— Counter-Currents —

Hate Game Theory, Not the Player, Part 2

[1]3,246 words

Part 1 here [2]

Those who want a quick refresher on the basics of game theory may wish to review my first article [2] on the subject, which applied game theory to race relations. Game theory is even better suited for describing international relations, and can be used to make sense of the complicated border crisis between Poland and Belarus and how it fits into a broader geopolitical conflict.

The most important thing to remember when applying game theory to geopolitics is that there are multiple players, and they are all playing multiple games with each other at the same time. They have also been playing at game theory with each other for decades, and sometimes centuries.

Thus, when the Polish border crisis began quietly in the summer of 2021 and then intensified in late October, its roots are most likely in the failed coup against Belarus’ President, Alexander Lukashenko, in 2020. Similar to the coup against President Trump, this was a color revolution that relied upon election fraud. Unlike Trump, however, Lukashenko stood his ground and crushed the coup. It is likely that Lukashenko knew from the globalist forces’ past behavior that he would not be allowed to quietly retire or start a new career as a grifter. He also knew that if he surrendered that Belarus would be economically pillaged, culturally defiled, and demographically invaded.

This shows that, even before the Afghanistan debacle, the American empire was losing its edge. Everyone should have seen that Lukashenko had been backed into a corner geopolitically but that he also has Russian support, has loyal supporters in his government and military, and that his domestic opposition was mostly comprised of art students. It was silly to believe that he would step down, especially given that the other side couldn’t be trusted to cooperate. And it is unwise to launch coups that don’t succeed, for as Machiavelli observed, “Men should be either treated generously or destroyed, because they take revenge for slight injuries — for heavy ones they cannot.”

This is precisely what happened, as the recent border crisis was probably Lukashenko’s revenge for the attempted coup. It was a mix of deterrence through retaliation and petty vindictiveness. Vindictiveness is emotional, while deterrence is intended to incur short-term pain on both sides for the long-term gain of deterring bad behavior in the future. Repaying competition or betrayal with more of the same in the long term can lessen conflict, as the other side will think twice about doing it again — unless both sides slide into an endless tit for tat, as happens in many disputes.

While the details of the spy games may never be known to us, Belarus reasonably claims that the coup was backed by the United States, with heavy involvement by Poland as well. Lukashenko’s retaliation goes well beyond what a civilized nation should use for deterrence through retaliation, however. In the summer of 2020, Belarus began encouraging “tourism” from the Third World and especially Iraq, mainly among ethnic minorities there such as the eternally troublesome and Leftist Kurds. The intention was not to let them defile Belarus, but to fling them across the border into Poland.

Using such refuse as an invasion force against a white country should be considered tantamount to a war crime. These invaders are looking to exploit Poland from within and commit every crime imaginable against the Polish people. The long-term effects of demographic invasion are as bad or even worse than strategic bombing; just compare Detroit with Japan. Lukashenko had no problem with this reasonably foreseeable collateral damage.

But what other options did Lukashenko have? The Polish government had no problem with the collateral damage that a coup would have wrought in Belarus, either. Poland can no longer trust Belarus — and by extension, Russia — enough to seek de-escalation, however, even if they would prefer to increase cooperation and decrease competition. The lessons to be learned are not to back other players of game theory into a corner or enrage them, and that the US can no longer be relied upon to be a competent player to cooperate with.

This leads to the interesting question of whether Lukashenko acted unilaterally or with Vladimir Putin’s express or implied permission. Most of the Western media assumes that Putin was in on it from the start, because they have come to believe their own propaganda that Putin is literally another Hitler. Another intriguing possibility is that Lukashenko acted unilaterally, and in effect betrayed his close ally. This, along with deterrence through extreme retaliation, is an example of how a weaker game theory player can still play competitively against the strong. Lukashenko knew that Putin would have no choice but to back him, or at least not counter-signal him, because Belarus is essential a buffer against the West and potentially an ally in the unlikely event of war in the Baltics.

This is an example of unequal outcomes affecting player decisions. Lukashenko knew he could score a lot more points by acting unilaterally, and that while Putin would be annoyed, it would be a mild annoyance. This means that unlike what usually happens after a betrayal, their future dealings will be unaffected, and they will continue to cooperate. I am uncertain as to whether Lukashenko acted unilaterally, but if so, it would be interesting to learn more about his decision one day.


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Lukashenko is sending security forces along with several other nations to help restore order in Kazakhstan after what appears to have been a second failed US-backed color revolution. It is interesting that it failed because it was not as astroturfed as usual; many of the protestors’ demands had merit, such as lower energy prices and an end to harsh and demeaning COVID measures. This shows that the US is quickly losing its competency at launching color revolutions. While Belarus is a small country and hundreds of miles away from Kazakhstan, they have first-hand expertise in successfully resisting a color revolution. This is an example of how a weaker player can creatively find ways to cooperate with larger players and give them something they don’t have, which can then be used to induce cooperation in other games or to smooth over past competitions and betrayals.

We also find a smaller player using their strategic position to betray a larger player on the other side of the conflict in Poland and Hungary’s relations with the rest of NATO and the European Union. Just as Belarus receives substantial funding from Russia, Poland and Hungary receive a lot of funding from the EU. However, much to the globalists’ chagrin in Brussels, the peoples and governments of Poland and Hungary refuse to defile their countries with mass immigration or degeneracy — at least for now. Both sides know that the EU is terrified by a resurgent Russia. Regardless of whatever arguments can be advanced in favor or against Poland’s and Hungary’s immigration and social policies in the halls of Brussels, the facts are that so long as the globalists correctly or incorrectly perceive Russia as an existential threat, Poland and Hungary will continue to successfully compete against them on immigration and degeneracy while simultaneously cooperating on defense and raking in lots of cash.

While I strongly applaud any nationalist country that can make the globalists hand over stacks of cash soggy with liberal tears, there is a lurking danger here. Globalist gifts invariably come with strings attached, and while Poland and Hungary have been successful at avoiding those strings, this may not be tenable forever. What if the globalists switch from a mix of cooperation and competition to betrayal, and launch a color revolution against them? What if Poland and Hungary become overly dependent on foreign aid?

The solution to these dangers is autarky, or self-sufficiency, but it is difficult for countries that are the size of the Visegrád Group nations to achieve autarky. Regional autarky is the path forward, which means continuing efforts to expand the Visegrád Group. With globalist countries growing increasingly weaker and more repulsive, it should become easier to find other nations that want to resist both Russia’s military hegemony and globohomo’s cultural hegemony. Smaller nations finding opportunities to cooperate with each other can give them the strength to compete and stand up to larger nations in larger games. Efforts have already been underway with the Three Seas Initiative and the Visegrád Group, and hopefully they continue.

The Polish border crisis also demonstrates the use of signaling in game theory. When Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia sent units to help Poland secure her border, they were signaling to all interested parties, as well as others such as Ukraine, that they would cooperate with Poland in future games where they might be tempted to betray a country and abandon them to Russian aggression. Such signaling is usually limited to words, which is why so many state officials are fond of releasing statements denouncing or praising various events. While this is oftentimes the grandstanding of bureaucrats, it is also an attempt to reassure other players that their country will act a certain way in a potential game.

Because signaling is usually limited to words, signaling through action is much more powerful. When the Baltic countries sent forces to aid Poland, they sent a much stronger signal than a limp-wristed press conference would have. This is important, because in the extremely unlikely event of a hot war with Russia, Belarus’ position would allow her to cut off the Baltic nations from the rest of NATO, and therefore the Baltic nations’ willingness to stand firm together and not fold within a few days of combat is of the utmost importance.

This brings us to how the Polish border crisis is a sub-game within a much larger game that is essentially Cold War II between the globalists and Russia. That this conflict may not appear to have escalated to that degree is because it is being fought mainly through fifth-generation warfare, which is based on information, technology, hacking, and economics. In other words, non-kinetic means predominate over traditional methods in it, but the former can cause just as much, if not more, damage. Cold War I was mostly fought through fourth-generation warfare, which is based on insurgency and proxy wars such as Vietnam, combined with the threat of nuclear war.

Cold War II consists of several games between Russia and globalism which are part of a single master game. These demonstrate an important aspect of game theory, which is that the outcomes of certain games can vary in magnitude, both objectively and subjectively, in the players’ minds. A strategy that is as old as time is to confuse your opponent about what your true objectives are. As King Louis XI observed, “He who knows not how to dissimulate, cannot reign.”

Russia now has three main games that they are playing against globalism: Ukraine, the Polish border crisis, and the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline. Because this is the era of fifth generation warfare, Nord Stream 2 is clearly the most important game from an objective standpoint, and I am sure that Russia subjectively agrees. In brief, Occupied Germany and the rest of the EU moved away from clean and efficient nuclear energy and are now dependent on natural gas, especially for winter heating. Guillaume Faye in Why We Fight correctly predicted that the Greens’ astroturfed anti-nuclear hysteria would lead to Europe becoming dependent on foreign energy. Faye predicted that this energy dependence would be to America and the Islamic world, however. In a strange twist of fate, Europe is now beholden to Russian energy instead, with the American globalists strongly opposing German cooperation with Russia, and hence betrayal of the US, on this issue.

This is another example of how lesser players can go rogue in game theory and get away with betraying stronger players. This should also serve as a reminder to the paranoid conspiracy theorists that the globalists are more of a decentralized network of Jewish instinct and collusion than they are following a grand scheme. Germany has been firmly in globalism’s iron grip since the brutal and inhumane occupation of 1945, but not all globalists, even the Jewish ones, are always on the same page. Infighting amongst them can be as endemic as it is on the Dissident Right, albeit usually carried on more professionally and discreetly.

Putin is smart. He is playing as though Ukraine and Poland are his real goals so that he can use them as leverage for his primary goal: expanding Nord Stream 2. Because so many woke globalists have internalized their own propaganda that Putin is literally Hitler (even though he is more the equivalent of a radical centrist from the 1990s), they assume that he must be fixated on conquering land. Take, for example, how the German newspaper Bild published a map showing a possible Russian invasion of two-thirds of Ukraine, which appears to be based more on hysteria than fact. In reality, it is unlikely that Russia wants to expand further into Ukraine at all.


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On a recent episode [7] of the Highly Respected podcast, guest Peter Nimitz, an expert on Eurasia and prehistory, opined that some elements in the Russian government may actually want to return parts of Ukraine back to them because they are not profitable to manage. However, Russia doesn’t want to appear weak in doing so. Appearing weak would undermine her position in the other games she is playing. Furthermore, pro-Russian support was vital during the initial invasion of Ukraine, but as one goes further west in the country, the sentiment quickly becomes more anti-Russian and fiercely nationalistic. A further invasion of Ukraine could easily result in Russia facing a bitter insurgency, and one conducted not by Arabs but by high-IQ whites. After Russia’s terrible experiences with the white Chechen jihad, I highly doubt they want to face another white insurgency. Globalists may not learn from past mistakes, but Russia does.

The globalists have inflicted an informational asymmetry upon themselves that even the most sophisticated symphonies of Russian spycraft and diplomacy never could have, although Putin is happy to help them along. Once Putin expands Europe’s energy dependence, he will be able to use betrayal and competition in that game for leverage in other games. Russia’s pain of losing revenue from natural gas sales will be eclipsed many times over by a European energy crisis. Why bleed over “a few acres of snow” in Ukraine when you can freeze your enemy’s civilian population and crash their economy instead?

This shows that despite several American authors having written about fifth generation warfare, it is still not properly understood or being applied by the globalists against foreign adversaries, even though they oftentimes zealously, if sometimes clumsily, make use of it against their own citizens.

The lesson from Nord Stream 2 is again the value of autarky and the dangers of becoming entangled with a “frenemy.” Germany could one day betray Ukraine and the Visegrád Group as a result of economic pressure by abandoning them in a future conflict with Russia and Belarus. The need for autarky is further exacerbated by the fact that the US can no longer be relied upon, either. American affluent white female liberals (AWFLs) and Jews, such as Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, may enjoy saber rattling and sending young white men to die because it feeds into their need for a power trip (she recently threatened to expand NATO membership into other countries, which is a major red line for Russia). However, they cannot be relied upon as a security partner because of gross incompetence. As I explained here [8] and here [9], the US military has been in a state of terminal decay for some time. The US and EU should be considered similar to a friend who starts a fight in a bar and then flees or proves to be weak, leaving you in an awkward situation.

One final aspect of game theory raised by Cold War II is the identity and personality of the parties involved, and what teams they are on. Some of Ukraine’s rivalry with Russia is driven by the memory of the Holodomor, in which approximately seven to ten million Ukrainians died. However, the Jews who orchestrated this genocide now sit not in front of them in Russia, but behind them in the West. This likewise demonstrates how events from the past can continue to affect current geopolitical game theory.

Furthermore, for nationalists — at least in America (we don’t have T-80 tanks in our backyard) — a rising Russia and China are undoubtedly a net positive. The American regime has launched something of a domestic cold war against its own citizenry, and thus as Russia increases in strength, our occupational government will weaken and therefore be in less of a position to tyrannize us.

It should be remembered, however, that even if Putin sometimes uses nationalist rhetoric, he is not one of us. Putin has gone along with internal migration of non-whites to white areas of the Russian Federation, for example. When ultra-nationalist Russians opposed this, many of them were smeared, arrested, and sentenced in politicized show trials. Sound familiar? His close partner Lukashenko might provide asylum and grant an interview to a January 6 hero to snub the West, but he is also fine with besieging Poland with foreign invaders.

Furthermore, Russia is still involved in a network of valuable Cold War I alliances with brown, far-Left countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela that operate in the spirit of critical race theory. While he has made some based remarks that have been useful to us, it is unlikely that Putin will become a strident, ideological champion of White Nationalism, as that would potentially alienate these Third World allies, who are useful for force projection in the Western Hemisphere (for example, Nicaragua hosted Russian strategic bombers in 2013 to unsettle the weak Obama regime). Russia is likewise riddled with corruption, including when Putin pushed the sketchy Sputnik V vaccine, as detailed on a recent edition [10] of The Writers’ Bloc, which is far from nationalist behavior. Putin is not on Team White, and he is not riding in on a white polar bear to save us from globohomo. Any benefits we true nationalists gain from Russia’s ascent are purely incidental. An ultra-nationalist like Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his party may invite white Americans to settle in Siberia out of a sense of common identity, but if Putin and his party were to encourage such a policy, it will be for calculated economic and political gain.

The Polish-Belarus border crisis and the broader conflict in Ukraine should be seen as a tragic brother war. Game theory can describe and illustrate this conflict, but in this case it provides little that could be used to productively deescalate it, especially after some of the moves that the players have made. It does not help that a major player such as the US has become entirely erratic. Autarky and solidarity seem like the only useful strategies for now.

Escalation is likely to continue in the short term because of the clumsy Kazakhstan coup, which has infuriated the Russian bloc. If this brother war is to deescalate, it will because responsible, white statesmen sit down to candidly discuss the realities of facts and power without the interference of old Jewish women who are shrieking about abstractions such as “human rights” and “democracy.” The only other foreseeable possibility is for the parties to compete against each other until exhaustion, as in the Thirty Years’ War, but through fifth generation warfare.

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