Counter-Currents
40:27
Millennial Woes and I talked about Alt Right’s crisis of confidence in the wake of Trump’s betrayal and what comes next.
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15 comments
This was an excellent talk, particularly the second half. Highlights:
– the need to agitate and “rub salt in the wounds” of White disaffection (balkanize, balkanize, balkazine)
– the realization that all nonsense about “4-D chess” is absurd (hello Roissy) and that it is time to stop the cheerleading and hero worship for Trump
– the need to be serious and be “elders” of the race. Maybe it’s time to dispense with Pepe and Kek at this point?
– the possibility that future politicians will step up with a more pro-White right-wing populist agenda (“the Nazi next time”)
The time for trolling and lulzing is over We need serious strategising.
Ted,
Here’s something you might like to consider: perhaps the root causes of the defects in the culture of the “alternative right” could be likened to deficits of executive functioning (EF) in individuals, as discussed by Russell A. Barkley in his landmark book on the subject, Executive Functions: What They Are, How They Work, and Why They Evolved (New York: The Guilford Press, 2012). I can’t fully elaborate on Barkley’s ideas here, for they are rather intricate, but I will cut and paste his discussion of several contractions in EF and their implications for individuals (pp. 185-86):
• A maturational contraction or perversion such that the individual’s behavior either comes to resemble that of a younger, less mature member of the species or reflects a bizarre and abnormal variation of the normal performance of the species.
• A spatial contraction in that the individual is less capable of using both rearrangements of the physical environment and of social entities that surround it in its quest for self-regulation over time to achieve goals.
• A temporal contraction in the individual’s time horizon — a reduction in their capacity for foresight and thus in the length of the temporal period over which they can consciously contemplate the future and make preparations to act in anticipation of that future. Deficits in EF produce a nearsightedness to the future (a temporal myopia), making the individual relatively time blind and thus more focused on the now or near-term than should be the case for that individual’s developmental stage. The individual with EF deficits is therefore likely to be governed more by external events within their immediate sensory fields than by mental (internal) representations concerning hindsight/foresight and the future more generally. Those mental representations can no longer serve to guide their behavior toward delayed consequences and future goals as would be the case in normal individuals of that age.
• An inhibitory insufficiency — the individual is less able to defer immediate actions and thus less able to contemplate a future, the choices they may have, and the longer-term goals that may be worth pursuing.
• A motivational time preference contraction or reward discounting increase — the individual shows a greater discounting of delayed rewards (values consequences less as a function of their delay) in choosing what goals and consequences to pursue and thus can be characterized as showing a high time preference or poor delay of gratification.
• A behavioral complexity contraction — a decrease in the length, complexity, and hierarchical nature of goal-directed behavior because the goals being pursued are nearer in time and because the behavior necessary to attain those goals is necessarily shorter in duration, less complex, and less in need of being hierarchically organized.
• An abstract to concrete rule contraction — with injury to the EF system, the capacity for the individual to use more abstract rules for self-governance contracts such that higher-level rules, such as ethics, laws, and regulations, may no longer have any governing influence over behavior. The individual comes to be guided by nearer-term, more concrete, and hence more selfish forms of rules (and morality).
• A social complexity contraction — the number of interactions needed with others and the number of others with whom the individual trades, reciprocates, and cooperates will contract. Since the goals pursued are immediate or near term, the need for and motivation to share and cooperate with others, particularly socially important ones, diminishes greatly or disappears entirely. The result is a highly selfish, impulsive, hedonistic, and even socially callous or psychopathic nature to the individual’s conduct.
• A cultural scaffolding collapse — the defective EF system no longer allows the individual to acquire and capitalize on the information available in the culture as well as on the products, devices, and other means that culture can provide to assist with the individual’s goal-directed actions, to extend those goals further ahead in time, and to bridge those larger temporal delays. In the young, this would represent as well a decreased responsiveness or sensitivity to pedagogy.
All of these contractions will result in a loss of freedom or self-determination and the dynamic and flexible quality that higher levels of EF contributed to human adaptation to the environment. (Author’s emphasis.)
I’m sure you’ll think of certain people — e.g., those who can think of nothing better to do than “sitting poolside” and fornicating frenetically — while reading the above.
If you’re interested, I could have a copy of Barkley’s work forwarded to you.
Proofreader,
Thank you for this comment, which I just found here now. I’ll read it carefully. I appreciate the book offer as well, but there are some practical issues – I can always pick it up at Amazon, if I feel it necessary.
I’m gratified that you at least see some value in my comments and viewpoints.
Ted,
I have a PDF file of Russell Barkley’s book and could have it forwarded to you.
A few writers and speakers on our side have commented on time horizons and related matters — Greg Johnson has definitely done this, and I suspect that he’s been influenced here by Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s book, Democracy: The God That Failed — but these matters generally aren’t discussed in depth, despite their importance. As is evident in the citation above, Barkley’s discussion of these matters is quite thorough, and his framework might be the most useful for discussing these matters.
Thinking and acting in a practical, long-term, strategic manner is a complex matter — much more complex than making predictions and plans on paper.
“I have a PDF file of Russell Barkley’s book and could have it forwarded to you.”
OK, if someone willing to act as “cut-out” for this.
Thank you.
Thank you for the material which was received.
In my previous comment, I should have referred to “time preferences” rather than “time horizons,” as the former is the term used in the relevant literature. Some discussions of time preferences address some of the things Russell Barkley addresses with his model of executive functioning, but Barkley’s model comes across as being more comprehensive and coherent.
Time preferences are discussed in chapter 1 of Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Democracy: The God That Failed. Hoppe notes (p. 5, n. 6): “In contrast to the widespread recognition of the phenomenon of time preference by economists, in particular those of the ‘Austrian School,’ amazingly little attention has been paid to it by sociologists and political scientists.” Edward Banfield’s The Unheavenly City Revisited might be worth reading in this context; the quotations from it are more readable than Hoppe’s turgid prose.
The implications of time preferences to one’s perceptions of what is possible, practicable, and desirable should be obvious. As a general rule, the higher one’s time preferences, the more agency one can exercise and develop; instead of discounting the future, one can prepare for it, invest for it, and help to create it.
We need a political culture that ratchets time preferences upwards rather than downwards. (A fixation on “lulz” obviously ratchets time preferences downwards.) A high time preference can be embedded in the structures and workings of a political culture: its “scaffolding” can be largely taken for granted, allowing one to work conscientiously, continuously, and cooperatively.
I think you overlook something here in your recapitulation of the standard dissident account of the geopolitics and recent history of the Middle East. I note though that you correctly debunk the ‘war-for-oil’ thinking which the left (((dissidents))) love to trot out.
In part, the Saudis support the opposition forces in Syria because the opposition represents and is organised along tribal lines. The Aneza and Shammar confederations, for example, have highly ramified ties of kin with the Saudi royal family, and they have memberships of millions in each of Syria and Iraq.
The Saudis support the opposition because their interests (genetic and otherwise) are tied up with the opposition’s success. It’s a question of geopolitics, of course, in the sense that an Aneza/Shammar tribal ascendancy in Syria/Iraq would represent an extension of the power of the House of Saud. If the opposition wins in Syria, blood relatives of the Saudi royal family will be taking power
I don’t think that secular Arabism has been a threat to theocratic ME regimes, as an alternative model, for quite some time. I also disagree with you that Arab secular Arabism represents the best possible system for Arabs to live under. It is in fact profoundly unnatural. For easily comprehensible sociobiological and resource-competitive reasons the Sunnis (always at least a large majority in any ME country) never like them, always chafing under their rule and striving to reassert tribal supremacy. Arab secular regimes must needs grant privileges and allocate resources to minorities at the expense of the tribes, who are too viscous to live in a society which recognises an interest greater than their own. Saddam favoured his own (admittedly Sunni) tribe; the Assads favour the Alawites. States formed of tribes can of course can reach equilibrium, but it’s a permanent condition of truce rather than of genuine peace–much like multiculturalism, really.
Again: the natural condition of the Arabs is tribal anarchy. What is happening in Syria is a reversion to type–with much more deadly weapons. This is not, however, to say that the ‘West’ should encourage tribal anarchy on behalf of Israel.
I too always thought the worship of Trump misplaced. He was certainly (and remains) of net benefit, if only for the nascent awakening his election represents. But he’s a coarse and in many ways stupid man with very close ties to (((people)))–he’s a property developer, for fuck’s sake!–and no real concept of politics in the true sense.
All this aside, it will be very interesting to see whether all is forgiven if he manages to build the wall.
Greg, you have been on fire lately.
I read your “God Emperor” article on Unz and I just listened to this conversation here. This is the second time in as many days that you’ve made me feel completely scooped! Whenever I come to a conclusion regarding these rapidly changing events, it turns out that Greg Johnson just said exactly the same thing I was thinking of.
I’m so glad we’re catching the same vibe, but now I’m jealous. For the sake of the cause, however, I must put all that aside. Keep up the good work.
Trump, Kosher President, launching more wars for Israel.
Greg,
Something I’d like to see is these podcasts being collected and placed on CDs (or other hard media). The CDs could be sold similar to books, given away as premiums, donated to students, smuggled into countries which have censored Internet forums, etc.
Think of a student in a college library with headphones on, listening to these podcasts…and thinking.
A lot of really good analysis is in these programs, as well as a running cultural commentary. There’s the marketing appeal of access to otherwise proscribed speech and defying stultifying authority. Such CD collections could be expanded to include The Right Stuff and other Internet insurgents. Activists might do programs on how to organize your own movement, with video from the front lines. Get that student out of the library and into the streets.
CD collections could also be kept as an archive of the peculiar crisis which the Western world faced in these decadent decades. Think of it as a voice to the future. Imagine a running account from Romans describing the events of the 5th century AD (though one hopes we are closer to the 3rd century when the Romans could still turn the situation around!).
Call it the Red Pill series or the Not-So-Secret-History of the 21st Century.
“Activists might do programs on how to organize your own movement, with video from the front lines. Get that student out of the library and into the streets. ” That’s a good idea. Viewers of such videos should be be able to say to themselves, “that’s something I could organize,” “that’s something I could participate in,” or “that’s something I could support.” Activism should be put within the view and within the reach of the mass of people on our side.
It might also be useful to make use of literature with a practical orientation on education, instruction, training, and coaching, as well as literature dealing with the practicalities of advocacy, non-profit, and volunteer organizations. Such literature should be appropriately adapted and popularized.
I think we need to lower the entry barriers to activism through effective demonstration, instruction, and support. I have in mind here the barriers against individual involvement formed by the fear, uncertainty, and doubt generated by ignorance, inexperience, and isolation. If individuals don’t have a good idea of what to do, or how to do it, or where their work fits in with that of others, they’re unlikely to get involved or do anything effective. Calling them cowards, idlers, or idiots solves nothing. We need to work with human nature rather than against it. Most people are followers rather than leaders. We need to give our people practical solutions rather than insoluble problems. Most people would prefer to do well-defined work, or work they feel competent to do, rather than bother themselves with what Horst Rittel called “wicked problems.”
It should be noted that the lowering of entry barriers to activism that I advocate here needn’t involve lowering standards for activists and their work. I firmly believe that activists need to be appropriately developed, instructed, selected, and organized.
Good interview. It’s not everyday I hear someone in the Alt-Right call nonsense on the quack theories about our monetary system. You’re right, the Quantity Theory of Money is nonsense, even Friedman backed away from it towards the end of his life.
The reason there wasn’t hyperinflation is multifaceted. Banks don’t lend out reserves, they’re not used as the raw material for loans. It’s virtually impossible to create hyperinflation in a monetary economy.
In terms of QE, the federal government didn’t “print trillions”. QE was simply an asset swap that changed the composition and term structure of government sector securities.
Lastly, kudos on the petrodollar nonsense. The federal government is the monopoly issuer of the dollar, it controls both the price and quantity. The US can issue/create/spend as many dollars as it wants regardless of whether or not the US is the world’s reserve currency. It all boils down to political decisions.
The United States has the world’s reserve currency, which many prefer to the currencies of crappy third world nations and even middle income nations, and I think this fact has shielded the US so far from inflation as a result of increasing the money supply. The globalization of money has shielded the US from inflation.
Trump doesn’t make his decisions based on ideals or principles of justice. He’s a pragmatist. I don’t think the neo-cons have swayed his ideals. I think he made an agreement with them to support their preferred hostility toward Assad in return for Healthcare or maybe the wall.
We have to remember too that Trump was anti-nuclear Iran throughout the campaign. He was sort of on the fence between being a neo-con and paleo-con with respect to foreign policy. I think he compromised his seat on the fence in return for neo-con support of healthcare and possibly something else. We’ll see if the change over votes from the first healthcare vote are by neo-con individuals.
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