The Other Europe:
An Interview on Intermarium
Interview and translation by Jarosław Ostrogniew; French translation here
Tomasz Szczepański (Barnim Regalica) was born in 1964 in Szczecin (Poland). He is a historian (Ph.D. in humanities), writer, essayist, and activist, and an advocate of Zadruga (Polish pagan nationalism) and indigenous Slavic faith.
He was an anti-communist activist beginning in 1984, a member of the illegal Polish Socialist Party, and a member of the Confederation of Independent Poland since 1987. From 1987 to 1989 he edited the underground bulletin Intermarium.
After the collapse of communism he became an opponent of the democratic-liberal establishment. He was an organizer and participant in numerous anti-communist and anti-establishment patriotic and nationalist demonstrations. He taught history for 11 years and is currently an employee of the Polish Army Museum in Warsaw.
Tomasz Szczepański has advocated the idea of Intermarium and worked for its realization since the 1980s. He is the founder and leader of the Association for Tradition and Culture “Niklot” (active since 1998) and the metapolitical quarterly Trygław.
What are the theoretical foundations and origins of the Intermarium project?
The foundation of the Intermarium project is the aim of creating in Eastern Europe (or East-Central Europe), understood as the area between Russia and Germany, a pole of power able to counterbalance the power of either of these two neighbors. The aim of creating such a pole is to secure the area from imperial attempts by Russia and Germany and to create conditions for unconstrained development of the nations of the region.
The countries of the area are often divided into two sub-regions, the Carpathian Mountains being the borderline: the proper Baltic-Black Seas Intermarium (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus, Ukraine) and the Danube-Balkan segment. Both sub-regions are collectively called the ABC area after the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black (Czarne in Slavic languages) Seas.
In addition to geographical, economic, and cultural factors, the basic element creating unity in the area is the fact that it has been and still is an object of constant expansion by Russia and Germany, and historically also of Sweden and Turkey. And the political elites – and probably large parts, or even the vast majority, of the Russian and German nations – treat expansion into this area as legitimate, the evidence of which are their geopolitical doctrines: “Mitteleuropa,” “Lebensraum,” “the Brezhnev doctrine,” and the “near abroad.”
Attempts to realize the Intermarium project after 1918 were connected with two waves of democratization in Middle Europe (1918-1921 and 1989-1991), hence the common association of this concept with the idea of exporting the democratic state model to the East. This is not precise. It used to be this way, but it does not need to be this way, as the aim of the Intermarium project is independence, and democracy is a secondary issue. We can imagine that, for instance, a democratic counter-candidate of Aleksandr Lukashenko in Belarus could be simultaneously a pro-Moscow agent, thus in this case the advocates of Intermarium would support Lukashenko as the candidate securing – in his own interest – the separation of Belarus from Russia.
Intermarium should be also considered as a political expression of cultural distinctiveness of Central (Eastern) Europe from both its neighbors. Although politically it is a project countering primarily Russian imperialism, culturally it is rather an anti-occidentalist project.
I do not agree with the thesis that this area is a transition between the East (Eurasia) and the West, as this perspective considers the main feature of the region as simply the “attenuation” of occidental traits. Thus the uniqueness of the Intermarium is constituted only by the lack of its own features. Let us focus on what is culturally unique in this area. First, there is a powerful agrarian element in the national cultures of the area. Almost all of the nations have reconstructed their elites after a long period of time on the basis of the peasantry, or in the case of the Poles and Hungarians, and partly the Romanians, their elites consist of a nobility connected with the rural culture. However, in all of these nations the local bourgeoisie was weak, consisting mostly of ethnically alien elements. Thus, except for the Czechs, bourgeois cultural traits are very weak in the nations of this region.
Second, this is Slavic Europe. The examples of the Baltic countries, Hungary, and Romania only apparently deny this fact. Their strong connection with Slavic cultures, as well as the absorption of Slavic elements by the Hungarian and Romanian ethnos in the process of their development, is well-known.
Third, in the 20th century all countries of the region were subject to communism – the most destructive social experiment known in human history – and this has unified the social experience of these nations, enabling common understanding among them.
And finally, the concept of the nation understood in ethnic (anthropological) categories dominates in the whole region, contrary to Western Europe, where mere civic nationalism is more common. A member of a nation is a person who is connected with the nation by origin, language, and common culture (often also by religion); citizenship plays a much more minor role.
How was the idea of Intermarium developed in Poland and in Europe?
Although there were historical precedents, the Intermarium project was first introduced as a part of ideology of the Polish state by the Chief of State Józef Piłsudski in 1918-1922.
It is commonly identified with Polish federalism, which is not completely true. Polish federalism aimed at creating a common federal state from all the countries of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the idea of Intermarium aims to create an alliance of independent states.
The Peace Treaty of Riga between Second Polish Republic and the USSR in 1921 meant the resignation to the political impossibility of this concept – not a complete resignation, as it remained both in the political thought and in the semi-unofficial practices of certain institutions of Second Polish Republic. The Polish army, during preparations for a war with the USSR, created the so-called “contract officers”: these were military-men from the nations conquered by the USSR, who were not Polish citizens, but who served on the terms of a contract. It was anticipated that in the case of a war with the USSR, soldiers of the Red Army who were willing to fight against Bolshevism would contact Polish Army units. The leadership of army units consisting of such soldiers (which could form the nucleus of future allied armies) would be entrusted to these contract officers. Due to their nationality and lack of Polish citizenship they would be considered more credible. Also émigré periodicals fom the USSR were supported, not only in the case of Intermarium nations, but also peoples of the Caucasus, Urals, and even the Kalmyks. Of course, Polish intelligence services cooperated with pro-independence organizations among these nations.
The concept of Intermarium was taken up by the young generation of Polish conservatives during the Interwar period. We often associate the idea of Intermarium with the Piłsudski’s political camp, and although this association is true, it is noteworthy that the Polish nationalist political camp has also embraced this concept, with one of the versions elaborated by Adam Doboszyński.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that up to 1939, Intermarium was on the margins of the Polish political mainstream, which rather aimed at defending the Versailles status quo. After the beginning of the Second World War, however, various concepts of a Central European federation had many influential proponents among Polish emigres.
The project has been revivified in political thought in Poland with the foundation of Confederation of Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej – KPN, the first oppositional political party since the incapacitation of the Polish People’s Party in 1947 by the Communists). The KPN harkened back to the Piłsudski’s pro-independence movement, so it could not remain indifferent to its geopolitical thought. After 1980, when the collapse of the USSR and of the broader “socialist camp” seemed more and more inevitable, some of the other oppositional circles began to more or less openly refer to the Intermarium project. It must nevertheless be emphasized that this agenda was embraced by only a minority of the opposition.
In July of 1994 a League of Parties of Intermarium Countries was proclaimed in Kiev. The League consisted of pro-independence parties from six countries (Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Ukraine). The Confederation of Independent Poland, the Third Republic Movement, and the marginal Polish Republican Party–Third Power represented Poland in the League. Congresses of the League took place in 1995 (Jarosław nad Sanem, Poland), 1996 (Minsk, Belarus) and 1997 (Kiev, Ukraine). There was also an attempt to create a common bulletin, two issues of which were published. This initiative died out at the end of 1990s as a result of political changes in the countries involved – including the marginalization of the main advocates of the project.
It is noteworthy that some non-political social initiatives, undertaking the questions of Central Europe, have referred to this idea. These initiatives usually died out after a few years, due to the lack of state support and the inability to find other sponsors.
Although the Intermarium idea has been promoted by circles which have never exercised real state power, it must nevertheless be emphasized that some of the official policies of the Third Polish Republic (in 1989-2004) can be considered as more or less direct references to this idea. I consider the Central European Initiative (Hexagonale) and Central European Free Trade Agreement to be examples of this. The Visegrad Group is also an example to a lesser extent – mainly due to its limited potential and the declared aim of the group, which is the support of the countries of the group on the path to European Union membership, thus de facto cooperation in liquidating the sovereignty of the region. However, Polish policy after the collapse of communism was essentially aimed at entering the main structures of the Western world, that is NATO and the European Union. All alternatives to this aim – and Intermarium is such an alternative, especially in regard to the EU – were fundamentally rejected by the establishment. If certain elements of the project were used, it was rather as a medium of realizing the idea of the occidentalizaton of Central-Eastern Europe. After the Third Polish Republic entered the European Union, elements of the Intermarium agenda were visible in the policy of President Lech Kaczyński.
Nevertheless, the realization of the Intermarium project still seems to be the most effective way of securing the independence of Poland.
What possibilites for and obstacles to the realization of the Intermarium project do you see?
The entrance of most of the countries of the area into the EU has basically undone the possibility of realizing this project in the conceivable future. Although we must remember that it does not rule out creation of a regional bloc inside the Union; there are still institutional frameworks enabling cooperation in the spirit of Intermarium, created before entrance into the EU, such as the Visegrad Group, which can be filled with a new content in a new political configuration.
Discussion of the Intermarium idea makes sense, especially if we assume the collapse of the European superstate project.
The main opponents of the realization of the Intermarium project are Russian and German imperialists as well as advocates of the European superstate.
Why the Russian imperialists? This is obvious and does not need a detailed elaboration. However, we must notice that despite the evident successes of Vladimir Putin in overcoming domestic troubles and in international relations, the systematic demographic tendency toward a decreasing Russian population has not changed. Taking into consideration neighboring China and the already existing presence of not only Chinese capital, but also of a few million Chinese in Siberia (with a tendency to increase in number), the loss of a part of Siberia in favor of China, in one form or another, seems quite probable within a generation. Finally, the Russian economy, based mainly on natural resources, is dependent on the international prices of these raw materials.
Furthermore, after departing from communism, Russia has not found an alternative ideological foundation for the reconstruction of the empire. Despite official support, Orthodox Christianity has not come out of the post-communist crisis. Eurasianism could be such a foundation, but it would mean breaking with the hopes of parts of the Russian elite for the occidentalization of Russia.
That Intermarium is obsolete from the perspective of German policy is also a point that probably does not need much elaboration. Let us focus on the convergence of German and Russian interests, apart from certain economic complementarity (on the one hand a developed and energy-consuming economy, on the other a provider of almost inexhaustible energy resources). If we assume that the aim of German policy is the regaining of losses – including immaterial ones, such as international position – which the country suffered after the defeat in the Second World War, it is difficult to conceive Germany regaining territory in Central Europe if the region creates a strong political structure. And such a structure would also not be in favor of Russia, thus the German-Russian cooperation against the countries of Intermarium (especially against Poland as a potential leader of the region) is completely natural.
Thus we arrive at the last group of opponents of the Intermarium project: the advocates of the EU as a superstate. Contrary to the previous ones, they do not represent interests of a certain state or nation, but a certain ideological project, for the EU is also an ideological project. It is a democratic-liberal scheme, aimed against all strong national and religious identities, striving to create a “European” identity by uprooting national identities. The Intermarium project must provoke dislike in these circles for at least two reasons.
First, are “cultural” reasons: nations inhabiting the region, due to the common experience of communism, are more attached to their identities which have so often been threatened. Thus, they are unwilling to renounce these identities for the sake of a European mirage, especially when they see that it is often a tool hiding national interests of the old members of the EU. Second, the Intermarium nations have also the experience of Russian hegemony. It induces them to cooperate with the United States, which – even if the US provokes some objections – is nevertheless appreciated as an ally possessing not only real strength but also the will to use it. And the EU as a geopolitical project aims at pushing the Americans out of Europe.
What possibilities do you see of persuading the closest neighbors of Poland to become involved in realization of the Intermarium Project?
The alliance of two of the strongest countries of the region, Poland and Ukraine, is the spine of the geopolitical concept of Intermarium. One needs only to take a look at any map and calculate the potentials to know the reasons.
Ukraine — or rather a large part of the Ukrainian elite arising from the anti-communist tradition — never had to be strongly persuaded to get involved in this project. The prejudice against Poles is very weak, as Ukraine is simply a large country and will remain such, even without Crimea. And a new generation has already grown up for whom an independent Ukrainian state is something obvious. Furthermore, the war in Donbass has strengthened Ukrainian distinctiveness (including the Russian-speaking Ukraine). Simply put: war favors clear self-definitions.
Belarus – here, when it comes to anti-communist elites, the situation is similar, despite greater fears of Polish revisionism. The problem however is that these elites are sparse, which is connected with the weakness of Belorussian state traditions. Furthermore, the “pro-Western” elites supported by the grant system have a tendency to support the cultural postulates of the sponsors, which will not bring success in the Belorussian society. (There is some analogy to the supposedly anti-Putinist actions of Femen, which have done far more to help than harm Putin.) It seems that some hope may be pinned on the evolution of the “Lukashenkian” elites, which are rather willing to rule their own state, not to be functionaries of the Muscovite empire. This of course applies also to Lukashenko himself.
Lithuania is the most difficult element of the puzzle, because the Lithuanian elites have defined Poland and Poles as the worst threat, and the Lithuanization of Poles in the Vilnius Region is a demand of the Lithuanian raison d’état. We cannot consent to this, and this has nothing to do with Polish revisionism. Besides, participation in the EU and NATO gives them a sense of security, which makes it easier to quarrel with Poland.
We surely share a fear of German revisionism with the Czechs. The question is: how much have the Czech elites made their peace with German domination? If they go much further, it would almost constitute consent to becoming some kind of a new Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia – with a similar territory. Acceding to the demands of Sudetenland Landmaschafts can lead to this. I cannot answer this question. But the reaction of our elites on the issue of German demands toward the Czech Republic was surely petty-minded, if not even cowardly. After all, in this issue we are in the same boat.
The question is whether Polish policy can influence and moderate the relationship of Hungary with her neighbors, which is a key issue for the peace in the region. Hungarians have the right to defend their minorities in other countries, but it must be clearly stated that one glance at the ethnic map proves that Transylvania just cannot be regained by Hungary. Anyway, Poland should act in an mitigating way as much as we can, as the quarrels in our region will be used by external factors.
It is even possible to establish positive relations between the Intermarium and Russia – but with a Russia which is reconstructed mentally, not only politically and socially.
This would be (speaking in certain mental shortcuts) a Russia of Boris Savinkov or Alexiey Shiropayev. By the way, the latter should be promoted in Poland. It is noteworthy that nobody is doing it, perhaps because of Shiropayev’s opinion on the role of Jews in the history of Russia.
The problem with Russian imperialism is that it is not only a geopolitical concept, something serving the national interests and thus something which can be rejected if it does not serve them anymore. It is an effect of mentality shaped by Orthodoxy synthesized with the Mongol tradition and German bureaucracy: “the Knouto-Germanic Empire” as it was once brilliantly stated by Mikhail Bakunin. If Russia is the “Third Rome” (and this was the official doctrine of Muscovite Orthodoxy, to which Russia is now returning), then it even has an obligation to be an empire. Preventing this means the breaking of not only the physical (which is currently already taking place in Russia through its demographic crisis), but also the spiritual foundations of Russian imperialism.
And that is why with great fondness I welcome the current renaissance of Slavic religion, which does not have a “Weltmacht” aspect. Some hope lies in the rebirth of the tradition of Novgorod as an alternative model of Russian development to Moscow. But all those anti-imperial currents of Russian thought are marginal, at least at the moment.
However, all hopes that this problem can be dealt with through the officially proclaimed reconciliation of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland with the Moscow Patriarchy of the Orthodox Church, which is one of the pillars of imperialism, are in my opinion without sense.
Let us add that dealing with the Königsberg question must be a certain element of the normalization of Polish-Russian relations. This geopolitical absurdity threatens us by its mere existence, not only as a base for possible aggression. It also creates a field for Russian-German cooperation, which is always a lethal threat for Poland. Nobody can guarantee that Moscow would not be willing to give it back to Germany, for instance by simply selling it. Thus, we must search for such a solution for this Oblast, which will not be connected with its belonging either to Russia or to Germany.
What is your view of the possibility of realizing the Intermarium project in light of recent events: armed conflict in Ukraine, the immigration crisis in Europe, or the recent Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Poland?
Russian aggression in Ukraine has proved to all interested parties the durability of Russian imperialism, and it is far less significant whether the leaders in Moscow honestly wish to rebuild the empire or if it only uses imperialism as a tool of internal politics. For if it is only an example of the latter, it speaks a lot about Russian society itself. Without a doubt the ruling Law and Justice party and President Andrzej Duda are better prepared for this imperialist recidivism of Moscow, about which they have actually warned others before. From this point of view the last elections in Poland are a good change.
Regarding Ukraine, the war has strengthened Ukrainian identity; an enemy easily cements a community and defines the political horizon, which we already know from Carl Schmitt.
The war has also been an alarm bell for other states of the post-Soviet area, which is also useful.
It has also hampered the actions of the pro-Moscow lobby in Western countries, especially in Germany, Italy, and France, although I have no illusions regarding position of these countries; they want to do business with Russia, and they are ready to sell our independence for this business, just as Roosevelt and Churchill sold us out in Teheran and Yalta. Regardless of that, they had to do something; hence the sanctions.
The immigration crisis weakens Europe, but from our perspective this is good, as the contingent pressure which can be put on us – especially by Germany – will be weaker. Please remember that Intermarium is supposed to secure us not only from Russia but also from Germany, and the German constitution still states that the legal borders of Germany are those from 1937. From our perspective it is good that our historical enemies have internal problems.
The annexation of Crimea had a side-effect: it has complicated relations of Russia with the Muslim world (the issue of Crimean Tatars), and the Russian involvement in Syria has complicated them even more.
In Russia: Russian opposition against imperialism has emerged, this time of a nationalist, not democratic-liberal character (for instance: Russians from the Russian Federation, who are volunteers fighting on the Ukrainian side, and I am not speaking about mercenaries). Although the information about this is, due to various reasons, unclear in regard to the number and extent, it is still an interesting phenomenon.
I don’t want to play the prophet here, but the initial successes of Moscow in the Crimea and Donbass (although the latter is quite limited) might be the beginning of very serious problems.
While working on this interview we have used the following articles:
Szczepański, Międzymorze – zapomniana idea niezależności narodowej i stabilizacji regionalnej,„Obywatel” nr 3 (29) 2006, on-line: http://wolnemedia.net/polityka/miedzymorze-%E2%80%93-zapomniana-idea-niezaleznosci-narodowej-i-stabilizacji-regionalnej/
Idea Międzymorza ma nadal sens z Tomaszem Szczepańskim rozmawia Jakub Siemiątkowski, „Polityka Narodowa” 11, on-line: https://narodowcy.net/polityka-narodowa/idea-miedzymorza-ma-nadal-sens
Personal website of Tomasz Szczepański: http://barnimregalica.pl/
Website of Niklot: http://www.niklot.org.pl/
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“The immigration crisis weakens Europe, but from our perspective this is good,”
If this comment is typical of Polish patriots, if it is, then God help us.
Nowhere does the German constitution state that its legal boders are those of 1937, all it provides for is citizenship to all those born before that date in the imperial territory of that time, which is really just a ruling to deal with the refugees that were still prevalent when this consititution was drafted in 1949, it certainly does not entail any “territorial claims”.
The nub of the German problem is that the present German State has no constitution. What was drafted in 1949, just four years following Germany’s Unconditional Surrender, was a decree ordered by the three Western occupying Powers (the USA, Great Britain and France). [The eastern half of Germany was occupied at the time by the Soviet Union which made similar legalistic arrangements.] What was drafted by the Western occupying Powers in 1949 to suit and to justify their occupation of Germany , the so-called Basic Law, serves to this very day as the “German Constitution”.
The nub of the German problem is that there has been no Peace Treaty following the Second World War. And further, the United Nations is formally at war with Germany (and Imperial Japan). Did you know that ? Both Germany ( das Deutsche Reich) and Imperial Japan are described as Enemy States by the United Nations Organisation. And EVERY member of the United Nations has the formal right to invade Germany and treat the Germans as enemies against whom war continues. Germany is occupied to this day by British and American troops; and it may that these troops have a double function : both to keep the Germans down, but also to stop Poles, possibly any body else from attempting to continue the Second World War, a war that has not formally come to an end.
Frankly, I regard such legalistic quabbling as a useless diversion of time. Yes, the term “Basic Law” does not contain the word constitution, and yes, it states itself the necessary prerequisites for the passing of a “proper” constitution, but for all intents and purposes it serves as the premier legal piece of the country all other laws are subject to (disregarding EU regulations) and thus is effectively the German constitution, whether it is called “Basic Law” or “Imperial Constitution” or “Holy Piece of Paper” matters little then.
After the Federal Republic’s annexation of Eastern Germany, a new constitution could have been passed but for parlamentarian laziness, yet it is clear that it would not have been fundamentally different from the previous one, so why bother.
As for the physical occupation, the fiction of the European countries’ independence has been upheld for so long now, that the occupier himself has started to believe it, as, I believe, certain comments of a not too unlikely candidate for the next presidency attest to. Therefore I am rather confident about future developments in that area.
In our discussion of the “German problem”, JHRP is mistaken to condemn as legalistic quibbling my focus on the lack of a Constitution for Germany and in its place the so-called “Basic Law” . The whole point is that the “Basic Law” was imposed on Germany by the victorious Allies following Germany’ s Unconditional Surrender, and is accordingly the Victors’ subjugation, total and complete, of an utterly defeated people.
If such a constitution for a State, promulgated by its enemies, were not bad enough, then an examination of the terms of the so-called “Basic Law” should prove the point. In the “Basic Law” , the victorious, occupying Allies give them selves all the rights and privileges of conquerors: in particular the right to occupy Germany with military forces, which they do to this day. Even more pernicious, the “Basic Law” explicitly forbids any revision, questioning or challenging of the findings of the Allies’ post-war trials against the former German leaders. We are talking here of the trials held in Nuremberg against leading Germans such as Goering, Doenitz and Hess. It was at these trials that the Allies [the USA, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France] endorsed their propaganda-lie of the so-called “Holocaust”. This propaganda-lie is killing the Germans. In January of this year, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated on the anniversary of the capture of the Auschwitz camp by the Soviet Red Army, that the German people could never be forgiven for the crime of the “Holocaust”. Believe me, her statement was a dagger-blow to the heart of the German people; it explains the almost total lack of resistance to the floods of aliens now pouring into Germany.
As long as the Germans accept this “Basic Law” , forced onto them at the hour of their total defeat, then so will continue their abnegation and total humiliation before the eyes of the whole world; and more to the point for the rest of us: so also will continue, to the chorus of “Holocaust, Holocaust, Holocaust”, the abnegation of the White race and its total humiliation before the rest of the world.
The concept of an independent bloc between Western Europe and Russia is a good one. Poland and the Baltic states, however, seem rather more exercised by the historical threat from Russia than the present threat – culturally and financially – from the USA and its Western allies. Szczepanski speaks quite warmly of the USA: “…even if the US provokes some objections – is nevertheless appreciated as an ally possessing not only real strength but the will to use it.” Among the central and east European countries only Hungarians, it seems to me, really grasp the geopolitical big picture.
The concept of Intermarum will always be considered a threat by other European forces, especially Germany and Russia, who do not want Central Europe to become a united major geopolitical player. Hence, the statement of Mr. Szczepański about the positive impact of crises both in Russia and Western Europe, Intermarum cannot be realized if those two blocs have full power.
Germany (and German government) is generally viewed by Polish nationalists as a giant SPLC which aggressively promotes anti-racism and multi-cultiralism. Thus, when they hear about Germany’s problems with immigrants – there is a lot of Schadenfreude in it. There is some sympathy for German nation, especially that part which organizes protests against the government. But German partiots and nationalists have made so many negative and revangist remarks about Poland, that it is very difficult to find much good will among Poles.
Although, I must say that I personally have see some hope in recent events – many Poles have seen that the nations of other European countries are just as opressed and exploited by their governments as they are. But on the other hand, when the film of the French people and Muslims inhabiting France cheering as police cracked down the anti-Islamist protest in Metz – many Poles were outraged at the ethnomasochism and said that there is no hope for France anymore.
Summing up – there is a lot of petty nationalism and irredentism among Polish patriots and nationalists. But there are also some with broader European or White consciousness.
I think we must establish a network of contacts among young European nationalists: real cooperation and interaction are the best ways to counter prejudice among nationally aware Europeans.
I was surprised (when I got the answers for the interview) by Mr. Szczepański’s pessimism about the Visegrad Group.
But now I read this:
Visegrad Group is forming a military EU V4 group (combined Polish, Hungarian, Czech and Slovak forces plus representatives of Ukraine) in response to the both crises in Europe (war in Ukraine + terrorism and refugees).
And one of the scenarios they played during kick-off meeting in Poland was the pacification of local community protesting a “refugee” center.
So basically it seems that the aim of this new force is to prepare to fight against its own nations.
I’d be a devils advocate and say such a choice of scenario is to placate sections of the liberal West by appearing that they share the same liberal ideology. By undertaking such a scenario they are giving legitimacy to the ideology that infiltrator centres must be protected and so do not make the liberal West angry. If they took a stance different than the West then this would delegitimise the position of Western liberallism which could filter through into their own socieites.
Other plausible scenarios would of caused political damage e.g.
1) Russian aggression on Eastern European territory – annoys the Russians
2) Western aggression on Central/Easter Europe – weakens the alliance with the West
I think the outlook of the ex communist bloc countries is to not provoke the physopaths in the West. If they go against the West then they will face overt and covert repruccisions. Even if some of these countries had determined Nationalists the sentiment of the public is not strong enough to support them through thick and thin. The public would just vote for liberal parties who would not face western repercussions and placate the public about immigration no different than the UK labour party between 1950-2000.
“such a choice of scenario is to placate sections of the liberal West by appearing that they share the same liberal ideology.”
I really hope this is true.
In Poland the actual nationalists have little support and they made it to the parliament by not standing in the spotlight and entering a non-nationalist initiative. It would much more preferable if a center right party, which usually gets elected in Poland, would practice nationalist policies, most of the society would go with that.
Being an Eastern European living in one of these Eastern European countries I can tell you that the ruling elites are only a little less ethnomasochistic than the Western ones. Western media often demonizes “evil and backwards Slavs” who want to burn ethnic minorities alive or eat them for supper. This is far from truth.
For instance the media have reported that one of the new vice-ministers of Poland said that Poland refuses to accept any refugees. Yes, he did say it, but then he changed his mind. Then changed it again, Then some other minister has said something different. There have been seven (!) changes of semi-official statements in one day, and we still don’t know if Poland will actually accept refugees.
However, there is hope that the populists will push the government in an a more ethnocentric direction.
“The immigration crisis weakens Europe, but from our perspective this is good”
Every Counter-Currents article I read proves the moral superiority of Victor Orban’s national conservatism over the New Right.
What do you mean by this?
To advocate Polish chauvinism as a measure against Russian imperialism is like advocating Mexican immigration to counter Blacks in the USA.
JHRP and Richard Edmonds have already made their points clear, so I will focus on other aspects of the article.
The region of “Intermarium” is not Slavic. Even if it were, a coherent Slavic culture does not even exist. This is a rather obvious attempt to recreate Panslavism without Russia. Panslavism has been one of the root causes of World war One. Hungary is by no means Slavic, it has been an independent culture-bringer to the peoples around it, not a receiver of some obscure Slavic rural cultural inspiration. The same is true with Romania. Since the German element of that region has been genocided away, Szczepański is spared the need to explain away the cultural and ethnic contribution (probably the largest of all in the chaotic mixture of the region) of Germans.
Judging from the literature and personal experience, it is considered offensive by Baltics to be called Slavs, particulary Poles; they especially defend their language from allusions to be Proto-Slavic. Mr. Szczepański himself reports the same animosities from Lithuania, a nation that has lived in union with Poland for centuries and probably knows best. Estonia wasn’t even remotely touched by any Slavic cultural element, it is by all means except location a true Scandinavian country.
A number of other non-Slavic nations like Bulgaria and Macedonia are also wrongfully into that nonexisting influence sphere.
Szczepański view on contemporary German politics is so absurdly false that one must seriously ask where he gets his information from. Any form of revisionism is brutally suppressed in Germany and is not its number one political aim. We are not even allowed to commemorate our war dead undisturbed. A vaguely pro-Russian political connection between the more business-oriented parts of the Social Democrats and the former cadres from communist “East” Germany are checked by a system of pro-American organizations and structures in all areas of the political sphere. Most conflicts between pro-Atlantic and pro-European and/or pro-Russian activists have been decisively settled by the Atlantic connection from the founding of West Germany onwards as a vassal of the USA. (This is even taught in German secondary school courses)
His claim that civic nationalism dominates the rest of Europe is false. Ethnic nationalism was brought to eastern Europeans first by Johann Herder. Until then most of the local Slavic groups had no concept of nationalism, which explains the chaotic settlement patterns of that region, and in my opinion is rooted in the fabricated identity of the Slavs (in reality, Slavs are an artificial construction that summarize several unrelated ethnic groups. The motive behind this forgery was similar to the Intermarium project).
Nowadays, the rise of capitalism and democracy is suppressing nationalism entirely in Western and southern Europe, not only ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism has not replaced ethnic nationalism in countries where it did not exist prior 1945 (France, Spain). Where nationalists dwell, marginalized, in Germany, Scotland, for example, they are ethnic (and regrettably not White nationalists either).
Szczepański then goes on about the Interwar period, where Poles supposedly supported the Intermarium idea. But whereas he claims that Intermarium consists of a coalition of equal nations, the Polish Interwar politics was dominated by ethnic cleansing and foreign aggressions. Since Poland initiated aggressions against all its neighbours except Romania in its twenty years of interwar existence, we have a good insight into the honesty of its intentions.
“Nevertheless, the realization of the Intermarium project still seems to be the most effective way of securing the independence of Poland.”
This translates into: “A Polish empire will be the only way to secure the existence of Poland before either Russia regains its former stregth or things in Europe take a nationalist turn and the case of robbing half of Poland’s territory from Germany and murdering its inhabitants will be settled in unfavorable terms for our nation.”
A nation that is most well-known for guarding the Holocaust narrative by all means.
Now none of this is surprising to me, since Mr. Szczepański was born in Stettin, a city that was stolen from defenseless Germany under the circumstances of unspeakable atrocities by Poles in 1945. Any White Nationalist that is worth his name must be intent on avenging the grotesque crimes commited against my German nation in the Second World War, as Counter-Currents, the publisher of “Hellstorm” will surely agree.
There’s quite a beam of petty nationalism in your eye as well.
He is using “revisionism” to refer to the revision of borders.
Paradoxically, I think that Owlbear is right in some points. For instance, the Slavic element of Intermarum is higly exagerrated.
The problem with Germany in Eastern Europe is so complex that it would need a whole book of good explanation.
On the one hand, Germany surpresses all forms of revisionism at home etc. But on the other, for instance in Poland their policy is greatly revisionist, they simply fund local authorities or NGOs to rename the streets back to the German names (even though the Germans themselves changed the names few times before) etc., adding a lot of multi-culti sauce to it. For instance, for the celebration of Polish Independence Day in 2013 one of the government (Polish and German) funded NGOs helped to transport German antifa to Warsaw, who attacked Poles wearing national colours and symbols. Thus most Polish patriots and nationalists identify Germany with multiculturalist propaganda.
Slavs do not exist – dude, come on. Ethnic groups of Europe are cultural, linguistical and genetical reality.
The problem of the “lost German territories” – yes, they belonged to Germany when the war broke out. But this is a much more complex issue: Both Silesia and Pomerania were inhabited by Western Slavic tribes, closely related to those that later turned to Polish, Czech and Slovakian nations. They were autonomous regions, which attracted people (especially merchants and craftsmen) from many parts of Europe, including the Dutch and Wallonians. Whichever state was the strongest, it took control of the region (but the whole region remained pretty much unchanged). Silesia was controled by Poland (for about 350 years), Bohemia (200 years), then Austria (Habsburg monarchy: almost 200 years), then Prussia, then Germany (Second Reich) (combined: 200 years) then Soviets, and then Poland again. Even France controlled parts of it for some time.
Yes, the communists did expulse the German inhabitants, and it was atrocity, but Poles who came to the Western regions, came from the East, where they have been slaughtered by Soviets, Germans and Ukrainians, so they had their own problems. Also, Poland lost two major cities Vilnius and Lvov, which have also a long Polish history.
World War 2 was awful, we all lost, Eastern Europeans do not consider themselves to be the winners of this conflict. I think that any kind of irredentism or revisionism does have a strong root in the past but it should have no root in the future, and it can only lead to another European war.
Yes, Mr. Szczepański is a Polish nationalist in the first place, but much of what he says is a cynical constation of the dirty games of the existing European states, not the apotheosis of the situation.
As a sidenote: Mr. Szczepański ethnically is of Polish and German origin, and he is naturally not a bigoted Germanophobe, but he obviously is against the current politicies of the German state (and today – who is not?).
I have to agree with Owlbear except for one point: I don’t think that any discussion regarding the existence of Slavs is superfluous. Their language is surely something they have in common and makes them gravitate towards the idea of Panslavism. Only for Poles this is not an attractive commonality as they have had made trouble with every one of their neighbors, including Russia.
I noticed in the text immediately that Szczepanski was “born in Szczecin” . He was born in Stettin which, along with the rest of Eastern Germany was depopulated of Germans by Poles and Russians at gunpoint. Many of their victims are still alive, including my sister’s mother-in-law. The people of Silesia or Pomerania or East Prussia were Germans and not Poles, and the intent to move the border to the west was widely discussed before 1939, including the elimination of the Germans inhabiting these areas. If there were ever Poles in these areas, it is so long ago as to be in the same category as the Romans living in Southern Germany, the Swabians living at the Baltic Coastor the Goths in the Ukraine. Any historical territorial justifications for the claims and atrocities committed against their German neighbors in Eastern Germany in 1945+ based on a once-Polish area are childish.
And that makes it difficult to look on suggestions of a Polish Intermarium Empire with equinamity. One recalls immediately the grandstanding announcements of Rydz-Smygly or Joseph Beck in the time leading up to the outbreak of the war. Polish narrow chauvinism and misunderstanding about its position acted as the trigger for the outbreak of the Second World War over the legal status of the German city of Danzig.
Poland lives in fear of its past. That’s the nucleus of Szczepanski’s “German Imperialism”.
Poland also claims areas beyond the Curzon line which furnishes the explanation for “Russian Imperialism”. From a Polish point of view the empire from Sea to Sea would have to be under Polish dominance, as a measure to fulfill the territorial claims not granted to Poland on June 28, 1919 at Versailles. The fact that Poland is over-represented in the EU with the number of Commissars in Brussels,i.e. wielding an over-proportional influence, suggests the same course in any conceivable Eastern European Union Poland would be part of.
In retrospect it was a huge mistake of Germany in 1917 to proclaim the re-establishment of the Republic of Poland.
in reality, Slavs are an artificial construction that summarize several unrelated ethnic groups.
Oh, isn’t that interesting. You mean, they’re like white Americans, who after 150+ years are just a Mulligan’s Stew of countless European ethnic groups?
Please consider that those “ethnic groups” you refer to are themselves just an untraceable olio of nameless tribes.
“Any White Nationalist that is worth his name must be intent on avenging the grotesque crimes commited against my German nation in the Second World War, as Counter-Currents, the publisher of “Hellstorm” will surely agree.”
You cannot possibly be serious with this utterly ridiculous claim. Why should any white nationalist be in the slightest bit interested in the post-war deportations of the Germans, given the perilous situation of just about every Transatlantic country in Western Europe/North America currently finds itself in in terms of globalization, mass immigration, shifting demographics, the suppression of any sort of national pride and the socio-political stranglehold of society ?
Any White Nationalist that is worth his name should want to fight to preserve their nation’s identity, demographic makeup and, particularly in Germany’s case, want to protect their women from being raped by some Muslim welfare tourists that have no intention other than to have their lives funded by the German taxpayer’s money.
A lot of people have already made some good comments regarding problems with this author’s views, but I would like to add some of my own. First of all, the notion that the weakening of one nation or region in Europe will be good for another is an outdated idea. Szczepański seems to hold this notion in regards to Western Europe and Russia, however, it is very narrow-minded because we should be able to realize by now just by looking at history that problems in one part of Europe don’t magically stay confined to that part, but will necessarily spill over to other regions as well. We have reached a point in history where what is good for France, Germany, etc. will be good for eastern Europe as well (especially when it comes to solving the ethnic/racial/cultural problems). There is no “bloc” that you can form in eastern Europe that will change the reality of this. We simply have to stop being thick-skulled chauvinists and we need to realize that we all have to support each other as fellow Europeans.
Lastly, I would like to say that I think he is wrong about German imperialism. I can see why from a Polish perspective it would be advantageous to speak about German imperialism. But let’s face, Germany is no position to be imperialistic, and I doubt their people are interested in being imperialistic these days either. As for Russia, yes the government of Russia is imperialistic, but its people are not. I have spoken to many Russians on the Right in the past and I can say with confidence that the Russian people do not support the Russian government’s imperialist desires. Szczepański sees the damaging of the German and Russian populations as the answer to Russian/German imperialism, but this moronic because if there is a problem of imperialism coming from these countries then we can say with certainty that the problem is the governments of these countries, not the people.
I agree with you – we should focus on the people, not the governements, we are equally exploited by a hostile elite.
However, the interview is a “counter-point” to the previous article of Emile Durand on Intermarum. The whole concept of this new bloc is based on the idea of counter-balancing Western or Eastern power. Intermarum can be realised only in opposition to West and East. But, if Europe becomes a serious bloc, working for the good of the nations of Europe, not the alienated elites, there is no need to form such a bloc.
On the other hand, the Ukrainian and Baltic nationalists have started to discuss Intermarum very seriously and they have much more pan-European outlook:
You can also see how much the idea angers Russian imperialistic branch of patriots:
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