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The Uppity White Folks Manifesto, Part 1:
Make Multiculturalism Work for You


Carl Larsson, Ett hem åt solsidan, 1885.

1,601 words

Part 1 of 3

White people are ready for white identity politics. This is clear from the rise of populist and nationalist politicians and parties around the white world, as well as the research of Ashley Jardina, who shows that significant numbers of white Americans have positive racial identities, believe the current system is anti-white, reject white guilt, and think it is appropriate for whites to politically organize to protect their collective interests. [1] [2]

This is encouraging news, because it means that the metapolitical conditions for white identity politics are crystallizing. Center-Right parties, however, refuse to cross the line into explicit white identity politics because they are part of a globalist elite that regards white nationalism and populism as the top threats to their hegemony. But that is also encouraging news, for it is an opportunity for genuine white identitarians to establish themselves as a political force.

In The White Nationalist Manifesto [3], I outlined how we might restore or create homogeneously white homelands. But the vast majority of people who are ready for white identity politics are not ready for full-on White Nationalism.

I use the phrase “uppity white folks [4]” for the people who are ready for white identity politics but not (yet) ready for White Nationalism. They need a manifesto as well. I’m not the guy to write it. I will stick to White Nationalism. But I do have three suggestions for turning uppity white folks into a political force.

Make Multiculturalism Work for You

If you don’t aim at a white ethnostate, then by definition you are committed to some form of multiculturalism. So you need to make it work for you. Under the present system, however, multiculturalism works only for non-whites, who are encouraged to cultivate group identities and assert them in the political realm. Whites, however, are barred from this. That would be “racism,” and racism is the worst thing in the world — but only when practiced by white people, specifically the white majority or founding stock of any given white nation.

Under the present dispensation, it is okay even for white minorities to practice identity politics in white nations. So Swedes can practice identity politics in Finland, but not in Sweden. And Finns can practice identity politics in Sweden, but not in Finland. Being Finnish is an approved ethnic identity in Sweden. Being Swedish is an approved ethnic identity in Finland. But Finns in Finland must define their identity in terms of universal values like openness and tolerance, and Swedes in Sweden must do exactly the same thing. Thus white ethnic identity is good only when it is weaponized to undermine ethnically defined white states, never good when it is used to maintain them.

This is a morally outrageous double standard, since it puts whites at a systematic disadvantage in their own homelands. If it is legitimate for minorities of all races to be politically selfish, while white majorities are allowed only to think about the common good, that is a recipe for exploitation. Identity politics for white majorities is moral [5], because it is fair. It is necessary [6], in order to prevent exploitation. And, since whites will eventually tire of unfairness and exploitation, white identity politics is inevitable [6] as well.


You can buy Greg Johnson’s White Identity Politics here. [8]

But you can’t stop with mere equality. You need to demand special privileges. Bear with me. This isn’t as bad as it sounds. Not all peoples can be equal in a multicultural society. For instance, in Spain, the dominant language is Spanish. In Sweden, it is Swedish. Is this “fair” if you are a Finn living in Sweden or an Englishman living in Spain? Yes and no.

Obviously, no society can treat all the languages of the world as equal. Life would simply grind to a halt. Thus one has to privilege the dominant language.

Or languages, because in Spain the Basques and Catalonians have their own languages, and they naturally resent Spanish imperialism. The Basques and Catalonians demand special privileges as indigenous minorities, and the Spaniards have wisely granted them. If they didn’t, it would strengthen Basque and Catalonian separatism.

Most people have no moral objections to special privileges for indigenous minorities. The same is true for what can be called historically recognized minorities, for instance, Germans in Hungary or Swedes in Finland. Such populations exist in practically every white society due to historical conquests, migrations, and sloppy partitions. Such privileges are a central feature of all multicultural orders.

But for some reason, whites are no longer comfortable with demanding special privileges for the people who founded the state: Spaniards in Spain, Swedes in Sweden, the French in France, (white) Americans in America, (Anglo) Canadians in Canada, (Anglo) New Zealanders in New Zealand, and so forth.

Such privileges objectively exist, of course, for all those born to the dominant linguistic and cultural stocks of these societies. It is a privilege to grow up in a country where one is part of the founding group, so that nothing about the language, culture, history, and public spaces is alien to you. But people have been taught that asserting and defending these privileges is the moral outrage of “supremacism.”

It was wrong for the Japanese to impose themselves on the Chinese and Koreans. It was wrong for the French to impose themselves on Indochina and Africa. It was wrong for the Spaniards to impose themselves on the Aztecs and Incas.

But how did we get to the point where Japanese supremacism is “problematic” in Japan, French supremacism in France, Spanish supremacism in Spain, etc.? Why shouldn’t peoples be supreme in their own homelands, as long as other peoples are not denied the same privileges in their homelands?

As for indigenous minorities, fairness requires they either be granted their own homelands or maximum autonomy in their local affairs. The same is true of historically long-established minorities.

But both founding populations and indigenous minorities should reject the absurd idea of granting civic equality to the entire population of the globe. The only thing we owe foreigners is respect for their basic human rights.

Multiculturalism means different group identities and different group privileges within the same society. To make multiculturalism work for the founding population, they need to assert their special privileges as the founding stock and resist the demographic and cultural erosion of their status.

In practical terms, what would that mean? Let’s take Sweden for example, although of course the same principles apply to all counties. A Swedish identitarian movement should make three basic demands:

  1. The Swedish state must halt and reverse the demographic decline of Swedes in Sweden. They should demand that each year, the Swedish percentage of the Swedish population be a bit larger than the year before. This would entail social and political programs directed specifically to the demographic benefit of Swedes and not other groups. For instance, the Swedish state would reduce the immigration of non-Swedes and increase their emigration (for instance by repatriating refugees and reunifying immigrant families in their homelands). It would also reduce incentives for Swedes to emigrate. If Swedish birthrates are below those of non-Swedish populations, the state should create programs to specifically increase Swedish birthrates. For the people who would object that it is unfair to discriminate against non-Swedes, first, it is completely fair to promote the well-being of a people in its own homeland; it does not prevent other peoples from doing the same in their homelands; second, under the present system, the Swedish government treats non-Swedes better than the natives. Why should they have special privileges? If any group should have special privileges in Sweden, shouldn’t it be Swedes? That’s what it is to have a homeland.
  2. The Swedish state must promote the well-being of Swedes in Sweden. The Swedish state should be committed to making sure that every year, Swedes enjoy a better quality of life. This requires social and political programs tailored to the well-being of Swedes and not other groups. A country that cared about its founding stock would not, for instance, let social problems like the mass “deaths of despair” and the opioid epidemic affecting white Americans to go unnoticed and unaddressed.
  3. The Swedish state must secure the cultural dominance and enrichment of Swedes in Sweden. This means that the Swedish state should make the Swedish language, history, and culture normative in Sweden for Swedes and non-Swedes alike.

Why shouldn’t Swedes have a homeland called Sweden? Why shouldn’t Swedish language and culture be normative in Sweden? Why shouldn’t the Swedish state prioritize the genetic and cultural interests of Swedes? Why shouldn’t Swedish identity and history be reflected in the public realm in Sweden? Why shouldn’t visiting Sweden, or residing there as a foreigner, be contingent on respecting the Swedish people and their language, culture, and values? That’s what it means to have a homeland.

Yet this sort of nationalism is rejected by the entire cultural and political establishment in Sweden and most other white countries. That is the madness of the multiculturalism that has entranced white nations into marching, lemming-like, to their biological and cultural extinction.

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[1] [12] Ashley Jardina, White Identity Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), esp. chapter 3.