.2% |
| I would be indifferent towards the United States winning | 111 | 11.0% | 10.9% | 16.9% | 10.1% | 6.2% |
| I would be opposed to the United States winning | 45 | 4.5% | 5.5% | 6.2% | 4.2% | 2.2% |
| I don’t know | 205 | 20.3% | 18.0% | 22.7% | 21.8% | 17.3% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
42.3% of all respondents said they would be willing to accept slightly higher taxes and/or inflation and minimal casualties. Significantly fewer said they would accept somewhat higher taxes and/or inflation and moderate casualties at 15.4%, and even fewer said they would accept much higher taxes and/or inflation and heavy casualties at 6.5%. 11% reported they would be indifferent towards the US winning such a conflict, while 4.5% said that they would be opposed to the US winning.
However, it’s possible that these numbers would change in the event of an actual global conflict given that many Americans are already struggling to make ends meet.
VI. Is a Draft Feasible?
Discussion of a large-scale conflict naturally raises the specter of a draft, and even more so due to the ongoing recruitment crisis [7], so we asked respondents how they would react to the government instituting a draft. Respondents could select all options that applied to them:
| Q. 19 If the United States were to institute a draft, which of the following best describes what you are likely to do (click all that apply): | ||||||
| All Respondents | % | % | % | % | ||
| # | % | Democrat | Independent | Republican | Another Party | |
| I would strongly support it | 80 | 7.9% | 3.2% | 7.6% | 12.2% | 13.8% |
| I would somewhat support it | 140 | 13.9% | 12.6% | 9.4% | 20.4% | 6.9% |
| I would have no real opinion either way | 89 | 8.8% | 8.1% | 7.0% | 11.3% | 10.3% |
| I would oppose it, but still comply if drafted | 138 | 13.7% | 10.4% | 17.3% | 13.7% | 6.9% |
| I would oppose it through making myself ineligible, or I am already ineligible | 325 | 32.2% | 35.6% | 35.7% | 22.9% | 62.1% |
| I would oppose it through draft dodging | 55 | 5.5% | 4.9% | 7.0% | 4.3% | 6.9% |
| I would oppose it through malingering | 34 | 3.4% | 4.5% | 2.6% | 2.7% | 6.9% |
| I would oppose it through political action such as voting and writing elected officials, etc. | 291 | 28.8% | 38.5% | 30.7% | 17.7% | 31.0% |
| I would oppose it through peaceful protest | 199 | 19.7% | 29.4% | 19.0% | 11.0% | 24.1% |
| I would oppose it through non-violent civil disobedience | 119 | 11.8% | 14.6% | 13.7% | 6.1% | 24.1% |
| I would oppose it through espionage, sabotage, leaking information, etc., | 5 | 0.5% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.0% | 10.3% |
| I would oppose it through violence against government property | 16 | 1.6% | 1.3% | 1.5% | 1.2% | 10.3% |
| I would oppose it through violence against government officials | 13 | 1.3% | 1.0% | 1.5% | 0.3% | 13.8% |
| I prefer not to answer | 35 | 3.5% | 2.9% | 3.8% | 4.0% | 0.0% |
| I don’t know | 74 | 7.3% | 7.1% | 6.7% | 8.5% | 3.4% |
| Total people answering | 1008 | |||||
| Total answers given | 1613 | |||||
| Respondents Age 18-29 | % | % | % | % | ||
| # | % | Democrat | Independent | Republican | Another Party | |
| I would strongly support it | 7 | 3.8% | 3.3% | 0.0% | 8.7% | 14.3% |
| I would somewhat support it | 8 | 4.4% | 4.9% | 2.9% | 4.3% | 14.3% |
| I would have no real opinion either way | 15 | 8.2% | 9.8% | 5.8% | 8.7% | 14.3% |
| I would oppose it, but still comply if drafted | 45 | 24.6% | 18.0% | 26.1% | 34.8% | 0.0% |
| I would oppose it through making myself ineligible, or I am already ineligible | 71 | 38.8% | 41.0% | 39.1% | 30.4% | 71.4% |
| I would oppose it through draft dodging | 21 | 11.5% | 14.8% | 10.1% | 6.5% | 28.6% |
| I would oppose it through malingering | 14 | 7.7% | 13.1% | 2.9% | 4.3% | 28.6% |
| I would oppose it through political action such as voting and writing elected officials, etc. | 59 | 32.2% | 39.3% | 33.3% | 19.6% | 42.9% |
| I would oppose it through peaceful protest | 47 | 25.7% | 27.9% | 27.5% | 17.4% | 42.9% |
| I would oppose it through non-violent civil disobedience | 31 | 16.9% | 21.3% | 17.4% | 8.7% | 28.6% |
| I would oppose it through espionage, sabotage, leaking information, etc., | 3 | 1.6% | 1.6% | 1.4% | 0.0% | 14.3% |
| I would oppose it through violence against government property | 8 | 4.4% | 6.6% | 1.4% | 4.3% | 14.3% |
| I would oppose it through violence against government officials | 8 | 4.4% | 4.9% | 2.9% | 2.2% | 28.6% |
| I prefer not to answer | 12 | 6.6% | 6.6% | 5.8% | 8.7% | 0.0% |
| I don’t know | 14 | 7.7% | 3.3% | 11.6% | 8.7% | 0.0% |
| Total people answering | 183 | |||||
| Total answers given | 363 | |||||
Among the critical 18-29 age bracket, 24.6% of respondents reported that they would oppose a draft but still comply, 4.4% said they would somewhat support it, and 3.8% said they would strongly support it. Meanwhile, 38.8% of respondents aged 18-29 reported that they either currently are or would make themselves ineligible, and 11.5% said they would dodge the draft.
32.2% of respondents aged 18-29 said they would oppose a draft through political action such as voting and writing elected officials, as did 28.8% of all respondents and even 17.7% of all Republicans. 25.7% of respondents aged 18-29 said they would oppose a draft through peaceful protest, as did 19.7% of all respondents and even 11% of all Republicans. 16.9% of respondents aged 18-29 said they would oppose a draft through non-violent civil disobedience, as did 11.8% of all respondents and even 6.1% of all Republicans.
These numbers suggest that there would be substantial segments of the population who would oppose a draft through non-violent means. While resistance would be dominated by the 18-29 age bracket, which would be most affected, they would have significant support from other age brackets. And while Democrats were most opposed to a draft, many Independents and even Republicans would likely stand beside them.
Additionally, 1.6% of respondents aged 18-29 said they would oppose a draft through espionage, sabotage, or leaking information, as would 0.5% of all respondents. 4.4% of respondents aged 18-29 said they would oppose a draft through violence against government property, as did 1.6% of all respondents. 4.4% of respondents aged 18-29 said they would oppose a draft through violence against government officials, as did 1.3% of all respondents. Democrats were more open to violent opposition than Republicans.
This is rather disturbing, as political violence is a losing solution for all sides involved. While it is easy to click a button in an anonymous online survey, even 1% of young Americans engaging in violent resistance to a draft could be devastating. Furthermore, 6.6% of respondents aged 18-29 and 3.5% of all respondents answered “I prefer not to answer,” and it is not unlikely that some of those respondents may have been hesitant to state that they were open to political violence.
It should be noted that we did not mention Russia or Ukraine in this survey. Because Russia and Iran have close ties, it is not unlikely that Russia would become involved in a regional or global conflict, even if only indirectly. Many Republicans have an unfavorable view of US support for Ukraine, some in part due to propaganda painting Russia as a champion of nationalism, traditional values, etc. Propaganda need not be accurate to be effective. It is therefore likely that Russian involvement, even if only through propaganda, would at least slightly change these numbers among Republicans.
Furthermore, our poll only targeted white registered voters. Non-white responses may differ, and especially because many liberal non-whites are hostile toward Israel given that they perceive it as a white colonial power. This perception need not be accurate to have an effect. Also, given that blacks and Hispanics may already be predisposed toward violence, as suggested by crime rate statistics combined with the fact that Black Lives Matter faced little to no repercussions for rioting in 2020, it is possible that minorities would be more open to political violence against a draft than whites.
Minority response to a draft merits further research, but we are unfortunately unable to poll these communities at this time as we have had difficulty balancing their demographic factors such as education, ideology, age, etc.
We also asked respondents whether they think instituting a draft would be feasible.
| Q. 20 Do you think that instituting a draft in the United States is feasible? | ||||||
| Results by Party | % | % | % | % | ||
| # | % | Democrats | Independents | Republicans | Another | |
| Absolutely yes | 83 | 8.2% | 4.5% | 7.3% | 12.2% | 13.8% |
| Probably yes | 168 | 16.7% | 16.8% | 14.6% | 18.9% | 13.8% |
| Maybe | 180 | 17.9% | 19.7% | 16.7% | 18.0% | 10.3% |
| Probably not | 328 | 32.5% | 33.7% | 31.3% | 32.6% | 34.5% |
| Absolutely not | 231 | 22.9% | 22.3% | 28.7% | 17.4% | 24.1% |
| I don’t know | 18 | 1.8% | 2.9% | 1.5% | 0.9% | 3.4% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| Results by Age | ||||||
| % | % | % | % | |||
| # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 | |
| Absolutely yes | 83 | 8.2% | 4.4% | 6.2% | 9.5% | 11.6% |
| Probably yes | 168 | 16.7% | 12.0% | 9.9% | 16.2% | 28.4% |
| Maybe | 180 | 17.9% | 19.7% | 14.9% | 16.5% | 21.8% |
| Probably not | 328 | 32.5% | 32.8% | 36.0% | 32.7% | 28.4% |
| Absolutely not | 231 | 22.9% | 28.4% | 31.4% | 23.7% | 8.0% |
| I don’t know | 18 | 1.8% | 2.7% | 1.7% | 1.4% | 1.8% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| REPUBS BY AGE | # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 |
| Absolutely yes | 40 | 12.2% | 6.5% | 11.1% | 12.8% | 15.9% |
| Probably yes | 62 | 18.9% | 8.7% | 12.5% | 17.7% | 34.8% |
| Maybe | 59 | 18.0% | 19.6% | 13.9% | 17.0% | 23.2% |
| Probably not | 107 | 32.6% | 47.8% | 33.3% | 31.9% | 23.2% |
| Absolutely not | 57 | 17.4% | 17.4% | 26.4% | 19.9% | 2.9% |
| I don’t know | 3 | 0.9% | 0.0% | 2.8% | 0.7% | 0.0% |
The 24.9% of all respondents who answered absolutely or probably yes were outnumbered by the 55.4% who answered absolutely or probably not. Among respondents age 18-29, only 16.4% of respondents think that a draft is absolutely or probably feasible, compared to 61.2% who think it absolutely or probably not feasible. The 31.1% of Republican respondents who think that a draft would be absolutely or probably feasible are also outnumbered by the 50% of Republicans who think that a draft would not be feasible.
As such, it is almost certain that reinstituting a draft would be as feasible as it would be popular — which is not at all.
VII. Public Perception of Foreign Intervention
To conclude, we asked respondents whether they think that intervention in foreign countries by the United States government is generally positive or negative, both in regards to the interests of Americans and in regards to the interests of foreign peoples.
| Q. 21 In regards to the interests of the American people, do you think that intervention in foreign countries by the United States government is generally: | ||||||
| Results by Party | % | % | % | % | ||
| # | % | Democrat | Independent | Republican | Another | |
| A major net positive | 39 | 3.9% | 2.3% | 2.9% | 6.7% | 0.0% |
| A minor net positive | 159 | 15.8% | 21.4% | 12.0% | 15.2% | 6.9% |
| About equally positive and negative | 256 | 25.4% | 30.4% | 22.8% | 24.1% | 17.2% |
| A minor net negative | 233 | 23.1% | 23.0% | 24.6% | 22.6% | 13.8% |
| A major net negative | 274 | 27.2% | 19.1% | 31.9% | 27.1% | 58.6% |
| I don’t know | 47 | 4.7% | 3.9% | 5.8% | 4.3% | 3.4% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| Results by Age | ||||||
| % | % | % | % | |||
| # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 | |
| A major net positive | 39 | 3.9% | 3.3% | 0.8% | 4.5% | 6.7% |
| A minor net positive | 159 | 15.8% | 14.8% | 12.8% | 14.8% | 21.3% |
| About equally positive and negative | 256 | 25.4% | 24.6% | 20.7% | 25.4% | 31.1% |
| A minor net negative | 233 | 23.1% | 25.1% | 24.0% | 24.6% | 18.2% |
| A major net negative | 274 | 27.2% | 23.0% | 36.4% | 27.4% | 20.4% |
| I don’t know | 47 | 4.7% | 9.3% | 5.4% | 3.4% | 2.2% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| REPUBS BY AGE | # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 |
| A major net positive | 22 | 6.7% | 10.9% | 2.8% | 5.0% | 11.6% |
| A minor net positive | 50 | 15.2% | 17.4% | 9.7% | 13.5% | 23.2% |
| About equally positive and negative | 79 | 24.1% | 23.9% | 9.7% | 29.8% | 27.5% |
| A minor net negative | 74 | 22.6% | 21.7% | 29.2% | 20.6% | 20.3% |
| A major net negative | 89 | 27.1% | 17.4% | 43.1% | 27.7% | 15.9% |
| I don’t know | 14 | 4.3% | 8.7% | 5.6% | 3.5% | 1.4% |
| Total | 328 | |||||
More respondents think that foreign intervention is a net negative for Americans than a net positive. Only 3.9% of all respondents think that foreign intervention is a major net positive for Americans, while 15.8% think it is a minor net positive, 23.1% think it is a minor net negative, and 27.2% think it is a major net negative.
Respondents aged 30-44 had the dimmest view of foreign intervention in regards to American interests, with 60.4% thinking it is a net negative compared to 13.6% who think it is a net positive. This continues the pattern of the 30-44 age bracket being the most skeptical about foreign intervention. This further suggests that educating the younger generation about the ill effects of foreign intervention by those who lived through the Global War on Terror could dispel any romantic illusions which they may have.
We also asked respondents about how they think foreign intervention affects foreign peoples:
| Q. 22 In regards to the interests of foreign peoples, do you think that intervention in foreign countries/affairs by the United States government is generally: | ||||||
| Results by Party | % | % | % | % | ||
| # | % | Democrat | Independent | Republican | Another | |
| A major net positive | 83 | 8.2% | 8.1% | 7.9% | 9.5% | 0.0% |
| A minor net positive | 197 | 19.5% | 21.4% | 17.5% | 21.0% | 6.9% |
| About equally positive and negative | 243 | 24.1% | 26.5% | 19.9% | 25.9% | 27.6% |
| A minor net negative | 200 | 19.8% | 21.4% | 18.1% | 21.3% | 6.9% |
| A major net negative | 233 | 23.1% | 17.8% | 29.8% | 18.6% | 51.7% |
| I don’t know | 52 | 5.2% | 4.9% | 6.7% | 3.7% | 6.9% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| Results by Age | ||||||
| % | % | % | % | |||
| # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 | |
| A major net positive | 83 | 8.2% | 7.7% | 5.4% | 10.6% | 8.0% |
| A minor net positive | 197 | 19.5% | 16.9% | 14.9% | 20.9% | 24.4% |
| About equally positive and negative | 243 | 24.1% | 19.7% | 22.3% | 23.2% | 31.1% |
| A minor net negative | 200 | 19.8% | 25.7% | 18.2% | 19.8% | 16.9% |
| A major net negative | 233 | 23.1% | 21.9% | 33.1% | 21.2% | 16.4% |
| I don’t know | 52 | 5.2% | 8.2% | 6.2% | 4.2% | 3.1% |
| Total | 1008 | |||||
| REPUBS BY AGE | # | % | 18-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | over 65 |
| A major net positive | 31 | 9.5% | 8.7% | 6.9% | 12.1% | 7.2% |
| A minor net positive | 69 | 21.0% | 26.1% | 15.3% | 19.9% | 26.1% |
| About equally positive and negative | 85 | 25.9% | 19.6% | 18.1% | 27.0% | 36.2% |
| A minor net negative | 70 | 21.3% | 30.4% | 26.4% | 16.3% | 20.3% |
| A major net negative | 61 | 18.6% | 8.7% | 29.2% | 20.6% | 10.1% |
| I don’t know | 12 | 3.7% | 6.5% | 4.2% | 4.3% | 0.0% |
| Total | 328 | |||||
[8]You can buy Greg Johnson’s Toward a New Nationalism here [9].
Respondents in general thought that foreign intervention was slightly less negative for foreign peoples than for the American people. 8.2% of all respondents think that foreign intervention is a major net positive for foreign peoples, while 19.5% think it is a minor net positive, 19.8% think it is a minor net negative, and 23.1% think that it is a major net negative.
More Americans think that foreign intervention is a net negative for them and even for foreign nations than those who think that it is a net positive. Why ,then, does a supposedly democratic and representative government continuously embroil America in foreign affairs?
VIII. Conclusion
Only time will tell what will come of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But for now, some major takeaways are that:
- Non-interventionism may be an effective way to court Independent voters, along with voters aged 30-44.
- The Global War on Terror is no longer a current event, but history. It is necessary to educate the youth about the true extent to which the Global War on Terror failed so as to prevent them from repeating the mistakes of the past.
- Support for Israel is declining, yet is still widespread. Asking supporters of Israel if they can name a concrete way Israel has aided US interests may help them rethink their support — especially since many of them believe that one cost of US support for Israel is a heightened risk of terrorist attacks.
- There is still a need to educate the general public about how Israel has concretely harmed US interests. The USS Liberty and other such incidents may be old and stale for skeptics of Zionism, but for many Americans they are fresh news which could drastically alter their perspective.
- If refugees from Palestine and elsewhere from the Middle East bring a heightened risk of terrorism and violent crime, Western countries should not accept them. The argument that Western countries have a moral duty to accept them after bombing or destabilizing their countries should be taken as an argument against foreign intervention instead of for immigration.
- A draft is not feasible, and trying to implement one today could prove to be even more of a catastrophe than in the Vietnam War. A draft would likely spark mass peaceful resistance, along with a small yet not insignificant degree of violent resistance.
- If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is likely to escalate along its current trajectory, and if such escalation would require a draft given the recruitment crisis, and if a draft is not feasible, then every step should be taken to deescalate the conflict.
But perhaps the best advice for the current conflict comes from George Washington’s farewell address: “The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave.”[5]
Notes
[1] See Evidence and Atrocity Propaganda, Counter Currents https://counter-currents.com/2023/10/evidence-and-atrocity-propaganda/ [10]
[2] For example, despite how Ireland was colonized instead of colonizing others, some have argued that Ireland has a moral duty to accept large numbers of migrants because many Irish immigrated to America.
[3] The demographics of the age cohorts were not as tightly controlled for as party affiliation and ideology were. However, they were better controlled for than usual for education and party affiliation. There was about 4% fewer respondents age 65 plus than the target percent, while the other age cohorts had 1-2% more respondents than their respective targets.